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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with certain characteristics of 
the development of global interdependence as they apply to the 
case of China. In particular it examines the processes and 
problems involved in the policies-of “reform and opening-up" as 
they affected China's adaptation to the world economy during the 
1980s. The thesis places this examination within a historical 
context and it considers the ways in which ideological and other 
legitimating institutions have been challenged as the reformers 
shifted from a Maoist self-reliant developmental strategy to a 
more interdependent and outward-looking one. This study is a 
systematic attempt to examine the problems involved in the 
pursuit of reformist policies that necessarily entail ever- 
deepening relations of interdependence with a largely 
capitalistic international economy on the one hand, and in the 
Chinese Communist leadership's attempt to maintain and develop 
a socialist political system on the other.
Instead of focusing on the formation of policy, on the 
decision-making structures and processes at the higher levels of 
the system as numerous writings on China's reforms have done, 
this thesis draws heavily on the dynamic changes in the social 
base and focuses more on the lower levels, especially the 
enterprises level, and is based on my field research in China.
This study shows that, after more than a decade of opening- 
up, China has markedly increased its interdependence with the 
world economy, which has not only helped China achieve its 
dramatic economic growth, but also played an important role in 
generating changes in cultural, political and perceptual areas. 
As a result, the possibility of China's further integration into 
the world community is greater than ever. However, the Communist 
Leadership's fundamentally flawed strategy of seeking to combine 
economic liberalism with political authoritarianism has caused 
a series of setbacks in China's development in the 1980s. Their 
continued refusal to consider fundamental changes in the 
political system means that China still faces an uncertain future.
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
Chinese names, terms, phrases and -titles used in this 
thesis are given in Pinyin (Chinese Phonetics), the official 
system of transliteration in the People's Republic of China. 
The exceptions are those applying to Hong Kong and Taiwan when 
Wade-Giles has been used.
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ABBREVIATIONS
/
1. CCP Chinese Communist Party
2. DPI Direct Foreign Investment
3. FRE Foreign-Related Economy
4. KMT Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)
5. MFN Most Favoured Nation
6. NIE Newly Industrialized Economies
7. NPC National People's Congress
8. PLA People's Liberation Army (Of China)
9. SEZ Special Economic Zone
10. TEDA Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area
11. TUTRIC Tianjin United Tyre and Rubber International
Co. Ltd.
11. WFO Wholly foreign-owned
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Opening-up to the outside world has been regarded by the 
Chinese reformers as the key to revitalizing China's economy.
But the shift from a Maoist self-reliant, inward-looking
developmental strategy to an interdependent, outward-looking one 
is a very difficult endeavour. In order to participate in the 
world economy, China has to satisfy certain criteria, adjust to 
international practice and fit in with the international 
economic system. That is to say, it has to adapt. The process 
of adaptation will have to be carried out at two distinct though 
interrelated levels of the state's institutions: those concerned 
with external interactions and those involved with domestic 
arrangements. This is not merely an economic or technical 
matter; for with increasing integration into the world economy, 
the existing structures will be more frequently challenged and 
adaptation in areas of social, cultural and political activity 
will also become necessary. Moreover, the adaptation has to be 
continuous simply because the world economy itself constitutes 
a highly dynamic system. Obviously, for China, adaptation is a 
huge task of great significance because its capability to adapt 
will eventually determine whether China will realize its goals 
of modernization and become a rich and powerful country. Either 
result, success or failure, would have far-reaching implications 
both for China itself and for the rest of the world. This thesis 
examines the processes and problems involved in the policies of 
"reform and opening-up" as they affect China's adaptation to the 
world economy during the 1980s.
If adaptation is never an easy process for any country, it 
was bound to be particularly difficult for China. For about 
three decades since 1949, China's economy had been organized and 
run in a very different way from the world economic system to 
which China now has to adapt. The legacy of the system of 
economic planning was bound to pose a special set' of problems as 
China sought to enter the international economic and trading 
system which is largely guided by free market principles.
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Besides, as a member of the "third world" -few of which have 
managed to adapt successfully to the world economy and narrow 
the gap between themselves and the developed countries since the 
end of World War II1 - China faces even more formidable 
difficulties. These include: a vast and ever growing population; 
a poor transportation and distribution system; energy shortages; 
limited supply of arable land and hugely uneven rates of 
regional development, etc.
Moreover, the attempt to integrate into the capitalist 
world economy is greatly impeded by the deep seated legacy of 
the traditional past especially when combined with the influence 
of the socialist system that has prevailed in the last several 
decades. By addressing the problems that have emerged in China's 
adaptation process in the 1980s, this thesis touches upon some 
of the key issues both in China's recent historical past of the 
last one and half centuries and in the development of its 
political economy in the last four decades.
Historically, some deep-rooted and inescapable incongruity 
between China and the West in terms of value systems, political 
cultures and philosophies, etc. has made it a continuously 
frustrating process for the Chinese to find both their rightful 
position in the world and the right ways to deal with the 
advanced West and achieve China's modernization programme.
In the last 150 years or so, the prevailing mentality and 
outlook among the ruling class in particular and in Chinese 
society in general, has been to try to uphold the basic values 
of the Chinese system while importing Western technology. This 
was epitomised in the 1880s by the slogan: "Chinese studies for 
the framework of values, Western studies for practical 
purposes". In other words, in order to become prosperous and
1 As some researches have found, transitions from 
relatively closed toward more open trading systems by 
developing countries have collapsed or been partially reversed 
more often than they have succeeded. See, for example, 
Michaely, Michael, et al. Liberalizing Foreign Trade: Lessons 
of Experience in the Developing World. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991.
strong, China should make use of the skills and technology from 
the West. At the same time, it has to preserve its own 
political system with 'its distinct values. Therein lies the 
dilemma. It will be easier for China to preserve its values and 
political system by closing the door to the rest of the world, 
but the cost of that course of action would, in the long term, 
result in China falling farther behind the advanced West: it 
would become both relatively poorer and weaker, which could lead 
to the repetition of the 19th century situation whereby China 
was repeatedly humiliated and oppressed by smaller but more 
advanced countries. On the other hand, by opening the door and 
integrating its economy into the world system, China might 
succeed in terms of modernization but could fail to hold on to 
some sense of a "Chinese way”, be it Confucianism or socialism, 
and thereby run the risk of China losing her identity.
Of course, the dilemma, complex as it is, should not be 
regarded as insoluble. Japan's development in the last 100 
years has shown China it is possible to modernize while largely 
retaining one's identity. Even in China in 1949, when the 
Communists established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 
1949, there was a feeling that this problem had been solved. 
Mao used socialism and communism to reinterpret China's history, 
claiming that China's socialist revolution and construction had 
not only made it possible for China to rapidly catch up with and 
even surpass the capitalist West but that it had also shown the 
way for all the third world countries to get rid of poverty and 
oppression.
By the time of Mao's death, it had become evident that, 
"His (Mao's) violent attempt at overcoming socioeconomic 
backwardness in a revolutionary way led to a historical blind 
alley rather than a deep-reaching modernization securing both 
national and social advancement".2
It was the recognition on the part of the post-Mao Chinese
2 Talas, Barna. Economic Reforms and Political Reform 
Attempts in China 1979-1989. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991,
p. 12.
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leadership that the economy was failing and the "faith" crisis 
was deepening (the crisis of faith in the Party, in socialism 
and in the cadres) that/led to the economic reforms and opening 
up to the outside world. The reforms undertaken since the late 
1970s involved jettisoning the dogma of leftism, encouraging the 
return from collective communes to~family :farming, legitimating 
and expanding the role of markets and expanding foreign economic 
ties so as to obtain advanced technology and investment, etc. 
In a sense, these reforms can be regarded as the latest attempt 
in China's history to find a route to modernity. Now, more than 
a decade later, it is widely acknowledged that China has been 
uniquely successful in comparison with the other former and 
existing socialist countries both in reforming the domestic 
economy and in integrating into the world system. In ten years, 
China has more thah doubled its total industrial and 
agricultural output, and has become a fairly active participant 
in the regional and world economy.
Nevertheless, with the deepening of the economic reforms 
and the expansion of the opening-up, some deep-seated problems 
have become more and more obvious and the above-mentioned long­
standing dilemma has reemerged along with some new features.
Deng Xiaoping and the other reformist leaders have followed 
a relatively pragmatic line in conducting China's economic 
changes. Deng attributed China's backwardness to its having 
closed the door to the outside world and to the failure to focus 
the central task of socialism on economic construction. 
Therefore, since the end of the 1970s, he has encouraged bold 
experiments and reforms in the economic area and has been 
adamant on keeping China's door open. But in the political and 
ideological fields he has been much more cautious and 
conservative, insisting that Leninist political and ideological 
controls be preserved. After all, the ultimate aim for the 
Communist leadership to carry out the reforms and opening-up is 
to defend and strengthen the rule of the CCP, not to weaken or 
destroy it.
In essence, this is one of the crucial problems confronting
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the Communist leadership, i.e. how to handle the relationship 
between the development of the economic base and the development 
of the superstructure.' According to the cardinal principle of 
Marxism, which forms the ideological basis of the Communist 
Party, the development of the economic base will determine the 
changes in the sphere of the superstructure. And the failure to 
adjust the latter will fetter the further development of the 
former. But Deng Xiaoping and many other reformist leaders do 
not seem to have worried much about or well understood the 
inevitable consequences in the realm of the superstructure after 
the economic base has changed.
China's economic practice and development in the 1980s have 
themselves, however, duly raised such questions as how to make 
the political system adaptable to the changing social situation 
and what new values, moral concepts and culture should be 
fostered in order to justify and shape these reforms and new 
developments. Moreover, the consequences of the open door 
policy have inevitably involved a growing interdependence with 
the largely capitalistic world economy, which has necessarily 
led to the penetration of influences other than the simply 
economic. The dynamism of the reforms and the increasing 
interdependence with the world economy have generated and 
necessitated more and more changes and constant adaptation. As 
a result of this, elements of the so-called socialist economy 
have been shrinking; the driving force of the reforms has been 
moving away from the centre and the central government's control 
over both the economy and society has been weakened. This trend 
clearly poses a serious threat to the existing system, and to 
the leadership of the Party in particular, and it is something 
which clearly cannot be tolerated by this same leadership, 
especially by the conservatives and those with a vested interest 
in the old system. Accordingly the question arises as to how the 
Communist regime has addressed and dealt with the challenges to 
their attempt at maintaining and developing a socialist 
political system. Beyond the historical and political factors 
mentioned above, the fact that what China is undergoing now is
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not a revolution but a reform movement also determines the very 
hard and complex nature of the adaptation process. Unlike a 
revolution in which the existing elite are overthrown and 
replaced by new people and new institutions, a reform is 
carried out largely by the "old” people on the basis of the old 
institutions. So to establish and sustain a consensus among the 
leadership is crucial; the elite would have to agree on what 
ought to be preserved, improved and reformed, and how this 
should be done. The last decade has shown that even if the 
Chinese leadership as a whole were agreed on the necessity of 
carrying out changes and reforms in the post-Mao era, they have 
often disagreed over how to proceed and how far to go. So, 
ironically, the rapid economic development and the increasingly 
unstoppable reform and opening-up have often intensified the
underlying conflicts and political struggles among the
leadership and these have sometimes led to dramatic political
changes. This, plus the fact that the reform and opening up are 
a pioneering enterprise which can always go wrong, means that 
the adaptation process must inevitably be wrought with 
difficulties.
How then has China actually adapted and what are the main 
obstacles encountered in the adaptation process during the 
1980s? It is impossible for this thesis to conduct a thoroughly 
comprehensive examination of the adaptation process, since, as 
was stated earlier, the adaptation is an extremely complex 
process involving both internal and external aspects and
affecting every area of social life. I have therefore chosen to 
explore how China's foreign-related economy (FRE)3, especially 
the joint ventures have adapted in the opening-up to the world
3 In this thesis, foreign-related economy (FRE) refers to 
the part of the economy involving, in various ways, foreign 
investors. This includes: wholly-foreign owned ventures (WFOs); 
equity joint ventures; cooperative joint ventures; processing 
and assembly arrangements; and compensation trade. (More 
detailed description is provided in the first footnote of 
Chapter IV) . Foreign-invested firms in this thesis refer to 
wholly-foreign owned firms (WFOs) and joint ventures.
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economy. I have done so because China's FRE has been the most 
successful aspect in China's development in the 1980s. By 
examining the process "and problems of the adaptation in this 
aspect, I believe, this study can provide a uniquely important 
perspective both in understanding China's overall domestic 
development, as well as its economic foreign relations in the 
1980s, and in foreseeing its development in the near and medium 
future.
China's interactions with the outside world have played an 
increasingly significant role in China's development because of 
many factors including the decline of the military threat from 
the Soviet Union from the beginning of the 1980s; the continuous 
supply of considerable investment by the overseas Chinese; 
China's reasonably successful cooperation with the World Bank; 
the reformers' determination and ability to keep the door open, 
etc. But the following two factors, I believe, have been 
crucial. First, unlike its previous efforts to modernize, 
China's reforms in the 1980s were carried out in a much more 
interdependent world environment. Therefore, it has been much 
more easy to accept that China's future lies in its integration 
into the world community. Second, the 1980s witnessed 
unprecedented growth and success in the market economy and, at 
the same time, the rapid decline and collapse of socialist 
economic and political systems in most parts of the world. 
These factors undoubtedly made an impact on China's reform 
process through the policy of opening-up. Indeed I would argue 
that China's contact with the outside world is much more than 
a mere ingredient of the whole reform package and a means of 
obtaining foreign technology and investment. With the deepening 
of the reforms and the intensification of China's foreign 
contacts, the opening-up strategy also gained in significance. 
In various ways the opening-up has exerted its influence on the 
top level decision-making process, on the balance of power in 
political struggles, on popular modes of thinking and on the 
direction of China's reforms and future development. To sum up 
the major consequences of opening-up:
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Firstly, the opening-up has greatly strengthened the 
argument that China's reform was both necessary and urgent. In 
the past, isolated from knowledge about the outside world and 
subject to biased propaganda from the official media and press, 
both the elite and the general public were easily persuaded that 
China was doing well especially” when compared with the "old 
China". Exposure to the outside world did not only greatly 
shake the normal complacency in officialdom but it also shocked 
the public into realizing how far China had fallen behind the 
enormous economic and technological advancements of the last 
several decades, achieved not only in the U.S. and Japan, but 
also in countries and regions nearer to home such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. The most telling 
comparison of all, as noted by Hamrin, was that of vibrant Hong 
Kong and stagnant Shanghai, "whose current respective roles as 
Asia's financial and trade centre and a sleepy backwater had 
been just the reverse at the start of the century."4 So 
although the economic reforms were first inspired by the 
domestic economic crisis, the opening-up and comparison with the 
outside world, especially the economic success elsewhere in East 
Asia, greatly reinforced the necessity and urgency for changes 
and helped to convince people that without reforms China cannot 
prosper.
Secondly, the opening-up and the ever deepening links with 
the Western world inevitably resurrected some century-long 
dilemmas and revealed more obviously the incompatibility between 
China's politico-economic systems and the world economic system 
to which it has to adapt. This has strengthened the call for 
more fundamental transformations.
It is true that China's domestic economic reforms and 
opening up to the outside world have often interacted. The need 
to develop foreign trade and a FRE has been one of the most 
significant driving forces behind many economic, managerial and
4 Hamrin, Carol Lee. China and the Challenge of the Future. 
Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1990, p.52.
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legal changes. Some market-oriented reforms did not only make it 
possible to open up to the outside world, but also provided new 
directions for the domestic economy as the nature of the global 
economy was better understood. In other words: "Economic
reforms in China did lead to major reforms in foreign policy, 
and of course the greater openness to international economy then 
had a major impact on China's domestic reforms."5 However, with 
the fast expansion of the FRE, the incompatibility between 
China's politico-economic system and the international practice 
and system became gradually more evident, as the Vice Director 
of China's Economic Structural Reform Commission, Gao Shangquan 
once pointed out: "The current economic system and structure do 
not only pose serious obstacles for further and deeper 
development of the foreign-related economy, but also make it 
very difficult for the foreign ventures to have their 
multiplying and demonstration effects for Chinese enterprises 
surrounding them, which, after all, is the ultimate aim of the 
opening-up policy".6 Accordingly, successful and especially 
long-term Sino-foreign economic activities urgently call for 
fundamental political, institutional as well as economic 
reforms.
Thirdly, the opening-up has influenced the political elite 
as well as ordinary people's understanding of China's relations 
with the outside world and their views on a series of 
fundamental political and economic issues. With the continuation 
and broadening of China's foreign relations, there emerged a new 
understanding among the leadership of China's place in the 
world. "The new appreciation within the political elite of 
China's basic weaknesses that had emerged from research on 
China's economic, science, and education needs led to a greater 
willingness by the leadership to work within the international
5 Segal, Gerald, (ed.), Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy 
Reform. London & New York: Kegan Paul International, 1990, p.4.
6 Gao, Shangquan. China's Economic Structural Reform in the 
Last Nine Years. Beijing: People' Publishing House, 1987, p.84.
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status quo.”7 The more radical reformers, especially many local 
officials, as I found out during my field research, became 
increasingly enthusiastic and positive about integrating China's 
economy with the international system. They intended to use the 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as models for a national 
transformation to a market economy and urged reforms in the 
direction of "modelling after the international investment 
environment" and "acting according to international practice." 
Moreover, despite various difficulties, the rapid development, 
and largely effective performance of China's FRE has presented 
a sharp contrast with the ailing state-run enterprises. As one 
commentator has summed up: "Where [the Southern coast and
Yangtze delta] the state's ability to exercise macro-control is 
already tenuous, the economy is working reasonably well, where 
the state's control is stronger, the economy is a disaster."8 
And according to Chinese official figures, by the end of May 
1991, 38.4% of the state enterprises within the budget plan were 
making a loss.9 This contrast has deeply influenced the public's 
views on a series of fundamental issues such as the ownership of 
the means of production, the relations between market and plan, 
and the relative advantages and disadvantages of a market 
economy and a socialist economy. These perceptual changes are 
of crucial importance to China's future development.
Fourthly, the opening-up and growing interdependence with 
the outside world has been one of the most crucial elements that 
have ensured that it would be more and more difficult to reverse 
the whole reform program.
After more than a decade of opening-up, the level of 
dependence of China's national economy on international trade
7 Hamrin. op. cit.. p.144.
8 The Economist. 30.3 - 5.4.1991, pp.56-57.
9 "Forecast and Analysis of the Economic Situation in the 
Second Half of 1991.", Section of Economic Situation Analysis of 
the National Economic Structure Reform Commission, China Youth 
Daily. 5.8.1991.
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has risen sharply; the more than 30,000 foreign-invested firms 
[by early 1991], belonging to the most healthy part of China's 
economy, are playing an/increasingly important and indispensable 
role in the economy. China's South-Eastern coastal economies 
especially have become considerably entwined with the 
international market. (See figures and analysis in Chapter V). 
Although reforms suffered several serious setbacks and 
entrenchments during the course of the 1980s, the FRE, 
especially that in the South-Eastern coastal areas, have not 
been badly affected. And FRE's overall stronger performance, in 
comparison with that of the state-owned enterprises, has 
vindicated the reform and opening-up policies.
That China's reform is more likely to be sustained is also 
due to the fact that the opening-up and expanding contact with 
the outside world has made more and more leaders and ordinary 
people keenly realize that unless China adapts quickly and 
consistently to the international economic system, the rapid 
global technological revolution will leave China even further 
behind. Besides, the fact that geographically China is in the 
middle of dynamic East Asia also means that "unless China does 
sustain quite remarkable growth rates, it is likely to fall even 
further behind its neighbours."10
In order to find out more about the actual adaptation 
process and the difficulties involved in China's opening-up, 
especially in the development of the FRE, I visited Tianjin in 
early 1991, and conducted a series of interviews with local 
officials, managers, academics and foreign businessmen working 
in the FRE in the Tianjin area. This thesis will highlight the 
information obtained from these interviews. I have attached a 
great deal of importance to the fieldwork in the belief that by 
examining the problems of adaptation at the enterprise level, I 
am looking at the heart of the problem. If the policies of the 
reforms are to succeed, they must be able to effect positive
10 Goodman, David and Segal, Gerald (eds.), China at Forty. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p.7.
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changes at the enterprise level. So far, numerous writings on 
China's reforms have focused on the formation of policy, on the 
post-Mao decision-makirtg structures and processes at the higher 
levels of the system and tended to overlook the changes at the 
enterprise level. This thesis draws heavily on the dynamic 
changes in the social base and focuses more on the lower levels.
Tianjin is a very suitable place to conduct this fieldwork. 
First, Tianjin is an important city, one of the three 
municipalities directly under the jurisdiction of the Central 
Government (the other two are Beijing and Shanghai), and 
therefore it enjoys the status of a province and thereby a large 
degree of autonomy. Secondly, if one were to classify China's 
foreign-invested firms into two broad categories, namely those 
established on the “green field" sites, such as in the SEZs, and 
those with established PRC partners in the industrial centres, 
then Tianjin, an industrial centre second only to Shanghai 
playing a special role as one of the major centres open to the 
world economy, is therefore representative of the second 
category of the foreign-invested firms in China. What is more, 
the conflicts arising from the pursuit of reformist policies 
that necessarily entail ever-deepening relations of 
interdependence with a largely capitalistic international 
economy on the one hand, and the attempt to maintain and develop 
a socialist political system on the other are much more 
obviously demonstrated in the old established industrial centres 
than in the newly-built SEZs. Thirdly, being from Tianjin 
myself, I know the city well and have extensive contacts there.
Basing my study on the literature on interdependence and on 
China's reforms and opening-up, I identified the important 
issues that were to be examined in the fieldwork. Given the 
conditions of China, it was not possible to go for a 
representative sample survey. Instead, I conducted a series of 
intensive in-depth interviews. And accordingly, a guided 
interview schedule rather than a detailed questionnaire, was 
used and the interviews were allowed to follow their own course 
so as to lead into areas of particular interest to each
18
interviewee.
By looking at the specific difficulties the practitioners 
have encountered, this thesis hopes to shed light on the 
problems in China's adaptation and integration into the world 
economy and the interplay between its opening-up to the outside 
world and the carrying out of the~domestic reforms. Moreover, 
by analysing the adaptation process in China's particular 
circumstances, this thesis also hopes to contribute to the 
understanding of the wider and dommon issues faced by "third 
world" countries in their efforts to enter into the world 
economic system.
OVERVIEW
This thesis begins, in Chapter II, with a conceptual 
account of the characteristics of interdependence relevant to 
the problems I identify in this thesis. Besides briefly 
identifying the general problems involved in the development of 
interdependence worldwide, the chapter will describe the 
dramatic changes in China's developmental strategy in moving 
from a self-reliant, inward-looking country towards a more 
interdependent and outward-looking one. It will examine the 
problems arising, among other things, from China's much more 
thoroughgoing historical sense of independence and its socialist 
political identity.
Before the discussion and analysis of the materials 
obtained from the interviews, which form the basis of the 
thesis, Chapter III will undertake an examination of the 
ideological developments in the 1980s and see how China's 
leaders have tried to address the problems involved in the 
reforms and opening-up. Though the Chinese reformers have 
followed a relatively pragmatic approach towards economic 
reforms, many debates did take place in the ideological area. 
Under a unitary Leninist political system, ideology was and is 
extremely important especially in terms of determining medium 
and long-term national strategies and direction. And for the
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purpose of' reducing the incompatibilities between its domestic 
systems and those of the Western world and facilitating the 
rapid modernization of/its economy, it is both necessary and 
urgent to work out a new and coherent ideology. So in order to 
appreciate the importance of my fieldwork, it is important first 
to trace the evolution of Chinese-ideological treatment of the 
issues, and then to understand how the ideological development 
has both positively and negatively influenced the actual 
implementation of the reform and opening-up policies in the 
1980s.
Chapter IV is a detailed description and analysis of my 
interviews with the key managers, officials and academics of 
various enterprises and institutions. With these, I seek to 
illustrate the difficulties and obstacles in the adaptation 
process within the FRE and show how the FRE has influenced the 
reforms of the state-run enterprises.
Also with close reference to the fieldwork, Chapter V will 
attempt to measure the impact of China's increasing 
interdependence with the outside world. In addition to 
illustrating briefly the influence of this growing 
interdependence on China's economic development, this chapter 
will focus on the changes that the ever-closer foreign contacts 
have brought on popular modes of thinking and attitudes toward 
a series of fundamental issues. The chapter examines, among 
other things, how the general public, especially those working 
in the FRE understand the advantages and disadvantages of using 
direct foreign investment to the development of China's national 
economy; what they see as the main obstacle to furthering the 
opening-up process and economic reforms; and what their views 
are on some of the fundamental issues such as ownership and the 
relationship between a market and a planned economy. Obviously, 
these changes in ways of thinking, in the long term, have 
significant social and political implications.
Finally, with reference to the latest dramatic developments 
(1989-1992), the concluding chapter, chapter VI will examine 
further the fundamental problems faced by the opening-up and
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economic reforms and see what implications they might have for 
China's domestic development and its relations with the outside 
world in the near and idedium future.
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CHAPTER H. INTERDEPENDENCE AND CHINA
I. INTERDEPENDENCE
In Western literature, interdependence refers to a pattern 
of interacting relationships between two or more units (in this 
case, nation-states) wherein the interactions, exchanges and 
transactions between and among these units are relatively equal 
or symmetrical and have reciprocal effects upon all the 
interacting entities. As Keohane and Nye defined: 
"Interdependence means mutual dependence. Interdependence in 
world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal 
effects among countries or among actors in different 
countries.1111
Many of the important articles and books on interdependence 
have derived their inspiration from dissatisfaction in the 1970s 
with the Realist assumptions.12 The basic Realist claims 
challenged by Keohane and Nye, whose work has been of major 
importance in the development of the interdependent theory, are: 
that states are unitary actors and dominant in world politics; 
that force is a usable and effective instrument in the relations 
between states; and that there is a clear hierarchy of issues 
dominated by the need of states for security.13
Against the assumptions of the Realist model of world 
politics, Keohane and Nye characterize world politics by complex 
interdependence. This assumes multiple channels of contact 
between societies, an absence of hierarchy among issues and a 
minor role for the use of force. This complex interdependence
11 Keohane, R.O. Nye, J.S. Power and Interdependence. World 
Politics in Transition. Boston: Little Brown, 1977, p.9.
12 See Smith, M.; Little, R.; Shackleton, M. Perspectives on 
World Politics. Groom Helm London in association with the Open 
University Press, 1981, p.117.
13 See Keohane, R.O. Nye, J.S. op.cit. .
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also gives rise to some distinctive political processes 
including linkage strategies, agenda control and coalition 
building .
Some other major issues extensively discussed in the 
interdependent literature include: the independent role that 
transnational and international^ organizations can play;14 the 
dramatic changes in the character of foreign policy and the way 
in which it is formulated due to the advances in modernization 
in the industrial societies;15 the relationship between the 
maintenance of the symbols of sovereignty and independence and 
the growth of interdependence;16 and the need to establish 
'regimes'17 to cope with the new problems on the world agenda, 
where states are not the sole managers.
All these and many other arguments and analyses can be seen 
as an attempt "to assert a more differentiated set of 
assumptions about the way in which world politics operate.”18
But distinctive from the common assumption that 
interdependence is on the rise, some scholars hold rather 
different or even opposite views. For example, writing within
14 See Pentland, Charles. International Organizations and 
Their Roles in World Politics. J. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson and G. 
Boyd (eds.), New York: Free Press, 1976, pp.631-656.
15 See Morse, Edward. The Transformation of Foreign 
Policies: Modernization. Interdependence and Externalization. in 
World Politics. Vol.XXII, No.3, Princeton University Press, 
1970, pp.371-392.
16 See Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret. Tribal 
Sovereignty vs. Interdependence, in Towards a Politics of the 
Planet Earth. New York: Van Nostrand, 1971, pp.401-426.
17 There are various definitions of "regime”, but the one 
generally agreed upon is the definition accepted at the 
Conference of International Relations held in Oct. 1980 in Los
Angeles. ”A regime is composed of sets of explicit or implicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given area of
international relations and which may help to coordinate their
behaviour.”
18 Smith, Michael, et al. op. cit. . p. 117.
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the Realist tradition, K. Waltz argues that: "Interdependence is 
low and, if anything, is on the decrease.1,19 Drawing on the 
history of trade and irfvestment since the end of the nineteenth 
century, he asserts that interdependence characterizes much of 
the European state system before WWI. By . contrast, the world 
today displays more independence and dependence. Waltz points 
out that, on the one hand, "large and economically well 
developed countries, the very ones that are crucial in world 
politics, can more quickly move toward an autarkic condition ... 
The low cost of disentanglement is a measure of low 
dependence"20. On the other hand, "low economic capability 
easily leads to dependence upon another state of higher economic 
capability. The higher the costs of disentanglement, the higher 
the degree of dependence; the lagging state will only get weaker 
if foreign capital and technology are excluded."21
Whether or not K. Waltz agrees that interdependence is on 
the rise, what he has argued touches upon the key issue in 
regard to the discussion of interdependence: the asymmetry of 
interdependence means very different things to different actors. 
In Power and Interdependence. Keohane and Nye, the non-Realists, 
argued that "asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of 
power."22 In line with this thought, they distinguished two 
kinds of interdependence: sensitivity interdependence and
vulnerability interdependence. "Sensitivity means liability to 
costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered 
to try to change the situation. Vulnerability can be defined as 
an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events 
even after policies have been altered".23 No interdependence
19 Waltz, K. "The Myth of National Interdependence".
20 Ibid. . pp.9-10.
21 Ibid. . p. 13.
22 Keohane, R.O; Nye, J.S. op. cit.. p. 12.
23 Ibid.. p. 13.
24
could be totally symmetrical and completely equally beneficial 
to each party.
However, the interacting relation between the developed 
countries is more likely to be sensitive interdependence, while 
the relationship between the developed countries and the 
developing countries is usually one of vulnerable 
interdependence. In fact the phenomenon of international 
interdependence is the consequence of the advances in 
international communication and transportation in the 
industrialized countries, and the theory of interdependence was 
originally formulated to describe and analyze this phenomenon in 
the developed countries. In other words, the theory was not, in 
the first place, meant to deal with the relationship between the 
developed countries and the developing ones, for the 
interdependence between and among the modern, industrialized 
states is an effect of modernization, while "among poorer, less 
developed countries, the causal connection between modernization 
and interdependence often seems reversed."24 And
interdependence for them is often regarded as a developmental 
strategy to achieve the goal of modernization. As Morse puts it, 
this is a developmental strategy that opts for "the fostering of 
domestic goals through international behaviour."25
Then, how feasible is this "interdependent developmental 
strategy" for the developing countries? Different scholars have 
expressed different views. Some have argued that in an 
international system characterized by interdependence, only 
through a strategy of interdependent development can a 
developing country find the quickest route to reduce the gap 
between itself and the industrialized world and eventually catch
24 Frederich, W. Wu. "From Self-Reliance to Interdependence? 
Developmental Strategy and Foreign Economic Policy in Post-Mao 
China", Modern China. Vol.7, Issue 4, Oct. 1981, p.448.
25 Morse, Edward L. Modernization and the Transformation of 
International Relations. New York: Free Press, 1976.
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up. For example, Eckstein argued that foreign economic infusion 
to a weak, developing country does not automatically reduce the 
latter to a dependent status in the international hierarchy. On 
the contrary, there are positive gains for a developing country 
from participating in, or "taking advantage" of, the capitalist 
world-economic structure of an international division of labour 
and from engaging itself in the give and take of the world 
economy.26
As against this, other scholars have looked more at the 
costs incurred to the developing countries in pursuing an 
interdependent developmental strategy.
Firstly, the structure of the world economy determines that 
the developing countries cannot obtain what they want. As 
Gourevitch, of the Radical Dependency School, elaborates in his 
article:
What the [radical critics] stress is the matrix set up by 
the advanced capitalist countries, a system of pressures 
which sharply constrain, indeed, wholly determine the 
options available to developing countries. Since capital, 
organization, technology and military preponderance are in 
the hands of the core, the core countries are able to set 
the terms under which skill, capital, and market will be 
provided to the periphery. The core forces others into 
subservience: suppliers of raw materials, purchasers of
finished goods, manufacturers of whatever the core allows 
them to do. The developing countries are unable to allocate 
resources according to their internal needs, following some 
alternative vision of development. As a result, they are 
locked into a structure where the benefits of growth accrue 
disproportionately to the core. Countries in the periphery 
develop dual economies : an expanding modern sector tied to 
the needs of the core, and a stagnant, miserable sector, 
irrelevant to the needs of international capitalism, hence 
abandoned and ignored.27
Secondly, closely linked to the ^ first point, the autonomy
26 See Eckstein, Alexander. China's Economic Revolution. 
London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977.
27 Gourevitch, Peter. "The Second Image Reversed: the 
International Sources of Domestic Politics", International 
Organization 32 (Autumn) 1978, pp.888-889. Quoted in Frederich, 
W. Wu. oo.cit. p.451.
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of developing countries can be very much restricted. For once a 
developing country involves itself in the world system, it is 
constrained by the system itself. As Scott points out: "As the 
system-central interests of a nation increases, so does its 
dependence in the system”. And as "an actor's dependence is 
related to the extent of its involvement in the global system, 
the more it is caught up in the system, the more constrained its 
behaviour will tend to be”28 What is more, since international 
transactions and cooperation are conducted under certain 
regimes, a country's commitment to the regimes also tends to 
"reduce the flexibility of governments and in particular limit 
their ability to act on the basis of myopic self-interest”. This 
is because
to do so is likely to be costly not only to the regime 
itself but to the state's reputation. To a government that 
values its ability to make future agreements, reputation is 
a crucial resource, and the most important aspect of an 
actor's reputation in world politics is the belief of 
others that it will keep its future commitments even when 
a particular situation, myopically viewed, makes it appear 
disadvantageous to do so. 9
So, when one uses the term interdependence to describe the 
relationship between developing countries and developed 
countries, one should note the substantial differences between 
this kind of relationship and that between the developed 
countries. Generally speaking, in dealing with the developed 
world, the less developed countries have to face a series of 
particular problems, which include, among other things, the fact 
that their bargaining position is generally weaker and more 
disadvantaged, their political systems tend be more fragile and 
they are bound to be more conscious of the danger that
28 Scott, A. The Dynamics of Interdependence. Chapel Hill 
and London: the Univ. of World Carolina Press, 1982, p. 145 
p.149.
29 Keohane, R. 0. After Hegemony. Guildford, Surrey: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1984, p.116.
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interdependence could well become dependency.
II. CHINA AND INTERDEPENDENCE
The concepts of "interdependence” and the closely related 
"international division of labour” were not accepted in China 
until the end of the 1970s. Although from 1949 to the end of the 
1970s China never totally isolated itself from the rest of the 
world and its trade and other interactions with the outside 
world were never wholly stopped, the Maoist doctrines of "self- 
reliance" and "independence" played the dominant role.
If the developing countries' interdependent developmental 
strategy could be understood as aiming at making full use of the 
comparative advantage in the international economy and in the 
international division of labour, and obtaining from the 
advanced West technology and investment and so on in order to 
quicken their own modernization, then Maoist self-reliance 
advocated an almost completely different path towards 
modernization - a path that mainly relied on China's own 
internal regeneration. As an article in a 1965 Beiiina Review 
expounded:
First, self-reliance means to rely on the strength and 
diligent labour of our people to carry on economic 
construction... Secondly, to build socialism self-reliantly 
means to make full use of all available resources in our 
country... Thirdly, to build socialism self-reliantly means 
to get necessary funds for construction through internal 
accumulation... Fourthly, self-reliance in building 
socialism also means that we must gain and accumulate our 
experiences in building socialism and get to know the laws 
of socialist construction through our own efforts instead 
of copying the experience of other countries. In building 
socialism self-reliantly our goal is to establish an 
independent, comprehensive and modern national economic 
system in accordance with the conditions and needs of our 
country.30
Although Maoist self-reliance "excludes neither the 
development of international economic and trade relations on the
30 Beiiinq Review. 18.6.1965.
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principles of equality and mutual benefits nor the mutual 
support and assistance given on the same basis",31 foreign trade 
always played a secondary role. Imports should take place only 
when a product could not be produced locally, and moreover, the 
imports should be able to facilitate domestic production of the 
product. Similarly, exports should be carried out only when the 
local needs have been satisfied. In those years, Chinese 
spokesmen on international affairs openly opposed the concept of 
interdependence.
The Chinese representative at the United Nations in the 
1970s, Huang Hua, for example, contended once that the concept 
of interdependence between rich and poor countries works 
ultimately to the advantage of the former against the latter. 
Using a vivid Chinese metaphor, he held that: "Interdependence 
in the contemporary world economic system could easily turn into 
an interdependence between a horseman and his mount."32
Linked to its stand on interdependence, China also rejected 
the concept of "international division of labour". As far as 
China's relationship with the then Communist Bloc was concerned, 
China was adamantly against the idea of "economic cooperation" 
and "interdependence" as advocated by the Soviet Union, seeing 
it as a means for the Soviet Union to control the other 
Communist countries. Besides, the concept was regarded as a 
label designed to perpetuate the old economic order, with its 
lopsided and abnormal development of national economies 
throughout the world. Huang Hua pointed out that the term "might 
be used by the superpowers to push under that name their self- 
seeking 'economic division of labour' and 'economic integration' 
and to maintain the most unjust and^j&bnormal state of world
31 Beijing Review. 14.7.1972.
32 Cited in Kim, S. S. China, the United Nation and World 
Order, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979,
p. 265.
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economic order.”33 In Mao's own words:
We advocated all round development and do not think that 
each [country] need not produce goods which other 
[countries] could' supply... The correct method is each 
[country] doing the utmost for itself as a means toward 
self-reliance for new growth, working independently to the 
greatest possible extent, making a principle of not relying 
on others, and not doing something only when it really and 
truly cannot be done... Relying on other countries...is 
most dangerous.34
Since the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of 
December 1978, China has gradually abandoned its highly 
ideologically-oriented and inward-looking socio-economic 
development policies, realizing that in order to become 
modernized, China had to open its doors to the rest of the 
world, especially the developed West.
This new perspective also led to a reappraisal of the 
concepts of international economic interdependence and the 
international division of labour. As early as 1978, in the 
speech to the National Conference on Finance and Trade, Hua 
Guofeng, the Chairman of the CCP at that time, remarked that: 
"in the new period... the gradual realization of the four 
modernizations and the growth of the division of labour and co­
ordination among various specialties will inevitably expand the 
scope of exchange and call for more and more contacts with the 
world market and constantly widen technical and material 
interchange at home and abroad."35
In April 1980 Red Flag stated: "It is evident that the
deepening of economic interdependence between and among
33 Cited in Ibid. . p.265. >
34 A Critique of Soviet Economics bv Mao Zedong. (Trans. 
Robert,M.) N.Y. and London, Monthly Review Press, 1977, p.102. 
Cited in M. Yahuda's "Contemporary Chinese Concepts of Self- 
Reliance, Independence and Alignment", p.23. (unpublished).
35 Beiiina Review. 28.7.1978.
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countries is an inevitable trend in world economic 
development."36 An article in Social Sciences in China
entitled "International Division of Labour and China's Economic 
Relations with Foreign Countries" also argued that "Socialist 
countries must fully utilize the international division of 
labour, which is determined by objective economic law... Full 
utilization of the international division of labour means a 
series of our enterprises and departments will forge more 
extensive and closer ties with the world market."37 In the 
author's view, by participating in the international division of 
labour, China could save labour and at the same time speed up 
the development of the country's productive forces. Also, as 
Harding has observed: "Chinese reformers have also accepted the 
proposition that a universal set of international economic
mechanisms and instruments exists, which China should learn to 
employ."38
Though the concept of "interdependence" began to be
positively accepted and even advocated in China, as a developing 
country, China's interrelationship with the industrialized West 
was not the kind of relationship that the Western interdependent 
theory had meant to describe in the first place, as argued 
earlier.
"Interdependence" is used in this thesis in a dual sense. 
It is used to describe both China's new foreign economic
developmental strategy itself and also the effects of that
36 Cited in Frederich W.Wu "Socialist Self-Reliant 
Development Within the Capitalist World Economy: the Chinese 
View in the Post Mao Era", Globalist Perspectives. Vol.l, no.l, 
Spring 1983, p.252.
37 Yuan, Wenji, Dai, Lunzhan and Wang, Linxing.
"International Division of Labour and China's Economic Relations 
with Foreign Countries", Social Sciences in China. March 1980, 
p.37 p.45.
38 Harding, Harry. China's Second Revolution. Washington. D. 
C. the Brookings Institution, 1987, p.133.
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strategy. In other words, China's outward looking new 
developmental strategy - the core of which is to make best use 
of foreign investment, technology, know-how and China's 
comparative advantages in the international division of labour 
to quicken China's modernization tempo (drastically different 
from its previous self-reliant, inward-looking approach) - could 
be described as an interdependent strategy. And one of the 
effects of this strategy is China's increasing interdependence, 
albeit still in its initial stages, with the world economy in 
the 1980s.
However, since an interdependent relationship always 
involves costs, especially, as discussed before, for a 
developing country, in shifting from the self-reliant 
developmental strategy toward an interdependent one, China has 
exposed itself to a series of costs and risks. Although some of 
these were shared by many other developing countries, a series 
of particular factors have made the problems accompanying 
"interdependence" uniquely complex and grave for China.
A. A More Thoroughgoing Sense of Independence of the Chinese
It is true that even in today's increasingly interdependent 
world, independence and sovereignty are still the most cherished 
traits for all nation states. Yet few states have demonstrated 
a sense of independence as keenly as the Chinese have. Even 
among other newly independent Third World states, many still 
tended to maintain a variety of ties with the former colonial 
metropolitan centre especially in the early years of 
independence.
Such a keen sense of independence was shaped by various 
factors. The bitter experiences in Chinese modern history has 
been the most fundamental. Although technically China never lost 
its status as a separate sovereign state under international 
law, ever since the 1840s the Chinese witnessed the imposition 
of unequal treaties, invasion by foreign forces, a carving up of 
China proper into spheres of influence and finally occupation by 
Japan. And this sensitivity regarding independence was further
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enhanced by the lively memory of a long and powerful tradition 
of imperial greatness and by a determination that this greatness 
should again receive recognition and be revived.
By 1949, with the establishment of the People's Republic of 
China, the world's most populous nation did regain its 
independence and sovereignty, and the central government could 
once again enjoy full control over its foreign relations. 
However, the sensitivity over the problem of independence was as 
keen as ever. This was not only because the Chinese were, as 
ever, still confronted with the massive difficulties of securing 
their broad sweep of land against unfriendly powers, but also 
because China's social and economic underdevelopment still left 
China in a fundamentally vulnerable position. Chinese leaders 
have repeatedly held that their country's independence can only 
be sustained by a China that is strong enough to defend it 
against challenges by the great powers and they have 
consistently demanded recognition and treatment by them as an 
"equal". The sense of independence has always been closely 
linked with a sense of pride and dignity. In exploring the 
psychological roots of the Chinese people's strong sense of 
independence, Allens Whiting once observed: "Long the primary 
power in Asia, she (China) has been cut deeply, during the past 
century, by an induced feeling of inferiority. Her fear of Japan 
followed a defeat caused by material inferiority. Her resentment 
against the West followed a capitulation caused by sensed 
political and ideological inferiority.1139 It was this 
inferiority complex that made the Chinese people's sense of 
pride and dignity and the sense of independence all the more 
delicate.
It was, to a great extent, due to this particularly keen 
sense of independence and dignity that Mao Zedong chose the 
self-reliant developmental strategy for his "New China", though
39 Whiting, Allens S. "Foreign Policy of Communist China" in 
Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics. 5th 
edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976.
33
the adverse international environment also an important factor 
in this decision. Mao's powerful sense of nationalistic dignity 
and self-confidence nurtured by his success in defeating all his 
enemies and establishing the PRC made him firmly believe that, 
through self-regeneration and a series of massive campaigns, his 
country could surely catch up with and even surpass the major 
capitalist countries and take the lead in achieving Communism, 
so that China could play a bigger role in the world and 
"contribute more to mankind."40 In analysing the causes leading 
to the Sino-Soviet split, Michael Yahuda once observed that: 
"What Mao later found objectionable about Sino-Soviet relations 
during this period (the 1950s) was less the economic aspects 
than the uncritical copying of Soviet institutions and the 
passivity and self generated psychological dependency to which 
it gave rise."41
The last 150 years of Chinese history have shown that the 
combination of material weakness and an inferior position in 
world politics together with the strong emphasis on upholding 
independence and national dignity has made it very difficult for 
China to establish cooperative relations with the outside world.
40 Mao's self-confidence was, to a great extent, gained 
through the unique experience of the Chinese Communist 
revolutionary movement in the 1930s and the 1940s, particularly 
during the Yan'an era. During this extremely difficult period, 
local self-reliance and decentralization in economic and 
military production in each of the region's areas became a 
strategy for survival. This strategy enabled the Chinese 
Communist revolution to make it through a very challenging time 
and thus must have left a permanent impression on the Communist 
leaders. See Frederich W. Wu. op.cit. Also see Oksenberg, 
Michael. "Mao's Foreign Policy of Self-reliance", Columbia Univ. 
Seminar on Modern East Asia, 4.3.1970.
41 Yahuda, M. op.cit.. p.21. Some scholars have argued that 
in the 1950s, the Soviets did not use their commanding position 
for coercive purposes. Alexander Eckstein noted,"there is no 
evidence to suggest the Soviet great bargaining power resulted 
in economic exploitation of the Chinese." Alexander Eckstein. 
China's Economic Revolution. London: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1977, p.137. Quoted in Yahuda, M. op.cit.. p.21.
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To shut her door and to conduct minimal relations with the 
outside world proved to be counter-productive: not only did
that fail to preserve China's independence and dignity, but it 
further weakened and damaged them. On the other hand, extensive 
contact with the outside world, especially with the powerful 
West, exposed China's independence as well as its identity to a 
series of threats. China has always had a strong sense of 
separate identity from the rest of the world: Confucianism in 
the 19th century and Socialism since 1949. The ruling elites 
have always feared that with detrimental external influence, 
China's separate identity could be lost. Hence the dilemma that 
has perplexed successive generations of the Chinese.
Although interdependence is a rather new concept, some of 
the phenomena and problems it describes existed long ago, 
especially when one talks about the interdependence between the 
advanced and undeveloped countries. The problem of how the 
backward countries should deal with the advanced and make 
themselves strong without becoming dependent and losing their 
identity is endemic to the international system. China's bitter 
experiences with the Western powers since the 1840s and its 
strong sense of independence, among other things, have made the 
dilemma the most continuous and acute one in modern history and 
remains unsolved even today. The last 150 years have see£* 
various debates and struggles between the so-called nativists 
and metropolitans, such as the reform and self-strengthening 
movements in the late Qing Dynasty. They gave rise to the ill- 
fated approach of trying to preserve Chinese systemic values 
through the selective adaptation of Western technology as 
epitomised by the slogan “Chinese studies for the framework of 
values, Western studies for practical purposes.” In the newest 
efforts for reform and opening-up to the outside world in the 
1980s, struggles and conflicts between various factions and 
ideas in the Communist leadership as to how China should conduct 
relations with the West still exist and occasionally they have 
become very fierce.
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B. Socialism and Interdependence
The establishment of a Communist regime and a socialist 
system in China has' made the "interdependence” problem 
particularly complicated.
In its relations with the outside world, especially the 
Western powers, China has always been sensitive to the possibly 
detrimental effects of outside influences upon its identity and 
essence. While the main avowed aim of most of those concerned 
with retaining a Chinese essence before 1949, had been to 
maintain the Great Tradition of China - Confucianism,42 the 
Communists, after they came to power, launched campaign after 
campaign against "remnants of China's feudal past", behind which 
they attempted to crystallize a new identity around the notion 
of "China as a revolutionary socialist society."
The socialist doctrine, if thoroughly and faithfully 
followed, would rule out the possibility of the socialist 
countries establishing cooperative and interdependent
relationship with the capitalist countries. According to the 
doctrine, capitalism worldwide had come to the stage of 
imperialism, which was regarded as the last stage of the 
capitalist system. Imperialism, it was claimed, was doomed to 
deadly crisis in all fields and had largely become decadent and 
moribund. In. a word, it was said to be dying. By contrast, 
socialism was said to be incomparably superior to capitalism and 
the former would eventually replace the latter. In practice, 
according to Mao, the capitalist world economy would be replaced 
by a socialist one through "not only competition but also 
fierce, broad-ranging struggle"43 In fact during Mao's era, 
especially during the periods when ultra-leftism ran wild, as
42 Oksenberg, Michel and Goldstein, Steven. "The Chinese 
Political Spectrum" in Problems of Communism. March - April 
1974, p.4.
43 Mao Zedong. A Critique of Soviet Economy. Moss Roberts 
(trans), New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p.105.
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during the "Cultural Revolution", anything tainted by so-called 
feudalism, capitalism and revisionism was severely attacked and 
destroyed. The notions' of "international interdependence" and 
"international division of labour" were publicly criticized (as 
described before) for they supposedly served to perpetuate the 
irrational and exploitative world economic system which 
benefited only the capitalist and imperialist countries. The 
goal for socialist China was to help create a new socialist 
world economic order to replace the capitalist one. Under the 
guidance of this ideology, China's economic development was 
highly inward-orientated and its external economic relations 
(after the break with the Soviet Union at the end of the 1950s) 
were kept to a very low level.
Confronted by an ever-deepening political and economic 
crisis, and also due to the economic imperatives generated by 
the Four Modernizations program, the post-Mao leadership headed 
by Deng Xiaoping opted for a development strategy that in 
relations with the outside world resembles closely what is being 
described in Western literature as interdependence. Although it 
is wrong to conclude that the post-Mao Chinese leadership has 
relinquished the long-standing national goal of making China a 
self-reliant and totally independent country, what the shift 
does imply is that to attain this goal, the new leadership is 
willing to make some radical modifications in its internal 
developmental policy and its external relations with the world 
economy.
As the last decade has shown, under the guidance of Deng 
Xiaoping's "Seeking Truth From Facts" pragmatism, a great number 
of radical changes have taken place in China. The highly 
ideologically-oriented policies were replaced with more 
practical and down-to-earth ones. The idea of interdependence 
was not only positively accepted but also actively advocated. 
Extensive economic relations with foreign countries have been 
established. Behind all these changes, however, some fundamental 
questions remain: is it possible for a socialist country to
establish genuine interdependent relations with the capitalist
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countries? When, in actuality, a socialist country is trying to 
get aid from the West and is rebuilding its economy according to 
a capitalist developmental model, how can that socialist country 
interpret and justify such propositions as "Socialism is 
incomparably superior to capitalism” or "Socialism will 
eventually replace capitalism",~ "with a view to ensuring the 
people's commitment to socialism? Is it possible for the 
Communist leadership to follow an interdependent developmental 
strategy in which only economic benefits could be retained while 
simultaneously preventing "pernicious" elements of the outside 
world from "contaminating" and "alienating" its people? Will it 
not lead to new social forces inside China? Will the strategy 
not lead to a weakening of the CCP power? All these and many 
other questions have come to the fore with the pursuit of the 
interdependent developmental policy.
If interdependence involves some particular difficulties 
and costs for all the socialist countries, these problems have 
demonstrated themselves more dramatically in the last ten years' 
development in China. This is because, among other things, 
China's reforms and opening-up policies were adopted and 
implemented when both the politics and economics had run into 
grave crises, and the "Three Beliefs Crisis" (lack of belief in 
the Party, lack of confidence in socialism and lack of trust in 
cadres.44) was clearly manifest. In addition, after almost 
everything tainted by the past had been attacked and destroyed 
under Mao's leadership, by the late 1970s and the early 1980s 
the Chinese Communist Party began to repudiate whole aspects of 
its revolutionary Maoist tradition as well. As a result, as 
Schell put it, "by the mid-eighties what it meant to be a 
citizen of the People's Republic of China was once again up for 
grabs. These repeated paroxysms of cultural and political self- 
immolation left China not only intellectually and spiritually 
confused, but also extremely vulnerable to all sorts of outside
44 See Orville Schell. Discos and Democracy. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1988, p.212.
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influence” 45
The policies of "emancipation of the mind" and of the
"opening-up" naturally led to new evaluations of the
/
distinctions between socialism and capitalism. As a result of
the "open door", more and more people saw that the capitalist
countries as a whole, no matter whether the old or the newly
industrialized, were much more prosperous than they had been led
to believe before, and none of the socialist countries had been
able to develop as rapidly.
Under these circumstances, it was hard , if not impossible,
to stop or repel the capitalist political and cultural
influences. Moreover, the economic and trade cooperation with
the outside world also generated a series of challenges to the
core practices of the socialist economy as embodied in the
state-owned enterprises. These were officially described as
"shock waves". As an article in World Economy noted:
With the proceeding of the open-door policy, the emergence 
of the 'wholly foreign-owned or half foreign-owned' 
enterprises could generate a series of 'shock waves' to the 
state-owned enterprises. For example, the wage gap between 
the two kinds of enterprises would affect the initiatives 
and the level of living standards of the workers in the 
state-owned enterprises. Also, with foreigners accepted as 
the managers or co-managers in the foreign-owned 
enterprises, the concept of labour commodity takes shape 
naturally, which obviously does not match the nature of a 
socialist country. Although the high efficiency in the 
foreign-owned enterprises is definitely a good thing, with 
the numerous difficulties in reforms, the state-owned 
enterprises could not easily raise their efficiency, and 
faced with this sharp contrast, people would reduce or lose 
their confidence and hope in the system of public ownership 
and socialism. In a word, the capitalist relationship of 
production would exert considerable influence on 
socialism.46
So the interdependent developmental strategy seelms to pose
45 Ibid. . p.72.
46 Zhang Youwen and Sun Xianjun. "The International Economic 
Environment for the Primary Stage of Socialism" in World 
Economy, March 1989, pp.11-12.
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more problems for socialist countries than for the non­
socialist ones. And the problems appear to be much more thorny 
and serious in the political and cultural fields than in the 
economic, which was best illustrated by Deng Xiaoping's boldness 
and confidence in liberating the economy and coupled with grave 
concern and steadfastness in “upholding" the "Four Cardinal 
Principles” and opposing "the bourgeois liberalization”.
Looking back at the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping has indeed gone a 
long way from Mao's self-reliant*, development strategy to his 
opening-up and outward-looking strategy. However, Deng's 
seemingly pragmatic approach characterized by "crossing the 
river by feeling the stones" is still underpinned by his 
conviction and determination that liberalization and opening-up 
should only be limited to the economic field; bourgeois 
liberalization must be opposed and Leninist political control 
must be upheld. So while Deng's strategy has brought about great 
benefits and progress to China in the last decade, his approach 
has shown to be fundamentally flawed. As I will discuses in 
detail in the following chapters, economic liberalization and 
growing interdependence with the outside world have inevitably 
given rise to a series of social, ideological and political 
changes. Ironically, it is the great dynamism and success of the 
reforms and the increasing interdependence with the world 
economy that have generated and necessitated more and more 
changes in the social, ideological and political fields. 
Consequently, the elements of the so-called socialist economy 
have been shrinking, the motor force of the reforms has been 
moving away from the centre to the local levels and the central 
government's control over the economy as well as the society has 
been substantially weakened. All of this fundamentally threatens 
the existing socialist system and the leadership of the 
Communist Party.
The reform of socialist countries in general and of China 
in particular has been examined in many aspects, including the 
domestic problems of their adaptation, the development of new 
institutions, the external demands of market forces, some of
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\these themes in the context of bilateral relationships, such as 
with Japan and U.S.. As yet, there has appeared no systematic 
attempt by a Communist leadership to examine the problems 
involved in the pursuit of reformist policies that necessarily 
entail ever-deepening relations of interdependence with a 
largely capitalistic international- economy on the one hand, and 
the attempt to maintain and develop a socialist political system 
on the other.47
Based on the series of Interviews I conducted with 
managers and administration personnel working in the FRE area of 
one of China's principal externally-oriented centres, this 
thesis attempts to examine the processes and problems involved 
in the policies of "reform and opening-up" as they affected 
China's adaptation to the world economy during the 1980s. In 
addition, this thesis will also attempt to describe and measure 
the changes that the reforms and increasing interdependence with 
the outside world have brought about in China's economic, social 
and political life and particularly to popular modes of thinking 
and outlook, all of which, I believe, are of crucial importance 
to understanding China's long-term development.
47 The few articles that did concentrate on some aspects of 
the problems involved in China's attempt to move away from the 
self-reliant strategy to a more outward looking one include: 
"From Self-Reliance to Interdependence? Developmental Strategy 
and Foreign Economic Policy in Post-Mao China" (Frederich, W. 
Wu. Modern China. Vol.No.7, Issue No.4, Oct.1981). "Economic 
Reform and Foreign Economic Relations: Systemic Conflicts in a 
Theoretical Framework" (Yuan-li Wu. in Changes and Continuities 
in Chinese Communism, Yuming Shaw (ed.) Boulder & London: 
Westview Press, 1988) . "Contemporary Chinese Concepts of Self- 
Reliance, Independence and Alignment" (Michael B Yahuda, 1987, 
unpublished).
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CHAPTER HI. IDEOLOGICAL ADAPTATION AND DIFFICULTIES
In China's unitary Leninist political system ideology is 
extremely important in spelling_ out the regime's claims to 
legitimacy and in providing the framework for determining 
medium and long-term national strategies and directions. 
Accordingly if the incompatibilities between its domestic 
systems and those of the Western world are to be reduced and if 
the rapid modernization of its economy is to be effected, a new 
and coherent ideology may be regarded as vital. So before I 
discuss the actual adaptation process based on my fieldwork in 
China, it is important first, to consider how China's leaders 
have sought to come to terms, conceptually, with the problems 
involved in the reforms, and second, to evaluate the impact of 
these ideological developments upon the actual process of 
reforms and the opening-up in the 1980s. But first it is 
necessary to explain how the term ideology is understood for the 
purpose of the thesis.
I. IDEOLOGY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP)
A. Ideology
Ideology is perhaps one of the most difficult concepts to 
define. Definitions differ enormously between writers, and 
explanations of the phenomenon are based on a wide variety of 
principles.48 Just look at a few examples:
In the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
48 For example, see Raymond Bourdon. The Analysis of 
Ideology (Translated by Malcolm Slater), France: Polity Press, 
1989. Hans Barth. Truth and Ideology. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976. Bernard Williams."Democracy and 
Ideology" in M. Rejai (ed.), Democracy: The Contemporary
Theories. New York: Atherton Press, 1967.
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Edward Shils 49 distinguishes ideologies from other belief 
systems by the following criteria as summarized by Bourdon 
Raymond:
They (ideologies) are distinguished by: the explicit nature 
of their formulation, their wish to rally people to a 
particular positive or normative belief, their desire to be 
distinct from other belief system past or present, their 
rejection of innovation, the intolerant nature of their 
precepts, the affective way they are promulgated, the 
adherence they demand, and finally, their association with 
institutions responsible for reinforcing and putting into 
effect the belief system in question.50
Franz Schurmann defines ideology as "a manner of thinking
characteristic of an organization.”51 He explains:
If organization is a rational instrument engineered to do 
a job, then the human beings who create and use it must do 
so on the basis of a set of ideas. However abstract these 
may be, they must have action consequences, for the purpose 
of organization is action. The more systematic organization 
becomes, the greater is the need for a systemic set of 
ideas to govern it.52
John Plamenatz in his Ideology defines the term as 
referring to ”a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even 
attitudes characteristic of a group or community".53
If ideology, as a whole, is conceived in many, often 
conflicting, ways, the Marxist ideology, under which the 
ideology of the CCP that I am dealing with in this chapter 
should be categorized, is by no means any more coherent or 
clear. While Marx in The German Ideology defines ideology as 
"false consciousness", which, according to J. Plamenatz's
49 Shils, Edward, "The Concept and Function of Ideology", 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol.7, pp.66- 
76.
50 Bourdon, Raymond, op.cit.. p.20.
51 Schurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist 
China. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1966, p.18.
52 Ibid. . p. 18.
53 Plamenatz, John. Ideology. London: Pall Mall, 1970, p.15.
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explanation refers to: "illusions that those who have them
cannot do without if they are to behave in ways typical of the 
class, profession, trade or community they belong to."54 Lenin 
saw ideologies as systems of ideas, or theories used by 
protagonists in the class struggle. To Lenin, the important 
thing for an ideology was its usefulness; its usefulness does 
not necessarily depend on its truth.55
I do not intend to look into the myriads of definitions of 
ideology. My main concern with ideology in this thesis is that 
concerns with the present Communist Party of China and I shall 
examine how the CCP's ideology provides the crucial basis for 
the regime's claims to legitimacy. Later, through the detailed 
examination of the ideological changes in the post-Mao period 
since 1978, this chapter will evaluate the impact these changes 
have upon the actual process of the reforms and opening-up in 
the 1980s.
B. Marxist Ideology vis-a-vis the Legitimacy of the CCP
The CCP's ideology is defined in this thesis as the 
official doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought to 
which the Chinese leadership, party and state are all formally
54 Ibid.. p.12. John Plamenatz further explained: "He (Marx) 
appears to have believed that these false beliefs were necessary 
to enable the state to carry out its real functions. If the 
state is to be what it really is, if it is to favour the 
interests which in fact it does favour, there must be false 
beliefs more or less widely accepted about what it is, about the 
interests it favours. For example, it must be widely held that 
it favours interests common to all who are subject to its 
authority, whereas in fact, according to Marx, it favours the 
interests of one class to the detriment of others." Ibid.. p.24. 
Actually Marx and Engels did not call their own theory an 
ideology, presumably because, again as J. Plamenatz explained, 
"they did not think of it as a form of false consciousness. The 
proletariat, according to them, is in one respect a uniquely 
privileged class: the beliefs about society and the course of 
social change that favour its interests are true beliefs." 
Ibid.. p.27. Also see the analysis of Marx's, definition in 
Raymond Bourdon op.cit.. pp.17-33.
55 For example, see Lenin's What Is To Be Done?. London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1944.
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committed. Three different levels of this ideology can be 
distinguished: first of all, general philosophical assumptions, 
for example, dialectical materialism; second, doctrinal elements 
indicating the general direction of political action in a given 
historical period, for example, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat; and thirdly, 'action programme' or programmes of 
political action specifically tied to particular historical and 
socio-economic conditions, for example, the four modernizations 
programme.
The most important role of this ideology is to legitimize 
the rule of the Communist Party. "Legitimacy”, following 
Sternberger's definition is the foundation of such governmental 
power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the 
government's part that it has a right to govern and with some 
recognition by the governed of that right56. "Legitimation" can 
be seen as the process encompassing the articulation of the 
leadership's awareness of the validity of its authority and the 
attempt to secure some recognition of that validity on the part 
of those it rules.
The ideology legitimates the authority of the Communist 
Party in a number of ways:
Fundamentally, the Party's rule is validated in its claimed 
infallible insight into the course and goal of history. 
According to Marxist 'historical materialism' and 'scientific 
Communism', there is an objective law of development, as a 
consequence of which human history is effected in a historical 
sequence of social formations (primitive society, slave society, 
feudalism, capitalism, socialism-communism). On the historical 
agenda of the present phase of development there stands the 
transition from capitalism to socialism-communism. While it is 
the historical mission of the working class to carry out the 
socialist revolution, to set up a dictatorship of the 
proletariat and to exercise leadership during the construction
56 International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol.9, 
1968, p. 244.
45
phase of socialism-communism, it is the Communist Party who is 
the incarnation of progressive social consciousness and has the 
monopoly of knowledge. 'In other words, inspiration by a higher 
will of history functions as the source of legitimacy for the 
Communist party.57
Based on their claim to global knowledge of social 
processes and the capacity to act as defenders of general social 
well-being, the Communist party describes itself as the vanguard 
of the most progressive social forces and as the representative 
of the great majority of the people in society. In China's 
particular case, through the Sinicizion of Marxism, the CCP 
claims that only she can solve China's problems and only she can 
save China. In a word, it is legitimate for the CCP to rule 
China.
Besides providing this normatively postulated legitimacy, 
the Communist ideology also identifies the goals of a socialist 
society, such as "to each according to one's contributions" and 
"common prosperity"; it identifies the way that the Party and 
the State are organized, that is, the "democratic centralism", 
and identifies the instruments of realizing the goals of a 
socialist society, that is, "public ownership" and "planned 
economy", etc..
Since Marxist ideology is so important in spelling out 
Communist regimes' claims to legitimacy, all Communist parties 
place great emphasis on propagating their ideology. They believe 
that "they cannot long retain power unless the doctrines are 
widely accepted. They believe, too, that they must be a united 
party if they are to gain power and keep it, and that to be a 
united party they must be united in the creed."58 Therefore, 
they consciously exploit ideology for political purposes, for 
example: secure in people's mind the identity of the new social
57 See Brunner, George. "Legitimacy Doctrines and 
Legitimation Procedures in East European System" in Political 
Legitimation in Communist States. T. H. Rigby and Ferene Feher 
(eds.), Oxford: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982, pp.28-31.
58 Plamenatz, J. op.cit. . p. 140.
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order; legitimate the Party's rule; to integrate society and to 
mobilise the masses for the tasks of national construction. 
Besides, as John Plamenatz points out, the ideology is also 
exploited for the purpose of "inducing people to make great 
sacrifices for causes which have meant much more to their 
leaders than to them."59 And ideology has also been used inside 
a party or other organizations by people "endeavouring to get or 
to retain control of it."60 Accordingly, all Communist regimes 
set up a huge and powerful propaganda department charged with 
packaging and propagating the official ideology, and filtering 
or suppressing rival ideas.61
C. A Brief Survey of the Evolution of the CCP's Ideology
In China's case, ever since the CCP came to power in 1949, 
ideology has always been of crucial importance both as a 
legitimating doctrine and as a political tool. And thanks to a 
combination of factors, during most of the 50s the CCP did enjoy 
great support and trust. These factors include: enthusiasm for 
building a New China, popular approval of both gradual 
improvements in living standards and the emergence of the PRC as 
a major international actor. However, since the late 1950s the 
influence of Stalinist Marxism and Maoist ultra-leftist ideology 
time and again combined to bring disasters to China's 
development. The first major setback came with the economic 
crisis following the failure of the "Great Leap Forward", a 
crisis so severe as to shake the faith of the peasantry in the 
Party and Mao. Even more disillusioning were the consequences of 
the "Cultural Revolution", which alienated a whole range of 
groups including intellectuals who suffered severe and often 
violent attacks, urban youth who were sent to confront
59 Ibid. . p. 143.
60 Ibid. . p. 143.
61 See Michael Waller, "What is to Count as Ideology in 
Soviet Politics?" Ideology and Soviet Politics. Stephen White 
and Alex Pravda (eds.), London: Macmillan Press, 1988, pp.21-42.
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conditions of extreme poverty in the countryside, and ordinary 
Party members and bureaucrats who were puzzled and shocked by 
such political turnabouts as the fall of Lin Biao (Mao's 
designated heir apparent).
So by the time of Mao's death in September 1976, the 
Chinese Communist leadership faced a serious crisis of 
confidence and "the official ideology had lost much of its 
ability to mobilize and sustain popular support"62 Faced with 
such a situation, the post-Mao leadership headed by Deng 
Xiaoping decided to carry out a series of radical reforms in 
order to "bring order out of chaos" and rebuild support and 
legitimacy for the regime.
Apparently, the task was enormous and formidable. And since 
in a Leninist unitary political system, ideology is so 
important, Deng and the other reformers had to begin by smashing 
the trammels of the old ideology and working out a new and 
coherent ideology so as to pave the way for the economic reform 
and opening-up programmes. As I shall discuss in detail 
later, in the 1980s the reformers did manage to carry out a 
series of important ideological modifications and put forward a 
number of new theoretical formulations to justify the reform 
policies, which is one of the chief reasons that have helped 
bring about many remarkable changes in Chinese society in the 
last decade. However, the post-Mao reformist Communist 
leadership failed, or rather were unable, to thoroughly break 
away from the old Maoist ideology and establish a cogent and 
coherent new ideology for the reform and opening-up programmes. 
Up till the end of the 1980s, after more than ten years of 
reforms, many crucial ideological issues had still not been 
clearly addressed and many obvious discrepancies or conflicts 
between the ideology and the practice had not been solved. That 
is one of the crucial reasons why the reform of the 1980s has 
proceeded in waves or cycles and also why many people are still 
deeply concerned and uncertain about China's future
62 Harding, Harry, op.cit. . p. 172.
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developmental orientation.
The fundamental reason why the reformist Chinese leadership 
could not work out a ' new ideology is because the Communist 
ideology, as argued above, provides the very legitimacy for the 
CCP regime. It was for the purpose of consolidating the regime, 
not to undermine it, that the reformers in the CCP leadership 
carried out reforms. And in order to stay in power they would 
certainly retain certain fundamental principles of Marxism, 
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
As we saw at the end of the 1970s, in order to get the 
modernizations and economic reforms on course, Deng Xiaoping and 
other reformers had, first of all, to break through the then 
dominant ideology of "taking class struggle as the key link” and 
negate the "Cultural Revolution". That obviously brought forward 
the question of how to treat Mao and his Thoughts. As I shall 
describe and analyze in detail later, though Mao was chiefly 
responsible for all the major disasters since 1949, including 
the catastrophic "Cultural Revolution", the reformist leadership 
only went as far as acknowledging that Mao made some serious 
errors in his late years. They were still committed to upholding 
"the banner of Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought". In Deng's own 
words: "Without Chairman Mao, the Chinese people would probably 
still be struggling in the darkness, and without Mao Zedong 
Thought, there would not be today's Chinese Communist Party"63 
The Dengist reformers treated Mao and Mao Zedong Thought in this 
way because as the chief founding father of the regime, Mao, 
through the prominent role he played in the early successes of 
the CCP and the personal cult cultivated for him in the later 
years, embodied the goals and achievements which the top elite 
had pursued for decades. "From this perspective, to have denied 
Mao's authority would have been tantamount to denying the
63 Selected Works of Pena Xiaoping. Beijing: People's
Publishing House, 1983, pp.138-139.
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meaning of a nearly lifelong commitment."64 What is more, the 
prominent place accorded to the leader on the myths which 
developed around the foundation of the CCP regime, "made it 
difficult to separate the legitimacy of the system as a whole 
from that of the place of the leader in it."65
As the last decade has shown, while-Deng tried to retain 
the Party's political control, the key priority for him was to 
shift the Party's main role to economic development. Through 
this, Deng, to some extent, turned the basis of the CCP's 
legitimacy from Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought to the 
party's performance in developing the country's economy and 
raising people's living standards.
But that strategy proved to be a risky and potentially 
dangerous one for the CCP. This is not only because failing to 
perform well would undermine both the political support and 
legitimacy of the regime, but more significantly, in order to 
perform well, the measures taken to liberalize the economy and 
increase contacts with the outside world in the long run could 
serve to challenge the very claims on which the regime's 
legitimacy rests. As we saw, shortly after the reform programme 
was launched at the end of 1978, official sources increasingly 
spoke of crises of faith, confidence and trust.66 These crises 
reflected not only the lingering disillusionment with the Maoist 
era but also problems generated by the emerging post-Mao 
policies. Out of the necessity for a modernization programme, 
the central leadership began to loosen its control over the 
economy and open up the door to the outside world. As contacts
64 Teiwes, Frederick C. Leadership. Legitimacy, and Conflict 
in China. London: Macmillan Press, 1984, p.49.
65 Righy, T. H. and Feher, Ferenc. (eds.). Political 
Legitimation in Communist States. Oxford: Macmillan Press, 1982, 
p.99.
66 See Alan P.L. Liu. "Political Decay on Mainland China: On 
Crises of Faith, Confidence and Trust", Issues and Studies. 
August,1982.
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with the outside world grew, both populace and cadres became 
increasingly aware of the superior living conditions not only in 
the capitalist West but also in some neighbouring states and 
regions, including Taiwan. Particularly damaging to faith in the 
system was widespread bureaucratic corruption. As a result of 
these and related factors, post-Mao society has been marked by 
open disbelief in the superiority of socialism, widespread 
contempt for those wishing to join the Party, a view of 
officials as a self-seeking exploitative class, and otherwise 
pervasive political indifference. At the same time, some radical 
democrats began to emerge and advocate ideas such as democracy 
and the rule of the law as demonstrated in the Democracy Wall 
Movement in 1979 (which I shall describe in detail later).
These developments sounded the alarm for Deng, and prompted 
him to impose the Four Cardinal Principles in 1979 (Adherence to 
the Socialist Road; the Leadership of the Communist Party; the 
Dictatorship of the People's Democracy and Marxism, Leninism , 
Mao Zedong Thought) and take a very conservative and wary 
attitude towards political reforms.
For Deng Xiaoping, liberalizing the economy and opening up 
the door serve the purpose of rebuilding the legitimacy of the 
CCP, and imposing the Four Cardinal Principles and holding back 
on political reforms also serve the purpose of defending the 
rule of the CCP. But there are built-in tensions between his 
economic liberalism and political authoritarianism. On the one 
hand, the lagging behind or indeed, the lack of political reform 
would pose obstacles to the development of the economic reforms 
and opening-up, as was demonstrated by the disruptive waves, 
cycles or even crises in the last decade; on the other hand, the 
economic liberalism and increasing contact with the outside 
world made it more and more difficult for the leadership to 
defend its unreformed political and ideological systems. This 
tension could become intensified or even explode, as was 
demonstrated by the series of anti-bourgeois liberalism 
campaigns and acute political struggles among the top leadership 
in the last decade.
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In a sense, it can be said that the process of economic
reforms and opening-up is the process of eroding the ideological
/
formulations upon which the CCP's legitimacy rest: the
achievements of the reforms and opening-up could hardly be 
regarded as a vindication of the_ socialist system and Marxist 
principles, but rather evidence of the success and effectiveness 
of the principles of a market economy. As time went on, it 
became increasingly evident that where the principles of a 
market economy were applied, such as in the agricultural sector, 
and in foreign-related and private enterprises, great progress 
has been made, whereas where the Socialist system was still 
fully or partly in place, as in the state enterprises, the 
situation has got worse. These facts made people even less 
convinced not only of the superiority of Socialism but also of 
the possibility of reforming Socialism. What is more, through 
the pervasive official corruption, malpractice and localism 
accompanying the reforms and opening-up, the public no longer 
believe in the official propaganda such as that of the CCP 
serving the interests of the people not themselves, and Learn 
From Lei Feng (a model set up by the Party to embody the noble 
qualities of a Socialist New Man, such as total personal 
devotion to the Party and the people, altruism, etc.). The 
public could now see that the Communist officials themselves did
not believe in these doctrines. As the Polish Communist Party
*
periodical Zvcie Partii pointed out in 1983, "The moral 
standards of the authorities...are a condition for the existence 
of people's power under socialism, a moral expression of its 
political essence. Infringement of these standards is equivalent 
to a denial of this essence, it leads inevitably to social 
conflicts.1,67 Related to this further loss of faith in socialism 
and the leadership of the CCP, the new social forces emerging 
from the reforms began to look for ways to protect their own 
interests.
67 Zvcie Partii. 13 and 17, 1983. Quoted in Lewis Paul G. 
(ed.), Eastern Europe: Political Crisis and Legitimation. London 
& Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984, p.32.
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All these factors, plus the worsening of the economic 
situation and the acute power struggle, precipitated the June 4 
Events in Tiananmen Square in 1989. The use of military means by 
the Party to preserve power ran counter to the establishment of 
popular legitimacy and undermined any claim to popular support. 
As in the case of the military coup of General Jaruzelski in 
Poland in 1980, the June 4 Events marked the clinical death of 
the official Marxist ideology. The June 4 Events were a 
watershed for the CCP. It was made plain then that the CCP had 
only one authentic ideology: power.68
If the fundamental reason why the Communist leadership 
cannot embrace the reforms whole-heartedly is because they can 
only go so far as not to undermine the basis of the regime, 
another very important factor is the existence of many factions 
of different beliefs and interests within the post-Mao 
leadership. In order to make my later description and analysis 
clearer, I shall conduct a very brief survey of the political 
spectrum in the post-Mao leadership. The post-Mao leadership 
could by and large be divided into three groups.
Group I. The "whateverists" represented by Hua Guofeng, the 
hand-picked successor of Mao. Their legitimacy was dependent on 
Mao and therefore they insisted on the dictum: whatever policies 
Chairman Mao devised should be resolutely supported and whatever 
directives Chairman Mao laid down should be observed forever. 
These remnants of the "Cultural Revolution" leadership were 
removed by the early 1980s. Many in this group who had advanced 
up the career ladder during the "Cultural Revolution" resented 
their loss of power and interest and were against the reforms as 
seen during the "Anti-Spiritual Pollution" campaign.
Group II. The conservatives represented by Chen Yun, Li 
Xiannian, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, etc.. These leaders were not 
against all reforms. On the contrary, Hu Qiaomu, for example, 
played a very important role in the political struggle against
68 Also see A Macierewicz, "Obstacles to the Establishment 
of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland", British Journal of 
Political Science, vol.12, 1982, pp.125-47.
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the whateverists and in justifying the reform programmes. 
However, the people in this group only favoured limited and 
moderate reforms. Chen Yun and Bo Yibo, who represented the old 
state planning apparatus, recognized the role of the market but 
intended to allow it to operate only within the limits of 
socialist planning. They upheld the concept that the state is 
there to feed the people. Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, together 
with Chen Yun, worried about the consequences of liberalization 
for the social fabric of China. They intended to maintain a 
Leninist Party and ideological control. For this reason, they 
are also called "leftists”. This group also includes the 
generals symbolized by Wang Zhen, who would not tolerate any 
challenge to the authority of the Party and were ready to 
preserve the power of the Party in the most brutal way.
Group III. The reformers represented by Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang and their followers of the younger generation. They were 
prepared to carry out bolder and more radical reforms. Besides 
being committed to removing bureaucratic constraints on economic 
activity and creating a market-driven economy, they were also 
more willing to carry out some reforms' in the cultural, 
ideological and political fields.
Deng Xiaoping acted as the paramount leader by arbitrating 
among the various factions in his political coalition. His ideas 
were characterized by pragmatism in the economic field and 
conservatism in the political and ideological fields.69
II. SOME MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1980S
A. The Mind Emancipation Campaign
In 1977, Deng Xiaoping returned to power. Now, with Mao 
gone, it was possible for Deng to carry out his own social and
69 The post-Mao leadership is divided into three groups only 
for the sake of simplicity in the study. Actually it is 
difficult to find terms that adequately take into account both 
policy preference and personal loyalties. See Hamrin, Carol Lee, 
op.cit.. p.5 p.9.
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economic developmental programmes. Yet Deng keenly realized that 
”the four modernizations do not have a future without breaking 
ideological rigidity ahd greatly liberating the thought of the 
cadres and masses.1,70
Thus, a mind emancipation campaign was launched under the 
advocacy and with the support of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and 
some other like-minded leaders, which helped make it possible 
for Deng to set his economic reform and opening-up programmes 
into motion.
(1) Comprehensive and Precise Understanding of Mao Zedong 
Thought
Deng opened the first breach in the Maoist ideology by 
challenging the rigid adherence to Mao's writings. He argued 
that they required interpretation in the light of current 
circumstances. To this end he raised the slogan
"Comprehensively and precisely understand Mao Zedong Thought". 
For at that time, the main manifestation of the ideological 
rigidity was to deify Mao and treat his words as absolute truth, 
which was best illustrated by the "two whatevers" advocated by 
Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing. It was obvious that, with the 
sanctity of Mao Zedong Thought unchallenged, it was not possible 
to negate the "Cultural Revolution", nor was it possible to make 
the historic shift in the central task of the CCP, that is, from 
class struggle as the key link to the economic modernizations. 
Therefore, in 1977, before and after his return to power, Deng 
strongly advocated the slogan of "Comprehensively and precisely 
understand Mao Zedong Thought".
To sum up Deng's arguments: first, Mao Zedong Thought was 
a system in which each part was organically related. Therefore, 
"We cannot explain Mao Zedong Thought only based on some of his 
particular words. Instead, we must understand it as a whole
70 Deng Xiaoping. The Selected Works of Pena Xiaoping. 
Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1987, P.133.
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system."71 Second, both Mao himself and Mao Zedong Thought had 
different destinies in different periods. In the period of the 
Democratic Revolution, toao Zedong Thought played the key role in 
all the successes of the CCP, while after the establishment of 
the PRC, Mao made serious mistakes, especially in his theory of 
"the continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the 
Proletariat" which proved to be completely wrong, and therefore, 
one should follow the correct and criticize and abandon the 
wrong.72 Third, and the most important point was that Mao Zedong 
Thought should be developed in accordance with the new 
circumstances and new situations. Mao Zedong Thought was never 
one man's thought, but the crystallization of collective wisdom.
By presenting Mao Zedong Thought in this way, Deng and the 
others could move beyond Mao's own words to Deng's 
interpretation of them. Mao Zedong Thought was thus relativised 
or modified to suit Deng and his group. In essence, the debate 
about how best to understand Mao was actually about the current 
policies.
(2) Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth
If ideological rigidity began to break down by the call for 
people to "comprehensively and precisely understand Mao Zedong 
Thought", then the debate on "practice criterion" became a much 
wider attack on the old ideology.
At the end of 1977, according to the opinion of Hu Yaobang, 
the Party School of the Central Committee clearly laid down two 
principles for the study of the history of the CCP. One was to 
explain Mao's directives comprehensively and precisely. The 
other was to take practice as the criterion for evaluating the 
political struggles. On May 10, 1978, an article of historic 
significance "Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth" 
was published in the internal magazine of the Party School. The 
next day, the article was published in Guancrmincr Daily under the
71 Ibid. . p.40.
72 Ibid. . pp.138,139.
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name of "Special Commentator".73 The crucial point that the 
article contended was that social practice should be regarded as 
the sole criterion for 'testing truth; the integration of theory 
with practice is one of the basic principles of Marxism. Thus, 
any theory must be constantly tested by practice; anything 
proved, by practice, to be erroneous should be changed or 
abandoned.74 Not surprisingly, the publication of the article 
and the ensuing debate on the criterion of truth was strongly 
opposed by Wang Dongxing75 and Hua Guofeng, the "whateverists", 
whereas it was firmly supported and encouraged by Deng Xiaoping, 
Hu Yaobang and the other reformist leaders. On June 2, Deng 
Xiaoping gave an important speech at the PLA's Political Work 
Conference in which he emphasized the basic Marxist principle of 
proceeding from the facts and combining theory with practice. At 
the same time he severely criticized the phenomenon of doing 
everything according to previously laid down rules and 
regulations and not allowing people to study new situations and 
put forward solutions to new problems. He concluded: "It is
vitally important to break spiritual trammels and truly liberate 
our mind."76 Around this time, numerous articles were published 
in many newspapers and the debate spread nationwide.77 In 
essence the debate on "practice criterion" at that time was more 
political than ideological (which severely undermined the 
legitimacy of Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng and ultimately led to 
his demise), however, it did serve as the basis and means for
73 The author was Professor Hu Fuming. See Schram, Stuart R. 
Ideology and Policy in China Since the Third Plenum. 1978-84. 
London: Contemporary China Institute, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, 1984, p.2.
74 See Guanoming Daily. 11.5.1978.
75 One of the then Vice Chairmen of the CCP.
76 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. 1987, p. 114.
77 Also see Jin Yu, Chen Xiankui. Grand Thought in Today's 
China - Deng Xiaoping's theory and practice, Beijing: The 
publishing house of the People's University, 1988.
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the mind emancipation movement.
(3) Seeking Truth from'Facts
In one of Deng Xiaoping's most important speeches,
"Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in 
Looking to the Future,"78 made at the December 1978 work
conference of the Central Committee which made the preparations 
for the well-known Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress at 
the end of 1978, Deng Xiaoping laid down "Seeking truth from 
facts" as the basis of the Party's new ideological guideline.
"Seeking truth from facts" means: people should not proceed
according to books but act upon reality, that is, China's
concrete conditions. Therefore, the criterion for formulating 
and judging a policy is to see whether the policy suits the 
development of present-day Chinese society and whether it is 
conducive to the development of productive forces. Deng's
pragmatism is typified by his famous dictum: "It does not matter 
whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice." 
It was greatly to the credit of the slogan "seeking truth from
facts" that the past ten years have seen so many bold
experiments and so many dramatic changes which would have been 
inconceivable in Mao's era.
(4) Socialism Is to Develop Productive Forces
With the "mind emancipation" campaign and unfolding of the 
"practice criterion" debate, Deng and his supporters pushed the 
offensive further into the sphere of economic theory. Deng said 
"whether the Party's line is conducive to the development of 
the productive forces... is the only arbiter of the correctness 
of this line"79 This was a clear repudiation of Mao's views in 
the Culture Revolution, and it made it easier for the reform- 
minded leaders like Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, Hu Yaobang, to carry
78 Maxwell. Robert (ed.), Deng Xiaoping: Speeches and
Writings. London: Pergamon Press, 1984, p.62.
79 Beijing Review. 28-14.7.1978, p.8.
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out experiments and reforms.
As far as the ideological adjustment in the economic sphere 
was concerned, two articles by Hu Qiaomu at the end of the 
1970s played a significant role.80 The first one “Thoroughly 
carry out the socialist principle of payment according to work” 
was published on 5 May 1978 in the People7s Daily, under the 
pseudonym of “Special Critic”. The article stressed the 
importance of the re-establishment of the basic socialist 
principle of "payment according to work". The second article, 
which was regarded as 'a turning point7 in China7s economic 
guidelines,81 was published on 6 October 1978 under the title 
"Observe Economic Law, Speed Up the Four Modernizations". The 
article was originally a speech made by Hu at a meeting of the 
State Council in July 1978. The delay in its publication of the 
article was due to the fact that Hu7s speech constituted a 
direct criticism of the plans for the quasi-leap announced by 
Hua Guofeng in February 1978.82 In the article, Hu argued that 
the task of leadership was to ensure that economic work 
proceeded in accordance with "objective economic laws". Since 
the establishment of a socialist system in China had resolved 
the major political problems, the remaining problems were 
"scientific": how to run the economy more successfully. Under 
the slogan of "doing everything according to objective economic 
laws7, material incentives began to be widely introduced, the 
"iron rice bowl" began to be challenged and a series of economic 
reforms aiming at increasing efficiency and efficacy began to be 
carried out.
80 At the end of the 1970s, the chief struggle among the top 
leadership was between the whateverists and the reform-minded 
leaders. Chen Yun, Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun etc. at this stage 
could all be regarded as reformers, basically agreeing with 
Deng7s approach. Their differences with Deng and the other more 
radical reformers became greater and sharpened later.
81 For example, see Schram, Stuart R. op. cit.. 1984, p.5.
82 See Bill Brugger. (ed.) . Chinese Marxism in Flux 1978-84. 
London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985, p.77.
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B. Socialist Economy Is Still a Commodity Economy
Marxist theory on commodity economics for a long time 
restricted the paths that socialist countries could choose in 
order to develop their national economies. According to Marxist 
theory, commodity production, currency, and profit should no 
longer be allowed to exist after the" enforcement of the 
socialist public ownership system, for otherwise there would re- 
emerge the exploitation of man by man. However, China's 
socialism was not built on an economy of the highly developed 
capitalism as envisaged by Marx and Engels; instead, it emerged 
from the "womb” of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, in 
which the economy was still dominated by the semi-natural 
economy, and the capitalist commodity economy was never well 
developed. After the leap from a semi-feudal to a socialist 
system,83 Mao and many of his communist colleagues wished to 
skip the historical stage of commodity economy as well,84 hence 
one movement after another from the "great leap forward" to 
people's communes. In those years highly-centralized economic 
and political systems were established; the planned economy was 
pitted against the commodity economy. Externally, the principle 
of "self-reliance" and "independence" was carried to the 
extreme. Of course, the largely hostile international 
environment was an important factor. Foreign economic relations
83 Deng once observed that: "To practice socialism, we need 
a highly developed productive forces, pauperism is not 
socialism... Although we say that we are practising socialism, 
in fact, we are not qualified yet. Only till the next mid­
century, when we reach the level of the middle-developed 
country, can we say we are indeed practising socialism, can we 
justly and forcefully say that socialism is superior to 
capitalism. Now, we are only moving in the direction." See Jin 
Yu, Chen Xiankui. op.cit.. pp.152-153.
84 To say "the commodity economy is a stage of development 
which cannot be skipped" implies the human society will develop 
the stage in which the commodity economy no longer exists. 
However, whether future society (or communism as the communists 
call) will be one free from commodities is debatable. For 
example, see Jiang Yiwei "On Socialist Commodity Economy and 
Capitalist Commodity Economy", Xinhua Digest. No.4, 1990, pp.41- 
43.
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were reduced to a very insignificant level, especially in the 
period before 1972. As a result, although China made obvious 
progress compared with' its own past, its economic development 
was seriously hindered, and China lagged far behind not only the 
industrial western countries, but some of its small neighbours 
as well.
After a few years' ideological debates and economic
experiments, by 1984 the reformers succeeded in putting the
following formulations into the important "Decision on Reform of
the Economic Structure” approved by the Third Plenary Session of
the Twelfth Party Congress held in October:
The socialist planned economy is a planned commodity 
economy based on public ownership, in which the law of 
value must be consciously followed and applied. The full 
development of a commodity economy is an indispensable 
stage in the economic growth of society and a prerequisite 
for our economic modernization. It is the only way to 
invigorate our economy and prompt enterprises to raise 
their efficiency, carry out flexible operations and 
promptly adapt themselves to complex and changing social 
demands.85
So, if the reality of the ever-increasing
internationalization of production and the internationalization
of economic activities all over the world served as the external
basis for China's opening-up strategy, the understanding and
recognition that a socialist economy is still a commodity
economy and that without the full development of commodity
production and commodity circulation economic modernization
will never be realized became the internal theoretical basis for
China's opening-up and economic reform policies. As one of
China's chief economists, Ma Hong, once expounded:
whether a country needs to develop its economic and 
technological exchanges with the outside world is decided 
by the level of its commodity economy. In pre-capitalist
85 "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China on Reform of the Economic Structure” adopted by the 
Twelfth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at its 
Third Plenary Session on 20.10.1984. People's Republic of China 
Year Book 1985. Beijing New China, Hong Kong, Xinhua Publishing 
House,News Ltd., p.78."
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society there was little international economic and 
technological exchange. This was due to the fact that the 
natural economy was dominant at that time while the 
commodity economy was not yet highly developed. 
International economic relationship did not develop far 
until the commodity economy had made tremendous advances in 
the capitalist society.86
In speaking of the economic motivations for the capitalists to
actively open up the world market, Mr. Ma quoted Marx and
Engels: "The need to continuously expand the market for their
products drives the capitalists to run to every part of the
world."87 Ma Hong went on to argue:
Although both the objectives and essence for the socialist 
countries to develop a commodity economy and open up to the 
world market are different from those of the capitalist 
countries, the development of a socialist commodity economy 
will enable us to get rid of the isolationism and narrow­
mindedness which are characteristic of the producers of the 
natural economy, then to make use of foreign capital and 
introduce into our country advanced technology and 
managerial methods and try to enter into the world market 
so that we can benefit from the international division of 
labour and the international commodity exchange.88
So, the positive revaluation of the commodity economy was 
intended to provide the justification for the practice of 
opening up to the world market, introducing market mechanisms 
into China's economic system and borrowing effective managerial 
methods to run the economy. If China's socialist economy is also 
a commodity economy as the capitalist countries and as the 
"Decision" states: "a full development of a commodity economy is 
an indispensable stage in the economic growth of society and 
prerequisite for our economic modernization"89, then it is both 
desirable and justifiable for China to establish extensive
86 Wang Mengkui & Xin Junfang (eds.), Commodity Economy and 
Socialism. Shen Yang: Liaoning People's Publishing House, 1986, 
p. 33.
87 Selected Works of Marx and Engels. Vol.l, p.254.
88 Wang Mengkui, et al.op.cit. . p.33.
89 "Decision on the Reforms", op. cit. . 1984.
62
relationships with the world market and borrow all the effective 
managerial methods from the West which have ensured a high speed 
of development of their commodity economy.
C. Chinese Society Is Still in the Primary. Stage of Socialism
In his report to the 13th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China in October 1987, Zhao Ziyang, the 
General Secretary of the CCP at that time gave a much more 
complicated interpretation of the idea "Chinese socialism is 
still in a primary stage.” He regarded a correct understanding 
of the present historical stage of Chinese society as "something 
of primary importance for building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics" and as "the essential basis on which to 
formulate and implement a correct line and correct policies".90 
The proposition developed by Zhao was so important that Michel 
Oksenberg once commented: "The report is likely to be remembered 
for its key ideological formulation: Chinese socialism is still 
in a primary stage."91
The idea that "Chinese socialism is still in a primary 
stage," is not totally new. It appeared in the "Resolution on 
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding 
of the People's Republic of China" adopted by the Sixth Plenary 
Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China on June 27, 1981. The 33rd Section of the Resolution says: 
"Although our socialist system is still in its early phase of 
development, China has undoubtedly established a socialist 
system and entered the stage of socialist society. Any view 
denying this basic fact is wrong".92 At that time the sentence 
was to emphasize the socialist nature of the Chinese society,
90 Beiiinq Review. No.45, Nov.1987, p.3.
91 Oksenberg, Michel. "China's 13th Party Congress", 
Problems of Communism. Nov-Dee. 1987, p.12.
92 Beiiinq Review. No 27, 6.7.1981, p.35.
63
not the “early phase of socialism”. The idea also appeared in Hu 
Yaobang's report to the 12th Party Congress in September 1982: 
"Our socialism is still in its initial period, the material 
civilization is still not highly developed.1,93 Again, at that 
time the proposition was still understood mainly with regard to 
the "productive forces", and was not yet linked with the 
multiple economic elements in the productive relations, let 
alone being treated as the theoretical starting point for the 
ongoing reform and opening-up.94
The phenomenon whereby the idea "Chinese socialism is still 
in a primary stage" suddenly became the focal point in the 
theoretical discourse in the summer of 1987, on the eve of the 
13th Party Congress, was obviously closely related to the 
political and economic situations in the latter half of 1986 and 
the first half of 1987. Both in the Beidaihe summer meeting and 
the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth Congress in the autumn of 1986, 
intense arguments and confrontations took place between the 
reformists and the conservatives95. In the anti-bourgeois 
liberalization campaign from late 1986 to early 1987, the 
conservatives not only attacked the "liberalization" tendencies 
in the political, ideological and theoretical spheres, but also 
severely criticized the "liberalization" tendency in the 
economic sphere. Evidently the reformists were faced with the 
ideological difficulty of having to justify the necessity of 
allowing multiple economic elements to exist, and the task of 
establishing a rationale in Marxist terms for the reform and 
opening-up policies.
To address the obvious discrepancy between some of China's 
new policies and the Marxist doctrine, Zhao contended in his 
report:
93 Beiiinq Review. No.37, 1.9.1982, p.11.
94 The origins and evolution of the phrase are traced in 
People's Daily. 5.11.1987, p.4.
95 See The Nineties. No.11, 1987, p.22.
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Building socialism in a big, backward Eastern country like 
China is something new in the history of the development of 
Marxism. We are pot in the situation envisaged by the
founders of Marxism, in which socialism is built on the
basis of highly developed capitalism, nor are we in exactly 
the same situation as other socialist countries. So we 
cannot blindly follow what the books say, nor can we 
imitate the examples of other countries mechanically.96
As for the "primary stage of socialism”, Zhao described it 
as follows:
... the specific stage China must necessarily go through 
while building socialism under conditions of backward 
productive forces and an underdeveloped commodity economy. 
It will be at least 100 years from the 1950's... to the
time when socialist modernization will have been in the
main accomplished, and all these years belong to the 
primary stage of socialism... It is a stage in which an 
agricultural country... will gradually turn into a modern 
industrial country...97
The reason the formulation of the "Primary stage of 
socialism” was given so much attention and emphasis by Zhao and 
the other reformists was mainly because it seemed to offer an 
intriguing alternative solution to the ideological difficulty. 
First, this conceptualization repelled the argument that because 
the communist-led revolution came prematurely and socialism came 
too early to China, capitalist practices should be allowed to 
flourish with a return to socialism later, which as Oksenberg 
said "remained an anathema to committed Marxist-Leninists”98. In 
his report, Zhao made it clear that China would not abandon the 
essential attributes of a socialist society: the continued rule 
of the Communist Party, public ownership of the main means of 
production, a planned economy, and commitment to the ultimate 
Marxist-Leninist goal of a classless society.99 Secondly, the 
concept provided a kind of rationale and justification for the
96 Beiiinq Review. No.45, Nov. 1987, p.4.
97 Ibid. . p.5.
98 Oksenberg, Michel, op.cit. . p. 12.
99 Beiiinq Review. No.45, Nov.1987, p.4.
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reform and open policies that might otherwise be interpreted as 
abandoning socialism.
Proceeding from the realities of "the primary stage of 
socialism” Zhao set out the main tasks for the Communist Party 
as concentrating on modernization; persisting in a comprehensive 
reform; adhering to the opening-up policy and vigorously 
developing planned commodity economy with public ownership 
playing the dominant role. Zhao said: "The basic criterion for 
judging all our work should be whether it serves the end of 
expanding the productive forces."100 According to the theory of 
the primary stage of socialism, a free market, stock exchange 
and bankruptcy need not exist exclusively in capitalist 
societies: they can also exist in a society that has already 
entered a socialist era and is in the process of attaining a 
fully modern economy.
In developing this proposition, the reformists hoped to be 
able to reject the accusations and attacks from the leftists and 
conservatives and to acquire a freer hand to carry out their 
opening-up and economic reform policies.
III. CONTRADICTIONS AND PROBLEMS IN THE IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The three major ideological developments, or breakthroughs, 
as briefly described above, ie. the calling for the emancipation 
of the mind; the reevaluation of the commodity economy and the 
conceptualization of "China's socialism is still in the primary 
stage", were all intended to justify and pave the way for the 
economic reform and opening towards the outside world. Although 
the reformers did achieve some success in providing guidelines 
and creating the driving force for the modernization, these 
ideological developments contained many self-contradictory and 
conflicting elements.
100 Beiiinq Review. No.45, Nov 1987, p.5.
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A. Emancipating the Mind vis-a-vis the Imposition of the Mew 
Ideological Principles
The leadership hea'ded by Deng Xiaoping did not unleash the 
mind emancipation campaign for the sake of restoring people's 
freedom of thought and speech. It was launched to undermine the 
authority of the Maoists and to enable the changes they wanted 
to take place. Therefore, when the mind emancipation went beyond 
the limits they were ready to tolerate, the leadership 
immediately imposed certain restrictions on the freedom of 
speech.
By the end of the 1970s, two events precipitated the first 
great turning-point in the zig-zag ideological evolution since 
1978. First, Deng's initial support of the "Xidan Democracy 
Wall” movement soon led to far-reaching criticism: a large
number of big-character posters appeared criticising the Party 
and some of its leaders and calling for democracy and legality. 
Second, in the Theoretical Work Conference held by the CCP 
Central Committee in early 1979, some radical viewpoints were 
put forward. For example, by condemning the 'leftist' mistakes 
of the 'Cultural Revolution', some people suggested that China 
should not have gone in for socialism so early; it should make 
up the missed lesson of capitalism. And by criticizing Mao 
Zedong's mistakes in his late years, some people intended to 
negate Mao's whole life and Mao Zedong Thought. In addition, 
some people strongly advocated the slogans for freedom, 
democracy and human rights.101
This situation not only caused alarm to the CCP's remaining 
"Old Guards" and the radical leftists, but also went beyond the 
limitation that Deng and the other reformists could tolerate. As 
a result, on the closing day of the Meeting of Theoretical Work, 
March 30 1979, Deng Xiaoping set out the Four Cardinal
Principles (adherence to the socialist road, to the people's 
democratic dictatorship, to the Communist Party's leadership and
101 Also see Wan Renzhi. "Opposition to Bourgeois 
Liberalization", Beiiinq Review. April 1990, p.3 & p.13.
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to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought) as the criteria to
define the limits of the "liberation of thinking".
Commenting on the proclamation of the four principles, Liao
Gailong, one of Deng's proteges said in October 1981 that:
It was necessary not only because some elements among the 
people had abused the call for the liberation of thought to 
attack Marxism-Leninism and the socialist system, but 
because those comrades whose thinking is ossified,... and 
who obstinately support the erroneous line of the 'two 
whatevers' took advantage of the opportunity to attack the 
correct line of the Third Plenum ..., saying that the 
decisions of the Third Plenum had brought about a mad 
attack by the bourgeois rightists,... consequently, the 
Party Central Committee considered that, ... in order to 
continue to implement thoroughly the correct line of the 
Third Plenum calling for liberating thought, and seeking 
truth from facts, and to continue liquidating the influence 
of the erroneous line of the 'two whatevers', it was 
necessary to reaffirm the four principles.102
This explicitly revealed not only the limit of the reformists' 
tolerance but also the severe struggles over the ideological 
problems in the leadership.
In the political development since 1978, despite the 
repeated claims by the CCP leadership that no political 
campaigns would be waged in the course of constructing a 
socialist society, a number of political campaigns, mainly in 
the ideological sphere, were launched. Among the major campaigns 
were: the anti-spiritual pollution campaign in the winter of 
1983, the theoretical study campaign in 1985, the anti-bourgeois 
liberalization campaign in early 1987 which brought down the 
General Secretary of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, and the overall 
counterattack after June 1989 Tiananmen Events, in which Zhao 
Ziyang, another General Secretary of the CCP was ousted. During 
these campaigns, ideological control was tightened, outspoken 
theorists, writers and scientists were persecuted, high level 
reformist leaders were removed and replaced, and open-door and
102 Liao Gailong. "The Road to the All-round Edification of 
Socialism", Yunnan Social Science. No.2, 1982, pp.6-7.
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reform policies were attacked.103 Chen Yun, for example, at the
National Conference of the CCP held in September 1985, gave a
severe warning about the decline of the Communist ideology:
There are now some people, including Party members, who 
have forsaken socialist and communist ideals and turned 
their backs on serving the .people. In pursuit of their own 
selfish gain, they put money above all else without regard 
to the interests of the state and people, even to the 
extent of violating the law and discipline .... These 
problems can be attributed to the relaxation of ideological 
and political work and the - decline in the function and 
authority of departments in charge of such work.104
B. Commodity Economy vis-a-vis Socialist Planned Economy and 
Social Values
The "Decision on Reform of the Economic Structure” approved 
by the Party Central Committee in 1984 clearly stated that: "The 
full development of a commodity economy is an indispensable 
stage in the economic growth of society." However, two 
important questions remained unresolved: the first was the
relationship between the commodity economy and the socialist 
planned economy based on public ownership; the second concerned 
with the incompatibility between what was called socialist 
ethics and the values developed under the circumstances of a 
commodity economy.
Briefly speaking, the commodity economy in the capitalist 
countries is based on the protection of private property, free 
market, open trade, exchange at equal pricing, free competition 
and an independent judiciary, etc; Stalinist socialist economy, 
on the other hand, is based on public ownership and central 
planning, with production, market, trade and price, etc.. all 
controlled by the government.
103 However, it should be noticed that all the campaigns 
were not on the same scale as those that took place before 1976 
and were quite short-lived as well; the public could no longer 
be mobilized to support the campaigns.
104 Beiiinq Review. No.39, Oct. 1985.
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Although the disastrous consequences of the ineptitude of 
the state planner and the rigid structure of the planned economy 
were keenly felt, it ' was very difficult for the communist 
leadership to abandon the planned economy and opt whole­
heartedly for a market economy. A genuine shift toward a market 
economy would ultimately require fundamental changes in the 
ownership of property and the reorganization of the national 
economy according to the free market regulations. This would not 
only mean the abandonment of the public ownership, which the 
communists regard as the cornerstone of socialism, but also 
means the loss of central control over the economy and therefore 
the substantial loss of power and legitimacy, none of which 
could possibly be accepted by a Communist regime.
Therefore, despite the acceptance of a "commodity economy" 
in the mid 1980s, the CCP still insisted: "the socialist
commodity economy is a planned commodity economy based on public 
ownership... not a market economy that is entirely subject to 
market regulation." More specifically: "Production and exchange 
completely subject to market regulation are confined mainly to 
certain farm and sideline products, small articles of daily use 
and labour services in the service and repair trades, all of 
which play a supplementary but indispensable role in the 
national economy."105 It is. evident that, the juxtaposition of 
concepts such as the "planned commodity economy", "socialist 
commodity economy" is itself absurd and self-contradictory.106
It is true that, in today's world, no market economy is an 
absolutely free economy; even in the West, governments regularly 
intervene in the development of the economy through various
105 P.R.C. Yearbook. 1985, op. cit. . p.78.
106 Another big step forward was indeed made when the 
formulation of "Socialist Market Economy" was accepted in the 
14th Party Congress held in October 1992. However, the 
juxtaposition of "socialist" and "market economy" is still 
awkward. And the Report made by the Party's General Secretary 
Jiang Zemin at the Congress still stressed the importance of 
maintaining the dominant position of the state economy. People's 
Daily. 13.10.1992.
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measures and to different degrees. However, when the communist
leadership said that China's economy should be a socialist
planned commodity economy with "planned economy” and "market
economy” combined together, they were by no means convinced that
it was a more practical and more feasible model for China's
economic development,107 rather it would conform better to their
official ideology. This argument could be supported by two sets
of facts: one was that after the "Decision of Reform of the
Economic Structure" was adopted, quite a number of articles were
published which aimed to rationalize the "socialist commodity
economy" in terms of the official doctrine and to explain away
the obvious discrepancy between the idea of a "socialist
commodity economy" and the classical statements on commodity
economics by Marx and Engels, who envisaged that socialism
should be a society in which commodity production was eliminated
and the anarchic state of production replaced by production
which was consciously planned and organized. The other was the
lack of discussion and specification as to how the socialist
commodity economy could work. Actually, as late as 1990, Wu
Shuqing (one of China's more conservative economists, president
of Beijing University appointed after the June 1989 events) had
only this to say:
The orientation of the reform should meet the needs of the 
development of a socialist commodity economy, therefore, we 
must search for a kind of mechanism which can organically 
combine both the planned economy and market regulation.... 
To create a new operative mechanism - which can suit 
China's concrete conditions, combine both a planned economy 
and market regulation and meet the needs of developing a 
socialist commodity economy - is an unprecedented great 
undertaking. All those who are determined to bring about a 
great advance in China's economy and realize China's 
modernizations... should make concerted efforts in
107 I think it does make sense economically when they say: 
"Meanwhile, we must also realize that the extensive growth of a 
socialist commodity economy may also lead to certain disorder in 
production, and there have to be guidance, regulation and 
administrative control through planning." See "Decision on the 
Reform", 1984, o p . cit..
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searching for the solution to the problem.108
The other problem Arises from the conflict between the so-
called socialist values and those developed in the environment 
of a commodity economy. The reformists regarded the development 
of a commodity economy as a way of making it possible to 
"invigorate the economy, to prompt enterprises to raise their 
efficiency, carry out flexible operations and promptly adapt 
themselves to complex and changing social demands".109 However 
the practice of a commodity economy both required and produced 
a series of changes, some of which could come into conflict with 
the Communist ideology and therefore damage fundamental 
interests of the Communist Party.
Commenting on the danger of "bourgeois contamination", an 
article in a 1985 issue of Red Flag, the magazine of the Central 
Committee of the CCP, discussed why the "commodity exchange" 
mentality must not be allowed to "pervade the Party's political 
life". The kind of marketplace commodity exchange that Marx and 
Engels denounced in The Communist Manifesto, it noted, was too 
money-oriented and too materialistic for the members of the 
Communist Party, who should be dedicated to the welfare of the 
people, and for whom personal utility returns should be moot and 
immaterial110.
The conflict also fully presented itself in the ups and 
downs of the campaign of "learning from Lei Feng". Lei Feng was 
set up by the Communist Party as a perfect example of being
altruistic and dedicating oneself whole-heartedly, to the state
and to the Party. As the 1980s saw, whenever the leadership 
wanted to tighten up on ideological control or a campaign 
against "bourgeois" ideas was unleashed, Lei Feng would return 
into the limelight in the official press. The problem was when
108 People's Daily (Overseas edition), 23.1.1990, p.2.
109 "Decision on the Reform", 1984, op. cit..
110 "Why the Commodity Exchange Principle Must Not Pervade 
the Party's Political Life", Red Flag. No.16, 1985, pp.44-45.
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the Party called on people to "Learn from Lei Feng" and his
altruistic dedication, how could it at the same time justify its
reformist policies such as encouraging "some people to become
rich first”? In a speech on the ideological and political work,
Li Ruihuan, a standing member of the Politburo in charge of
ideological work, once acknowledged the conflict between the
two. In his words:
For quite a long time, the economic policies were 
'tailored' and judged according to Communist ethics. As a 
result, those which were conducive to the development of 
the productive forces were condemned and negated as 
something immoral and heretical, which led to the 
prevalence of egalitarianism. In recent years, however, 
although our economic policies are correct, we have 
slackened the ethical education and sometimes the current 
policies are equated with the ethical principles, as a 
result, individualism of benefitting oneself at the expense 
of others: money worship of 'doing everything for money' 
have become prevalent. We should learn a lesson from the 
past experience. The two dimensions, strengthening moral 
education and carrying out the current economic policies 
should be able to help each other forward. One of the most 
important tasks in the ideological sphere is to search for 
the way in which the two could be in agreement with each 
other. 11
This kind of conflict was fully demonstrated through the fuss 
and controversy caused, in the early 1980s, by the slogan "Time 
is money and efficiency is life” which appeared and was 
advocated in Shenzhen, one of China's SEZs.112
111 Li Ruihuan. "Some Problems on Ideological work in the 
Enterprises”, People's Daily (overseas edition), 19.5.1990. p.4.
112 Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily. 5.4.1984. "There 
used to be a lot of controversy over this slogan”, as Mr Zou 
Erkang, Secretary-General of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 
once described: "The concept of 'money' was often wrongly, or 
one-sidedly, interpreted due to the 'Leftist' influence. Some 
people equated 'money' with capitalism. They turned a blind eye 
to the value of commodities and never cared to improve economic 
results." Mr. Zou strongly defended the slogan, saying "There is 
nothing wrong with the Shekou slogan, because it only reminds 
people to be time-conscious, improve their efficiency and create 
more material wealth for the state. In the past, however, 
efficiency was neglected, and much time was wasted on buck- 
passing and delays. That gravely slowed the growth of the forces
(continued...)
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The leadership would like to have both the benefits of 
economic liberalization and the economic contact with the 
outside world and sodialist, communist ethics. But the new 
circumstances of what is neither a planned economy nor a free 
economy have often combined the weaknesses of both systems and 
accentuated the corruption and maladies in society.
In China's ten years' economic reform and opening-up, a lot 
of Western technology was introduced, and a great number of 
economic and managerial reforms were carried out partly 
according to the capitalist models. However, in the meantime, 
the so-called "bourgeois” ideas, values and political systems 
had been severely attacked and criticized. This touches on a 
fundamental issue: could the capitalist techniques be used
disjointedly from the system from which they had evolved? Some 
could contend that, social techniques "must be applied as a 
system, their organic interconnections unbroken. Capitalist 
social techniques, it can be argued, are the products of a 
pluralistic culture and as such need a pluralistic, competitive, 
free-wheeling, free-choice environment to do their job of 
efficient resource allocation.1,113
C. The Primary Stage of Socialism vis-a-vis the Adherence to the 
Socialist Road and the Idea of Socialist Superiority over 
Capitalism
One of the most important characteristics of China's reform 
and opening-up in the 1980s is that spontaneous experiments and 
practice have often taken the lead and left policy-making and 
theoretical justification far behind. At the end of the 1970s, 
some provincial leaders associated with Deng Xiaoping began to 
push for agricultural and industrial reform before any policies,
112 (... continued)
of production. In that sense, the Shekou slogan is a repudiation 
of our recent past." Shenzhen SEZ Daily. 10.10.1984.
113 Prybyla, Jaw S. "China's Economic Experiment: from Mao to 
Market", Problems of Communism. Jan-Feb 1986, Vol.XXXV, p.23.
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let alone theories on reforms, had been formulated. Wan Li, in
Anhui Province, promoted experiments to reform the rural
incentive system; Zhato Ziyang, in Sichuan Province, began
decentralizing controls over industry, granting more autonomy to
industrial enterprises.
Faced with massive and often dramatic changes such as the
rapid growth of individual business, extensive economic
relations with capitalist countries, etc, the theorists as well
as the general public often have to try hard to understand,
analyze or justify the new developments. For example, having
stated that: "We are firmly upholding the socialist system of
ownership but, as required at this stage of socialist
development, allow individual economy and other operational
patterns as supplements", an article in Democracy and Law in
early 1981 questioned: "Can the socialist system admit
capitalist ownership? Do our present joint enterprises
constitute state capitalism?"114
Even Xue Muqiao, one of the well-known veteran economists
in China demanded serious consideration of the limits to
capitalist forms:
Individual ownership has been recognised by law, and 
enterprises jointly operated with Chinese and foreign 
capital and even a small number of foreign enterprises have 
also been recognized. Now that we may take in foreign 
capital and welcome investment by overseas Chinese, are 
people who have large deposits with the bank permitted to 
invest in state enterprises? At present, some enterprises 
encourage their staff and workers to join them as partners, 
many co-operatives have been newly established by commune 
members raising funds themselves and they issue bonuses to 
labourers according to work done and to investors according 
to the amount of capital contributed. Some well-off rural 
people's communes have also set up enterprises outside the 
original scope of their businesses, or have invested in 
state enterprises. In some localities, some enterprises 
have been established with the capital of individuals and 
each hires ten or more staff members and workers. To what 
extent can these semi-socialist or non-socialist sectors of 
the economy develop? This question is very important and
114 Democracy and Law. April 1980.
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complicated and needs serious discussion.115
In the last decade, the discussions and debates on the 
stage of China's socialism never stopped. Some scholars, 
including Su Shaozhi, the former Director of the Marxist-
Leninist Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in the 
early 1980s, argued that China's socialism was still an 
underdeveloped socialism.116 Even Deng Xiaoping once called it 
an "unqualified socialism"117.
However, many of the discussions, including the idea that 
"China's socialism is still in the primary stage", tended to be 
very general and vague, unable to provide an adequate analysis 
and specific guidelines for the practice. For example, in
speaking of the distinction between socialism and capitalism, 
Feng Wenbin, Vice President of the Central Party School in the 
early 1980s, wrote an article in which he distinguished between 
the principles which defined a socialist system and the form of 
public ownership. He wrote: "So long as public ownership of the 
means of production was dominant, so long as exploitation had 
been brought to an end with labour power no longer a commodity 
and so long as distribution was according to work done, one 
might talk about the existence of a socialist system."118 Yet, 
adherence to the formal principles defining the socialist
system, whilst allowing great variety of forms of ownership, 
offered no guide as to just how far the reforms ought to go.
Once it was accepted that the only arbiter of the
correctness of the Party's line is to see whether it is 
conducive to the development of the productive forces,119 and
115 Guancrminq Daily. 19.5.1982.
116 Su Shaozhi. Marxism in China. Nottingham: Spokesman,
1983.
117 See Jin Yu, Chen Xiankui. op.cit. . p. 152.
118 Beiiinq Review. No.23, 8.6.1981, p.21.
119 Beiiinq Review. No.28, 14.7.1978, p.8.
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that relations of production might be too far in advance of the 
productive forces, then it became possible to go back to earlier 
forms of social organizations without acknowledging that one was 
fostering capitalism. For example, it was even argued that 
although the individual economy and the 'SEZs' are not 
socialist, they contribute to increasing output and thus 
contribute to consolidating the socialist system.120
The conceptualization of the idea that "China's socialism 
is still in the primary stage" therefore could be understood as 
the attempt to provide a kind of justification for any practice 
that is conducive to the development of the productive forces 
and the earlier realization of the four modernizations.
Together with the discussion on China's developmental level 
and attempt to justify the reform policies, efforts were made in 
helping people to rethink and reevaluate capitalism.
In Mao's era, people were told that imperialism (the last 
stage of capitalism, according to Lenin) was decadent and 
moribund, that the Western capitalist countries were all caught 
up in deadly crisis in all fields, that the socialist system 
would eventually replace the capitalist system, etc.. However, 
when people had the opportunity to see capitalism for themselves 
through the "open door", they found that their understanding of 
capitalism was utterly different from the realities in the 
capitalist world. This naturally prompted them to think again 
about the nature of current capitalism. Among a series of 
articles on this theme, the essay by the director of the Hong 
Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency offers a frank and 
systematic exposition on modern capitalism, which was published 
in Beiiinq Review in November 1988. In this essay, the author 
called for the rejection of stereotyped views of capitalist 
societies, acknowledged that major changes have taken place in 
their social and economic practices and that they still possess 
a large potential for developing productive forces. Among other 
things, the following argument received wide attention: "As well
120 Academic Magazine of Jilin University. Feb. 1981, p. 19.
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as developing the productive forces, capitalism has also made
some historical contributions to the ideological and political
superstructure of capitalist societies.” He argued: "It has to
be noted, however, that capitalist material advances, as well as
those parts of its cultural wealth which are of positive
significance, were created by the whole of mankind: the
bourgeoisie, the proletariat, intellectuals, farmers and so on.
Thus they are the common wealth of the human race." Based on
this understanding the author contended:
As socialism can only be built on the foundations of 
previous social development, and the two systems will exist 
side by side for a considerable period to come, we should 
and must learn from capitalism and inherit all the 
outstanding cultural achievements of human history. Only in 
this way can socialism be consolidated, improved and 
developed. Without the cultural heritage of capitalism, 
there would be no socialism. Socialism can never cut its 
historical and present ties with capitalism and succeed by 
isolating itself from the development of world 
civilization.121
This viewpoint clearly implies that given that socialist 
countries are also striving to develop their productive forces 
and a commodity economy, they should not only employ the 
capitalist economic system which manifests the objective demands 
for the socialization of production and the development of the 
commodity economy, but also accept and assimilate the capitalist 
social systems and values which better suit the productive 
forces and the commodity economy.
In brief, one of the results of the reevaluation of 
socialism and capitalism was that the distinction between 
socialism and capitalism became very hazy, which could not but 
deepen the crisis of faith in socialism. Throughout the 1980s, 
comments and discussions as to which road China was following 
were never absent for long. Some people, Chinese as well as non- 
Chinese, would judge that China was going capitalist. The 
conservatives would accuse the reformists of practising
121 Xu Jiatun. "Reevaluating Capitalism", Beiiinq Review. 
Nov.14-20. 1988, pp.18-20.
78
capitalism only behind the facade of socialism. However, what 
should be noted is that the blurring of the distinction between 
socialism and capitalism and the crisis of faith in socialism, 
especially among the young people, were not beneficial to the 
fundamental interest of the reformists either. Therefore, during 
the ten years, whenever the situation developed to the point 
that the reformists thought things were going too far and the 
radical leftists could amass adequate power to unleash an 
attack, backlashes would occur, which certainly disrupted the 
on-going economic reform and opening-up.
IV IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE ON THE OPENING-UP AND ECONOMIC REFORM
In speaking of the ideology vis-a-vis the opening-up and 
economic reform, many people raise the question whether ideology 
really mattered in China's development in the 1980s? Without 
carrying out the kind of ideological and political 
transformations that Mr. Gorbachev did in the Soviet Union, had 
not China done quite well in the economic reforms and opening- 
up?
Undeniably, with the shift in the central task from class
struggle to economic construction in the post-Mao era, official
ideology can no longer dominate all aspects of people's life,
people now care more about effects and aims rather than
principles and means. As Orville Schell observed:
While a few older Party cadres still struggled to 
rationalize these radical changes in Marxist terms, most 
younger cadres (many of whom had been abroad to study) 
seemed not only uninterested in the contradiction from a 
theoretical perspective, but a little irritated at being 
reminded of China's continued insistence that it was a 
socialist country. In their rush to a new future, they 
brushed aside China's socialist past as if this aspect of 
their country's persona were a bothersome, somewhat 
embarrassing detail they now wished everyone would forget. 
What interested them was managing and using the exciting 
new financial instruments of bankruptcy and stocks and
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bonds to create maximum productive power.122
Many radical reformers, and the liberal economists and 
political theorists, such as those once gathered by Zhao at the 
Institute for Structural and Economic Reform, obviously 
favoured the strategy of inconspicuously and quietly taking the 
necessary steps to shift China's economy towards a market- 
oriented one without rousing too much public discussion 
concerning economic theory and systems and without going into 
open confrontations with the hard-line conservatives and 
leftists. They hoped "such a strategy would allow them to weaken 
the old ideology to the point where it would ultimately topple 
of its own accord before anyone got around to labelling what 
they were doing as the theoretical heresy that it actually 
was.11123
While I agree that China did achieve remarkable successes 
in the 1980s, I would argue that ideology did matter and could 
still have a crucial role to play in China's future.
It mattered because, firstly, without having broken through 
the ideological forbidden zones and jettisoned the leftist 
dogmas at the end of the 1970s, the radical shift from Maoist 
development strategy to the reformist and opening-up policies 
would have been inconceivable.
Secondly, if the younger generations tended to ignore or 
make light of the significance of ideology, the older
generations, especially the first generation of the
revolutionaries (in their late 70s and 80s in the 1980s) , did 
care a great deal about ideology; it mattered very much to them 
as to which road China was following. Given that in the ten 
years it was still these "old revolutionaries" who made the most 
important and final decisions in the country, their
ideologically oriented world outlook and the intense debates and
122 Schell, Orville. Discos and Democracy. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1988, p.53.
123 Ibid. . pp. 54-55.
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struggles over the ideological problems in the top leadership
certainly exerted great impact on the formulation and
implementation of the Economic reform and opening-up policies.
Thirdly, the tactics adopted by some more radical reformers
of avoiding political and ideological confrontation but quietly
carrying out the practical changes, conversely, proved the
crucial significance of the ideology. And while this piecemeal,
pragmatic tactic had its advantages and had worked quite well,
the costs and weakness of it were also obvious. To a great
extent, it deprived the reformers, as well as China, of a public
stage on which to think out loud and formulate a comprehensive
and understandable vision of China's economic future. Again as
Schell observed:
China's economy was being rebuilt in a very piecemeal 
fashion. But what the design of this new economy was
ultimately going to look like, how all(the economic 
mechanisms) borrowed from other economic systems were going 
to fit together to create a new and operable whole, 
remained an imponderable, so that sometimes it seemed that 
the whole process of economic reform would end up as 
nothing more than a chaotic jumble of spare parts, each
adopted from elsewhere to solve a specific problem, but
with no internal consistency.124
So when the cause of opening-up and reform ran into grave 
difficulties in 1988, with inflation rapidly soaring up to 
double digit figures, with corruption running rampant and with 
social disaffection and tension becoming increasingly 
intensified, people began to ask why the reform and opening-up 
had got into such a state and what had gone wrong. Among the 
discussions and debates, more and more people, especially the 
young and middle-aged intellectuals came to believe that what 
was lacking was the fundamental transformation of the basic 
political and economic systems as well as the cultural value 
system.
124 Schell,Orvill. op.cit. . pp.53-54. Of course, some people 
vould argue that the "piecemeal fashion” is both a strength and 
a weakness.
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Having discussed the process and difficulties in the post- 
Mao ideological adaptation, the next part of this chapter will 
examine how this difficult ideological adaptation process and 
the half-reformed ideology have influenced the development of 
the reform and opening-up. First, through the examination of 
the development of Shenzhen, one of the SEZs, I hope to show how 
ideological differences and struggles in the leadership could 
affect both the formulation and implementation of the major 
decisions and policies concerning the opening-up and reform. 
Then, through an exploration of the relationship between 
political reform and economic reform, together with a brief 
survey of the ups and downs of the political reform, I attempt 
to show that by impeding the fundamental changes in the basic 
political system, which were desperately needed for the success 
of the economic reform, the half reformed and self-contradictory 
ideology has often thrown the whole opening-up and economic 
reform cause in doubt.
A. Ideological Impact on the Formulation and Implementation of 
the Major Policies of Opening-up and Economic Reform - The case 
of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
Shenzhen was chosen as the case to show the ideological 
impact on the formation and implementation of the major policies 
of opening-up and economic reform for the following two reasons: 
Firstly, the establishment of the SEZs was the boldest and most 
significant decision in the ten years, and the SEZs were widely 
regarded as "the primary vehicles” of the open door and economic 
reform policy.125 Secondly, Shenzhen, which experienced the most 
rapid development among the SEZs, has been drawing the most 
attention, and the ideological debates and struggles over its 
establishment and development have also often been intensive and 
overt. Therefore, by examining the development of Shenzhen and 
the ideological struggles over it, I think the ideological
125 Huan Guocang. "China's Opening to the World”, Problems of 
Communism. Nov-Dee. 1986, Vol. XXXV.
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impact on the opening-up and reform could be well illustrated.
The idea of establishing SEZs was first put forward in 
1978, when China began" its modernization drive.126 The National 
People's Congress formally approved the special zones of 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province in August 
1980 by promulgating the "Regulations for the Guangdong Special 
Economic Zones" and the Xiamen Zone in Fujian province two 
months later.
During the 1980s, the policy of creating SEZs proved to be 
one of the most controversial aspects of China's opening-up to 
the outside world, although it had been advocated and even 
initiated by no other than Deng Xiaoping himself.127
It was quite natural for the development of the SEZs to 
raise some doubts, debates and disagreements since the 
establishment of a SEZ in a socialist country is a totally new 
phenomenon. In fact, in the course of the development of the 
SEZs, and Shenzhen in particular, a series of problems did 
arise, and therefore the policies had to be adjusted and changed 
accordingly.
But what should be noticed is that some of the opposition 
to the creation of SEZs did not so much stem from the practical 
problems which had emerged in the process of development as 
from different visions and beliefs, which questioned or 
challenged the very legitimacy of the SEZs. And because much of 
the criticism and attacks originated in the ideological 
divisions of the top leadership and were aired by some of the 
top level leaders, the impact on the formulation and 
implementation of the SEZ policies was substantial.
126 Liang Xiang. "China's Special Economic Zones", Beiiinq 
Review. Vol.27, No.4, 1984, p.24.
127 According to Liang Xiang, then mayor of Shenzhen, Deng 
Xiaoping, during his inspection of Shenzhen, stated that: "It is 
I who proposed running the special economic zones...." See 
"Liang Xiang on Background to Deng Xiaoping's Remarks." Wen Wei 
Po, 13.7. 1985. p. 3. Also see Zeng Jianhui. "The Birth of an 
Important Political Decision - A New Step in Opening the Country 
to the Outside World", Outlook. No.24, 11.6.1984. pp.9-13.
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In the tortuous development of Shenzhen SEZ from 1979 to 
1988, 1984 and 1985 witnessed the most dramatic episodes,
therefore my examination will mainly concentrate on the 
development of these two years while giving some general 
description of the other periods.
(1) The Initial Period from 1979 to the End of 1983
During this period, Shenzhen's development was surprisingly 
fast, it developed from a small border town of 20,000-30,000 
people into a city of some 300,000. Some 1.9 billion yuan were 
invested in capital construction, and some 2,500 contracts were 
signed with foreign investors.128 During this period, although 
the ideological debates over Shenzhen did not reach the 
fierceness as seen in 1985, opposition and criticism from the 
leftists were frequently heard. The SEZs were regarded by some 
people, for example, as "enclaves of capitalism”, "self-made 
concessions”; the policies carried out in the SEZs were 
condemned as "introducing capitalism into China" and "going 
capitalist"129. In the latter half of 1981, when a nation-wide 
crack-down on economic crime was launched, some officials from 
the central government were immediately sent to Shenzhen. On 
arrival, they asserted that 80% of the cadres in Shenzhen had 
gone "rotten", and 80% of their income was illegal.130 The 
accusation and attacks were intensified in the short-lived 
"anti-spiritual pollution" campaign in the winter of 1983. 
During those days Shenzhen was condemned as a "large dye vat and 
source of spiritual pollution", and The newspaper of Shenzhen 
was also severely criticised for its passive and indifferent
128 Liang Xiang. "The Policy of Developing Special Economic 
Zones is Entirely Correct", People's Daily. 29.3.1984.
129 Liang Xiang. "China's Special Economic Zones", Beiiinq 
Review. Vol.27, No.4, 1984, p.24. Also see Zheng Ming. No.3,
1984, p.6.
130 See Zheng Ming. No.3, 8.9.1984.
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attitude toward the campaign.131
A unique phenomenon accompanying the development of 
Shenzhen was that a great number of visitors from various levels 
of society and parts of China were attracted by its 
particularity as well as the controversies over its development. 
The reactions and assessments of these visitors, especially 
those from the national top level leadership, would certainly 
have significant impact on Shenzhen's development.
(2) The Golden Year of 1984
The year 1984 could be regarded as the "golden year" in the 
development of Shenzhen. In January 1984, Deng Xiaoping made a 
personal visit to Shenzhen and left with the following comment 
the "development and experience of Shenzhen prove that our 
policy for setting up the economic zones is correct". This gave 
the first most authoritative evaluation of the SEZs, and a 
national "learn from Shenzhen" campaign was immediately 
unfolded.
Numerous complimentary articles appeared in the press all 
over the country. People's Daily published a special issue on 
Shenzhen. Even Red Flag Publishing House put out a special book 
on Shenzhen, praising it as "the vanguard of urban reform" and 
"a miracle in the 1980s China". Shenzhen became so popular that 
at the Beijing observance of the 35th Anniversary of the 
Founding of the PRC on October 1, 1984, there was even a
Shenzhen float in the parade proudly displaying the slogan of 
that city's Shekou industrial zone: "Time is money, efficiency 
is life."
Moreover, in April, justified largely by reference to 
Shenzhen's experience, the leadership decided, again at the 
initiative of Deng Xiaoping, to open 14 additional coastal 
cities to foreign investment on a preferential basis. Besides, 
the opening-up of three deltas - Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) 
Delta, Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) Delta and a triangular area in
131 See Zheng Mina. No. 3, 1984, pp. 6-10.
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southern Fujian province - were also under consideration.
It appeared that the policies of creating SEZs and opening 
to the outside world had won a decisive victory and that from 
then on Shenzhen could develop in a much more favourable 
environment. But this view soon proved to be unduly 
optimistic.132 In fact, 1985 turned out to be the most difficult 
year for Shenzhen.
(3) The Difficult Year of 1985
The difficulty started with the rapid deterioration of 
China's foreign exchange situation. During the last quarter of 
1984 and the first quarter of 1985, the rapid increase in 
imports of both production and consumer goods produced a large 
deficit in China's foreign trade, and the nation's foreign 
exchange reserves dropped drastically, falling one third within 
six months133. This weakened the central government's control 
over the conduct of foreign trade in general and the expenditure 
of foreign exchange in particular.134 Under these circumstances, 
the central government took a series of measures to regain 
control over the foreign exchange situation.135 Likewise, the 
operations of the SEZs were also coming under closer, critical
132 Actually, from the content of Deng's inscription for 
Shenzhen, one would have perceived that until then some people, 
especially among the top leaders, still doubted or opposed the 
policy of setting up the SEZs, therefore it required no other 
than Deng himself to claim the correctness of the policy. This 
clearly indicated that the strength of the opposition was 
formidable and the policies of opening-up could come under 
severe attack at some or any time.
133 Zhang Weiying and Li Jiange. "The Proposal of 
Depreciation of the Renminbi and Opening to the Market of 
Foreign Exchange”, Research Reports of Economic System Reforms. 
No.6, Beijing, 1985, pp.1-18. Noted by Huan Guocang in "China's 
opening to the world", Problems of Communism. Nov-Dee 1986, 
Vol.xxxv, p.59.
134' See John Stuermer, "The Foreign Exchange Situation", 
China Business Review. Washington, D.C., Jan-Feb 1986, pp.14-17.
135 See Fewsmith, Joseph. "Special Economic Zones in the 
PRC", Problems of Communism. Nov-Dee 1986, Vol.xxxv, p.80.
86
scrutiny. Some articles began to expose the fact that none of 
the SEZs had been able to balance its international payments,
4
and all had depended heavily on the central government's supply 
of foreign exchange136. Besides, since the current foreign 
exchange rate "often makes export trade gain limited profits or 
even cause huge losses" while making it possible for "import 
trade to gain huge profits on the domestic market", as concluded 
by a seminar on the theory and policy of opening to the outside 
world held in Guangzhou on April 4-9 1985137, the SEZs, had
reportedly speculated in foreign exchange and made huge profits 
on the domestic market.138
The heaviest blow, however, came from the national 
leadership. And the most unexpected and alarming comment came 
from Deng Xiaoping himself. On June 29, 1985, in his meeting
with an Algerian delegation, Deng Xiaoping described Shenzhen 
SEZ as "a new phenomenon of Socialism, an experiment, the 
success of which remains to be proven", adding "We hope it will 
succeed, but if it fails, we can draw lessons from it".139 
Deng's rather reserved attitude compared with his previous full 
support to the SEZ, indicated the intensity of the debate over 
policy on the SEZs at the highest level and the pressure that 
the reformers were facing.
To illustrate this, we could briefly examine Hu Qiaomu's 
(Chief ideologue in the Party for most part of the 1980s) 
attitude toward the SEZs. In one of his articles in 1985, Hu 
sharply criticized the zones, evoking their similarities to the
136 Chen Zhaobing. "On Some Criticism of Special Economic 
Zones", Academic Study. Guangzhou, No.4, 1985, pp.40-48.
137 Lin He. "Roundup of the Seminar on the Theory and Policy 
of Opening to the Outside World", People's Daily. 17.5.1985. 
p. 5.
138 Zhang Ge. "On Several Issues of the Special Economic 
Zones and Coastal Open Cities", Development Research. No.2, 
1985, pp.22-24.
139 Xinhua. 29.6.1985. (trans.) in SWB 1.7.1985. FE/7991/
A4/2.
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foreign enclaves in the 19th century treaty ports. He wrote,
SEZs are not Special Political Zones. Foreign-owned 
enterprises are not concessions. No matter the enterprises 
are joint ventures or foreign-owned, they must all abide by 
Chinese law. The concessions in Old China were also created 
by foreign companies and factories at the beginning. The 
Qing dynasty's indifferent-attitude toward the concessions 
made it possible for the concessions to evolve into the 
extraterritorial concessions.140
Hu even suggested that the present Chinese government had also 
gone too far in yielding to the "inordinate demands". Again, 
during his inspection of Xiamen in early 1985, Hu said, "The 
Communist Parties in the West are all legal except in the United 
States, and they can organize activities in the enterprises." He 
asked: "why are Party organizations prohibited from being set 
up and organizing public activities in the foreign investment 
enterprises in socialist China?" He urged: "Do not yield to the 
inordinate demands so readily, it is both unnecessary and 
meaningless. Moreover, Hu condemned some foreign businessmen 
show no respect for Chinese unions and "forget even the laws of 
their own countries when they come to the SEZs"141
Hu Qiaomu's remarks about the Party's leadership in the 
foreign owned enterprises were also seen as being directed 
against Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of the CCP, for at 
that time, Professor Chen Shubai from Hong Kong was making 
preparations for the setting up of an experimental university in 
Shenzhen, in which no Party committee would be established, and 
this project had been approved by Hu Yaobang.142
In view of some people's concern that, some day, Shenzhen 
would become Hong Kong, Guangdong would become Shenzhen and the
140 See Zheng Ming. No.8, 1985, p. 10.
Hu's article first appeared in the internal publication 
Bulletin of Organization and Personnel. It was picked up first 
by Ming__Pao (Hong Kong) and then excerpted in Chinese Legal 
Affairs Newspaper. Beijing. See Fewsmith Joseph, op.cit.. p.81.
141 See Chinese Legal Affairs Newspaper. Beijing, 28.6.1985. 
Zheng Ming. No.8, 1985, pp.10-12.
142 See Zheng Ming. No.8, 1985, pp. 10-12.
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whole country would become Guangdong, Hu Qiaomu reportedly wrote
to Xi Zhongxun and Hu Qili, two of the Politburo and Party
secretariat members, ndting that
Nowadays many magazines catering to vulgar interests, some 
of which are published in the name of Taiwan, can easily be 
found in the news-stands in Beijing. They sell well and 
have a widespread influence. The situation all over the 
country can be easily imagined. This, in fact, is helping 
those people who want to turn the mainland into Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. We must clearly realize that in the realm of 
ideology, there is a problem .of who influences whom between 
Hong Kong and Taiwan and us. Is it us who influence Hong 
Kong and Taiwan with socialist and patriotic ideas or is it 
the capitalist decadent ideas and life style which 
influence us through the channel of Hong Kong and Taiwan? 
The answer should only be the former.143
The divergence of opinion over the policies of the SEZs and 
the opening-up at the top level was also revealed by Chen Yun's 
attitude toward the SEZs. Chen Yun was the only top leader who 
had never inspected any SEZs. In the initial stage of Shenzhen's 
development in 1980 and 1981 when the radical reformers gave it 
their fervent support, extolling it as "the roc that is taking 
off", Chen Yun's cool comment was: "The primary task for the
SEZs is to sum up the experience". And in 1983 and 1984, when Hu 
Yaobang appraised Shenzhen as "having opened up a new prospect" 
in his inspection in early 1983 and Deng Xiaoping gave his full 
support in his inscriptions during his inspection of the SEZs in 
early 1984. Chen Yun noted: "There are no 'fist'144 products in 
the SEZs now, Shenzhen does not have any 'fist' products 
either".145 And in the middle of 1985, when China's opening-up 
policy suffered a number of serious setbacks and Shenzhen was 
under great pressure, Chen Yun gave his strongest warning to the 
Party leadership in his written speech to the Disciplinary 
Committee of the CCP on June 29; he stressed:
143 See Zheno Ming. Jan. 1986, p. 10.
144 "Fist" products refers to products which can break into 
the world market and hold ground.
145 See Nineties (Hong Kong), No.8, 1985, pp.50-58.
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We are building socialism and the ultimate aim is the 
realization of communism. This is extremely important. 
Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee, the 
economic construction that our country is carrying out is 
socialist economic construction; the economic structural 
reform is also the socialist economic structural reform. 
Each Communist Party member must always bear in mind that 
we are striving for the socialist four modernizations, not 
any other modernizations. What we are engaged in is a 
socialist cause.146
In the midst of the 1985 policy debate over the SEZs and 
opening-up, two historical allegories were published in the 
central press which also reflected the widely divergent views on 
the opening-up policy. The first article, written by Chen Xulu, 
seemed directed against Hu Qiaomu's views, declaring that 
patriots in modern Chinese history included "those who became 
the targets of attack for advocating the need to make temporary 
concessions to foreign countries"147 The second article written, 
by Liao Zonglin, rebutted Chen's view, stating that the peaceful 
attitude of the Qing Court in the years after the 1894-95 Sino- 
Japanese War had, in fact, encouraged further foreign 
aggression, "making China a laughing stock in history" and 
"failing to play the slightest role in protecting state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity".148
It is clear that in the 1985 wave of criticism of the SEZs, 
and Shenzhen in particular, not much was directed against the 
actual problems that emerged in the process of economic 
development, and therefore the motive and aim did not seem to 
uncover the problems and overcome the obstacles so that the SEZs 
could develop more "healthily" and more smoothly. Instead, much 
of the criticism centred on ideological problems and it was
146 People's Daily. 1.7.1985. p.l.
147 Chen Xulu. "Patriotism in China's Modern History", 
People's Daily. 2.8.1985.
148 Liao Zonglin. "On the Question of Patriotism and National 
Betrayal During the Boxer Rebellion", Guangmina Daily.
27.11.1985. See Joseph Fewsmith. op.cit.. p.82.
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often heavily involved with power struggles among the top 
leadership. Since in China, "determining national strategy or 
direction involves deciding fundamental - moral and ideological 
- principles, not merely adopting a practical policy framework 
for problem solving,11149 these criticism and debates couched in 
ideological terms could produce a significant impact on the 
practical policies and actual economic development.
The first impact was on people's confidence in the destiny 
and prospect of the whole cause of economic reform and opening- 
up. In spite of the numerous declarations by many Chinese 
leaders that China's policy of reform and opening-up would not 
be changed or abandoned, many people, both Chinese and 
foreigners, knew that there existed fundamental differences and 
conflicts among the leaders over the orientation, pace and scope 
of the reform and opening-up. These differences and conflicts 
could, someday, lead to the reorientation or even the 
abandonment of the economic reform and opening-up. As Lin Li, a 
journalist from People's Daily, found out, very few cadres at 
the bureau level in Shenzhen had brought the family with them, 
for they were not sure what lay in store for Shenzhen and for 
themselves.150 A factory manager in Shenzhen once talked about 
the difficulties he had in making the decision to go to work in 
Shenzhen. In the "Cultural Revolution" he had been criticized as 
a "capitalist roader" and suffered a great deal both mentally 
and physically. So when in 1982 he was to go to Shenzhen to run 
a joint venture with a foreign partner, his wife would not let 
him go. It took him a long time to persuade her.151
The debates and struggles over the SEZs in 1985 brought the 
differences and conflicts among the national leadership into the 
open. Besides Hu Qiaomu's fierce criticism and attack on the 
policy regarding SEZs, Deng's sudden backing out of full support
149 Hamrin,Carol Lee. op. cit. . p.l.
150 Mina Pao. Hong Kong, No.8, 1985.
151 Beiiinq Review. July 1985.
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to a much reserved evaluation about Shenzhen had an effect 
little short of an "earthquake” . People began speculating 
whether Beijing was about to make some substantial changes in 
the policies over SEZs. Foreign investors wondered what would 
happen. And the leaders of the SEZs were put under great 
pressure.152
Although, in retrospect, one could say that Deng made the
remarks at that time intending to check and placate the
disaffection among the opposition; in claiming that Shenzhen was
an experiment, he could be saying that since it was a new
phenomenon, mistakes were inevitable, and the experiment should
be allowed to continue. At any rate, Deng's retreat, at least,
strongly indicated the strength of the opposition and their
potential capabilities to challenge the reform and opening-up
policies. And therefore, people's lack of confidence in the
prospects of the opening-up was well justified.
Secondly, the wave of criticism in 1985, together with the
problems emerged in the development of the SEZs, forced the
leadership to rethink and redefine the role of the SEZs. Before
1985, the radical reformers tended to regard the SEZs as pivots
both for foreign imports and domestic coordination. For example,
during his inspection of the Pearl and Yangtze River deltas in
November 1984, Zhao Ziyang made it very clear:
The special economic zones, open cities, and economically 
open zones are the bridgeheads in our opening to the 
outside world, and they should play the role of a 
springboard. On the one hand, they should import advanced 
foreign technology, equipment, and management and 
operations methods; absorb and digest them; apply them in 
innovations; and transfer them to the interior. On the 
other hand, they should sell commodities produced in the 
coastal areas with foreign technology to the interior, and 
export the latter's raw materials and produce, with added 
value after processing here, to the international market, 
in order to achieve better economic results. In a 
figurative sense, the special economic zones and open 
cities are like the intersection of two lines, forming two 
fan-shaped sectors, embracing the introduction of foreign
152 For the response to Deng's remarks, see Zheng Ming. No. 7- 
8, 1985, Nineties. No.7-8, 1985.
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technology and cooperation with the interior.153
However, during th£ summer of 1985, a series of discussions 
and decisions concerning the future developmental path of the 
SEZs rejected the "double-track" orientation endorsed by Zhao, 
and concluded that the SEZs should be built strictly in line 
with the requirements of an outwardly oriented economy and 
industry should be taken as the leading factor.154 What is being 
addressed here is not the argument concerning a more rational 
strategy,155 but the fact that during the implementation of the 
reform and opening-up policies major and fundamental 
reorientation, not just minor adjustment, could occur due, in 
part at least, to non-economic reasons.
Thirdly, ideological and political factors often made it 
impossible for localities and enterprises to genuinely and fully 
concentrate on the economic construction and run the economy in 
a rational and efficient way. Though the liberation of the 
economy had been regarded by the reformers as the key to the 
success of the modernizations, for example, after his 1984 
inspection of the SEZs, Deng concluded that the SEZs had made 
such impressive achievements simply because they had been given 
a little more autonomy, (and largely in line with this judgment,
153 Xinhua. 25.12.1984.
154 For example, see Liu Guoguang "The Strategic Objective of 
Developing the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone", People's Daily.
9.8.1985. p.5. Liang Xiang, "Construction and Development in the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone", Economic Daily. 11.12.1985. 
p. 3.
155 Some people did not agree with the idea of an exclusively 
outwardly oriented future. Someone argued that if a wall was 
erected between the zones and the interior, then the SEZs could 
hardly play their proper role as a "window" for introducing 
technology, management and knowledge. For example, see Wang Zhuo 
(of the Guangdong provincial government's Commission for Reform 
of the Economic Structure) "A Probe into Some Questions on 
Special Economic Zones", People's Daily. 7.10.1985. and "Have a 
Clearer Understanding of the Special Economic Zones from 
Shenzhen's Experience", Economic Daily. 25.1.1986. p.l.
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he advocated to open more cities and delegate more power to the 
regions and enterprises), however, the emergence of the economic 
difficulties and the policy debate in 1985 led the leadership to 
quickly tighten its control again. In late June 1985, Gu Mu, a 
member of the State Council who was in charge of the coastal 
economic development, announced that China would "give priority" 
to only four of the 14 open cities, - Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian 
and Guangzhou - and temporarily "slow down" the development of 
foreign cooperation in the other ten.156 Furthermore, the 
capital construction budgets of the SEZs were sharply scaled 
down. In Shenzhen, the funds for economic construction were cut 
by one third, from an originally budgeted 2.5 billion yuan to 
1.6 billion yuan.157 The leadership of Shenzhen were also 
reshuffled. In August 1985, Li Hao, previously a deputy 
secretary of the State Council, replaced Liang Xiang as mayor of 
Shenzhen. Li Hao was the first leader sent from Beijing rather 
than from the Guangdong government, which suggested Beijing's 
interest in tightening central control over Shenzhen.
Also indicative of the change of the ideological and 
political environment, the once widely publicized and 
controversial slogan "Time is money, efficiency is life" was, 
again, seldom heard. Instead, the leaders of the SEZs were found 
talking about socialist spiritual civilization on many 
occasions. For example, in a report to a meeting of cadres of 
organs directly subordinate to the central government held in 
late autumn 1985, countering the charges of poor management, 
economic crime, and of allowing Shenzhen to be a "weak link" in 
the construction of spiritual civilization, Liang Xiang stressed 
that an "Outline for Construction of Socialist Spiritual
156 Xinhua. 29.6.1985.
157 South China Morning Post. 2.7.1985. Cited in Joseph 
Fewsmith. op.cit.. p.81. On April 25, 1985, during his 
inspection in Shekou Industrial District, Vice Premier Yao Yilin 
said the SEZs could not continue to depend on "blood 
transfusions" from the state. Now it is time to remove the 
syringe needle. See Mina Pao. 4.6.1985. Ming Pao's account was 
based on coverage in Shekou News.
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Civilization in the Shenzhen Special Zone" had been compiled, 
and that more attention should be paid to the role of trade
4
unions, the Communist Youth League, and women's federations in 
foreign-invested firms.158
(4) A Brief Survey of Shenzhen's Development After 1985
By the end of 1985 and the beginning of 1986, various signs 
showed that Shenzhen had survived the flurry of criticism, and 
a compromise regarding the orientation of the SEZs had been 
worked out. Liang Xiang, the replaced former mayor, now the 
Party Secretary, published a long article in Economic Daily, one 
of the central dailies, recalling Shenzhen's development in the 
past and looking forward to its future, putting forward the 
guideline of "Relying on the hinterland, serving the four 
modernizations, facing Hong Kong and Macao and Marching toward 
the world".159 People's Daily also published a commentator 
article entitled "Take Business Overseas - Special Economic 
Zones Should Develop an Externally Oriented Economy", stating 
that "the outward-oriented economy and the hinterland economy 
are complementary to each other".160 The conference on the SEZs 
convened by the State Council at the turn of 1985/1986 adopted 
the "outward-orientation" strategy.161 And soon afterwards, the 
central ministries began to establish some high-technology firms 
to help the Shenzhen SEZ set up an outwardly-oriented industry.
Generally speaking, the development of Shenzhen after 1985 
was steadier. With tighter control over foreign trade and the 
stepping up of ideological and political work, Shenzhen had been
158 Liang Xiang, "Construction and Developing in the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone", Economic Daily. 11.12.1985. p.3.
159 Economic Daily. 11.12.1985.
160 People's Daily. 1.2.1986. Actually, the Commentator 
article was the first such authoritative treatment of the SEZ in
the Party Daily in over a year.
161 Xinhua, 6.1.1986.
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making efforts to strengthen and expand its industry and export 
capacity. However, criticism and opposition against the policy 
and development of the' SEZs could still be heard now and then 
and there were always some people looking at and evaluating the 
SEZs from the point of view of the rigid official ideology.
Just take one of the most widely noticed events, the so- 
called "Shekou accident", for example. On August 6, 1988, three 
"experts" in the ideological education of youth from Beijing 
came to talk to the local youth in Shekou, an industrial area in 
the Shenzhen SEZ. At the beginning of his speech, Educator Qu 
Xiao,162 assured the audience that "Shenzhen is not a kite lost 
through a broken string in the sky of the socialist motherland; 
Shenzhen is a magnificent eagle flying through the skies 
following the socialist navigation lane," the young audience 
were definitely not impressed. One of them immediately stood up 
and interrupted him: "There is definitely no market for you to 
come here and propagandise. We will never listen to what you 
have to say, we are here to make money. There is no such thing 
as ideals or making contributions to the state." According to 
the People's Daily, as the debate grew heated, one "expert" 
confronted a youth and asked: "Would you dare to tell me your 
name?" The audience laughed and the youth immediately presented 
his business card.163
What was striking about the "Shekou Incident" was the 
boldness of the youth and the change of attitude brought about, 
at least partly, by the economic reform and opening-up. As a 
youth in Shenzhen said to a reporter from the People's Daily : 
"We have more freedom here, and the central government is far 
away. Even if I swear at you, no one will come to interfere. My
162 Qu Xiao, a vice professor in Shenyang Industry College, 
was put in prison during the Cultural Revolution. He became 
famous by giving speeches to the youth all over the country 
after his release in the early 1980s, expressing his unchanged 
loyalty to the Party despite the ill-treatment by the Party.
163 See People/s Daily. 14.9.1988. As for the comment on the 
event, see Far Eastern Economic Review. 27.10.1988. p.14.
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Hong Kong boss will not fire me for this."164 The discussion and 
debate generated by this incident not only explored the 
problems of generational conflict and its implications for the 
Party's political work, but also raised the question, once 
again, of the impact of the reform and opening-up, especially on 
the young generation. The educators' comments clearly revealed 
the psychological threat reforms have posed for many Party 
cadres. When Qu Xiao was described by some as "a typical 
obedient tool", he said: "Even today, I do not believe that my 
concepts are outmoded.1,165 And conceivably, the incident 
provided ammunition for some to criticize and attack the 
policies of the SEZs in particular, and the opening-up strategy 
in general.
To conclude, Shenzhen's experience clearly shows that in 
the process of China's economic reform and opening to the 
outside world, ideological debates and struggles never ceased 
and could sometimes be very fierce. And since many of them 
occurred among the top leadership and were closely related with 
power struggles, the ideological conflicts have exerted their 
impact on the formulation and implementation of the major 
policies of economic reform and opening-up. As the above 
examination and analysis of Shenzhen's experience suggests the 
impact could bring about a major re-orientation of the 
developmental strategy; a slow-down or abandonment of some 
important plans, and a diversion of the whole-hearted attention 
on the economic construction. The most significant and long-term 
impact, however, was on people's confidence in the prospect and 
future of the reform and opening-up. Through the serious 
controversy over the policy regarding the SEZs, one can see that 
the challenge from these conservatives on important aspects of
164 See Far Eastern Economic Review. 27.10.1988. p.41.
165 People's Daily received thousands of letters following 
its initial account of the incident, some of which were 
published on 14.9.1988.
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the reforms remains significant. And since the long-term 
viability of Deng's program rests heavily on scoring continuous 
and impressive economic achievements and on the ability to 
control effectively the problems arising in the course of the 
reform and opening-up, any major economic setbacks and serious 
social crisis could jeopardize the whole reform cause.
B. Ideological Constraint on the Fundamental Political Reform 
and its Impact on the Economic Reform and Opening-up
The 1980s has often been called the decade of building the 
four modernizations (agriculture, industry, defence and science 
and technology). But these four are only part of modernizations 
China needs. To build China into a prosperous and powerful 
country, an over-all transformation is needed including the 
economy, politics, culture, education, etc.. Economic reform 
alone is far from enough. Firstly, the post-"Cultural 
Revolution” crisis was an over-all crisis. Secondly, the 
communist rule was a highly centralized system; there was no 
genuinely independent economic system to speak of and therefore, 
without simultaneous institutional and political reforms 
economic reforms in the long run could hardly be sustained.
Although in the 1980s the reformers had largely managed 
to sustain the momentum of the economic reform and opening-up 
and made many impressive achievements, many social and political 
problems worsened. Indeed, by 1988, the crises had become so 
severe that "the Communist Party's rule was compared - in the 
public mind at least - to the last years of Kuomintang (KMT) 
rule in the late 1940s."166 And the Third Plenum of the 13th 
Party Congress held in September 1988 adopted the policy of 
retrenchment, which marked the virtual stopping of the large- 
scale economic reform process, although "the deepening of the 
economic reform" was also talked about at the same time.
The causes of the economic difficulties were undoubtedly 
multiple and varied. Certain problems were bound to occur, and
166 Far Eastern Economic Review. 27.10.1988. p.36.
98
should be regarded as the basic costs any country must pay in 
the process of transforming its rigid economic system into a 
(even partly) market-oriented one and transforming its society 
from a relatively closed to an open one. But some problems were 
undoubtedly caused or exacerbated by the old political structure 
and system, which failed to meet the requirements of the 
changing economic situation.
Through a very brief survey of the ten years' development 
of both the economic and political reforms, this section seeks 
to show: (a) the phenomenon of the political reform lagging-
behind the economic reform; and (b) the economic consequences 
caused by this gap. Then, by looking into the main factors that 
had caused the delay and wavering of the political reform, I 
seek to argue that the rigid Communist ideology was one of the 
most important factors that had impeded and restricted the 
political reform and therefore, indirectly, constrained the 
economic reform and opening-up.
(1) The Faltering Political Reform and its Impact upon the 
Economic Reform
China's ten years' reforms since 1978 can be divided into 
three periods.
a. The first period from 1978 to October 1984
During this period, the economic reform was chiefly carried 
out in the countryside. "The system of contracted responsibility 
for production with remuneration linked to output" was gradually 
established throughout the countryside. At the same time, in the 
cities, some preliminary experiments in the economic structural 
reform were also carried out, with the stress put on giving 
localities and enterprises more autonomy in decision-making."167
In the political sphere in this period, China experienced 
the first high tide of political liberalization in 1978-82.
167 Zhang Yanning "China's Economic Structural Reform", 
People's Daily. 5.11.1988. p.3.
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Besides seeing an economic rationale for a transformation of the 
political structure, Deng and some other leaders also realized 
that despite the purge of the "Gang of Four" and the restoration 
of political stability, there was still a serious "crisis of 
confidence" throughout the society. And without reshaping the 
structure of political life in ways that would create a greater 
degree of democracy and legality, popular support for the regime 
could not be rebuilt.
In August 1980, at an expanded session of the Politburo, 
Deng Xiaoping made an important speech entitled "The Reform of 
the Leadership System in the Party and the State", which was 
widely regarded as the programmatic document for political 
reform. In the speech Deng severely attacked the Party's 
ossified and stultifying structure: "As far as the leadership 
and cadre system of our Party are concerned, the major problems 
are bureaucracy, overconcentration of power, patriarchal 
methods, life tenure in leading posts, and privileges of various 
kinds." Besides, Deng also alluded to the need to develop a high 
degree of democracy, arguing that it was important to make sure 
that the people genuinely had the power of supervision over the 
state in a variety of ways. In particular they were "to manage 
the state organs at all levels, as well as the various 
enterprises and undertakings."168
Accordingly, during the early 1980s a number of initiatives 
were taken to reform the political system, including the 
adoption of the new Party and State Constitutions, measures to 
trim the bureaucracy, attempts to improve the quality of the 
cadre force, and steps to promote effective citizen 
participation.169
However, due to the interaction between the attempts by 
conservative leaders to check and suppress intellectual deviance
168 Deng Xiaoping. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-82. 
Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1983.
169 See Benewick, R. and Wingrove, P.(eds.) . Reforming the 
Revolution. Macmillan Education 1988, Chapter 3, "Political 
Participation" by Robert Benewick.
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and the corresponding efforts by more reform-minded officials to 
limit the effects of political liberalization and democratic 
movements, and the fear of losing power by both of these 
groups, substantial political reform never really got under way. 
Actually several major events happened at the beginning of the 
1980s, both internally and externally whifch helped to dissuade 
Deng Xiaoping from pursuing the political reforms.
Internally two events took place. The first was the 
grassroots democratic movement, the so-called ,fXidan Democratic 
Wall” movement, at the end of the 1970s. Although allowed to 
flourish for a while, it was finally suppressed in the spring of 
1981 with its main activists sentenced to terms of up to fifteen 
years' imprisonment. And a campaign against "bourgeois 
liberalization" was unleashed in the summer of 1981.
The second was the unexpected development of the local 
municipal elections in late 1980. There were at least twelve 
elections in which Democracy Movement activists participated.170 
The most spectacular of these took place in the election 
district constituted by the Hunan Teachers' College in Changsha, 
where unlawful interference in the election by Party officials 
led to serious unrest as students boycotted classes, went on 
hunger strike and held public demonstrations.171 Consequent upon 
the experience of the 1980 elections, the election law was 
hastily revised. Among the revisions, the ambiguity about the 
right to campaign was noticeably removed; the right to campaign 
is now restricted to nominators being allowed to brief group 
meetings only.172 As a result, the 1984 election was treated as 
a low-key affair.173
Externally was the outbreak , of the .^Polish crisis, as
170 Nathan, A.J. Chinese Democracy. New York: Alfred Knopf,
1986.
171 Benewick, R. and Wingrove, P. op.cit. . p.65.
172 "Electoral Law for the NPC and Local People's 
Congresses", National People's Congress, 1986. See SWB: FE 8437
173 Nathan A,J. op.cit. . p.223.
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described earlier in the chapter. The Solidarity Trade Union 
Movement posed a powerful challenge to the leadership of the 
Polish Communist Party/ who had to impose Martial Law in the end 
to defend its rule. t
Until 1984, since the economic reform had been mainly 
carried out in the countryside*-”vast but peripheral area in 
China's political life - and many dramatic and very impressive 
achievements had been made, the national leadership, especially 
the radical reformers among them still enjoyed the wide support 
of the general public. This was spectacularly demonstrated by 
the banner of "Hello, Xiaoping" held by the Beijing University 
students in the 1984 National Day parade in Tiananmen Square.
Nevertheless, the delay and wavering with regard to the 
genuine political reform in the first half of the 1980s did not 
only lose many precious opportunities of fundamentally 
transforming the old political system in the post-Mao era, but 
failed to prepare the right political environment for the 
overall urban economic reform. Therefore, once the focus of the 
economic reform was shifted to the cities - the centre of the 
national political life - a great number of problems cropped up 
in rapid succession and the whole program of reform and 
modernizations itself was immediately put under great pressure 
and even threat.
b. The second period from October 1984 to September 1987
This period began with the October Central Committee 
decision on urban reform of 1984. From then on, great attention 
was focused on urban reforms, with the aim of creating a 
"socialist planned commodity economy". Enterprise autonomy was 
vigorously emphasized and planning was shifted even more towards 
a guiding as opposed to a directive role. The enterprise 
director's role was to be strengthened through the introduction 
of the "factory director responsibility system". Change in the 
wage system was advocated to bring pay more into line with 
enterprise and individual performance. Price reform was seen as 
an essential component of the reform. It was quite evident that
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urban economic reforms would be much more complicated and 
difficult. Actually, almost immediately after the reform program 
was set in motion in the final quarter of 1984 and the first 
quarter of 1985, the economic reform and opening-up policies 
suffered a number of serious setbacks: the economy was over
heating; inflation soared, especially in cities, as a result of 
the decontrol of meat and vegetable prices; both investment and 
consumption rose rapidly, fuelled by internal bank credits, wage 
rises and a rundown of foreign exchange reserves as the import 
of consumer and capital goods increased sharply.
Together with these economic difficulties, various maladies 
and malpractice became more and more severe and widespread. 
Abuse of power, corruption, speculation and profiteering by 
officials and their offspring ran rampant, which not only 
severely impeded the smooth development of the economic reform 
and opening-up but also dampened the enthusiasm of the ordinary 
people for the reform and deepened the crisis of confidence in 
the leadership.
The constraining effect of the political and institutional 
system on the economic reform was also obviously demonstrated in 
the bitter experience many reformist entrepreneurs encountered. 
It was common sense that without a great number of ingenious and 
brave entrepreneurs putting theories and policies into practice 
and blazing new trails, the success of China's economic reform 
was inconceivable. Yet reality showed that neither the emergence 
nor the survival of the entrepreneurs that the economic reform 
badly needed was an easy thing. Wen Yuankai, a well-known 
reformist intellectual of the Chinese Science and Technology 
University, conducted a survey in 1986 on the "national best 
young and middle-aged factory directors” elected in 1985; he was 
surprised to find that, except for a few who had really violated 
the law, half of the young directors had been removed from their 
posts by 1986.174
The problem had become so severe that the first half of
174 See Zheng Ming. September 1986. pp.8-10.
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1986 saw a spate of press reports describing cases of hindrance 
and even outright persecution of enterprise reformers. Just take 
one example: on April 24, Economic Daily described the
experience of Yang Mingjian, director of Taiyuan Solvent 
Factory. Shortly after he became the director in 1979, Yang 
carried out a series of bold reforms and the factory soon took 
on a new look. For three years, his factory was named a "model 
enterprise”. Just as the factory was making greater progresses 
under Yang's management, in 1984 a work team was suddenly sent 
to the factory by Taiyuan Chemical Rubber Industry Company. They 
came to inquire into Yang's so-called "economic problems” as 
alleged in an anonymous letter. The conclusion of the 
investigation was that Yang had accepted a bribe of more than 
600 yuan and should be removed from his office. In January 1985 
Yang lost his job. This event evoked wide repercussions and 
began to worry many other directors and managers in Taiyuan 
worrying. Then, in September 1985, according to the directives 
of the leaders in Taiyuan Party Committee and Shanxi People's 
Procuratorate, Taiyuan People's Procuratorate reexamined the 
case and found out that the allegation of bribe-taking was 
"absolutely groundless" and Mr. Yang was reinstated in his 
former office. In covering this affair, Economic Daily published 
a commentator's article. It pointed out that: "Recently, in some 
places and departments, many reformers have run into great 
difficulties. Some were censured and reproached, some were 
caught by rumours and slander, and some were even removed from 
office or transferred to some other posts." The commentator 
urged people to give much more concern towards the destiny of 
the reformers.175
The question remains as to why many reformers could be so 
easily victimized through anonymous letters, slander and frame- 
up? The chief cause lay in the political structure and system. 
Despite the efforts and progress in the democratization and 
legalization of the political life since the end of the 1970s,
175 Economic Daily. 24.4.1986.
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China was still a country ruled by man, not by law. That is why
many so-called economic crimes in the enterprises were not
investigated and dealt with by the legal departments, but by the
Party organizations. Considering that in China there does not
exist a set of rational and effective procedures for the
supervision, promotion and demotion of cadres, all of whom are
dependent on the nature and degree of relationship a cadre has
with his superior and how much trust he enjoys. Therefore, the
best way for a rival to knock * down his opponent is to do
something to damage the opponent's reputation and image in the
mind of the superior authorities. That is why rumours, slander,
framing, anonymous letters, etc. are so prevalent and effective.
Those high-ranking officials who are very much divorced from
reality, are often fond of listening to reports from various
channels. To show their authority and serious concern about the
matter, high-ranking leaders would send an investigation team to
the specific unit. Sometimes the investigators could be biased
or simply failed to get at the whole truth, thus reaching the
wrong conclusions and making some unjust verdicts.
By mid 1986, the environment for the economic reform had
become so unfavourable, the obstructive effect of the political
structure and system had become so obvious that Deng Xiaoping
himself began to reemphasize the political reform which had been
held in suspension from 1982. In his speech at the Standing
Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee on June 28,
1986, Deng pointed out:
In the final analysis, all our other reforms depend on the 
success of the political reform, because it is human beings 
who will - or will not - carry them out. For instance, we 
encourage devolution of powers, but other people take 
powers back. What can we do about it? ...The reform of the 
political structure and the reform of the economic 
structure are interdependent and should be co-ordinated. 
Without political reform, economic reform cannot succeed, 
because the first obstacle to be overcome is people's 
resistance.176
176 Deng Xiaoping. Fundamental Issues in Present-dav China. 
Beijing: Foreign languages Press, 1987, pp.147-148.
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Deng's speech demonstrated that the main reason for his 
renewed willingness to talk about political reform was the fear 
that the economic reforms were in danger of reaching an impasse. 
Reform of the political system was seen as necessary for the 
development of the economy. "Such thinking", as Saich pointed 
out "while opening up the potential for reform, immediately set 
limits to the nature of that reform. Reform was seen as a tool 
for the development of the economy, so that the only political 
reforms necessary were those which oiled the wheels of economic 
modernization. "177
Compared with Deng, many academics, Party theoreticians and 
even some radical reformers in the leadership would rather go 
further. Besides recognizing the necessity and significance of 
the political to the economic reform, they also believed that 
further political reform and liberalization were needed to 
prevent the abuse of power by Party and state officials, to 
create greater stability, and to make government more responsive 
to the will of the citizens, so that the confidence of the 
general public in the government and the system could be 
restored and sustained.
So with Deng's reemphasis on the political reform (in fact, 
he resurrected his own speech made in August 1980, as mentioned 
before), with the other Party leaders' advocacy and support,178 
and coinciding with the thirtieth anniversary of the setting
177 Benewick, R. and Wingrove, P. op.cit. . p.29.
178 For example, at one of the April ceremonies commemorating 
the Double Hundred Flowers Movement in 1986, Hu Qili, a member 
of the Politburo called for "the creation of a democratic, 
harmonious, and mutually trusting environment." See Xinhua 
Digest May 1986. At a May Day speech, Hu Yaobang, then the 
General Secretary of the Party, also described modernization not 
just as an economic phenomenon but as a "comprehensive, far- 
reaching revolution" that ought to affect "people's thoughts and 
concepts, spiritual state, and ways of thinking" See People's 
Daily. 2.5.1986.
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forth of the "double hundred" principle,179 the spring and 
summer of 1986 witnessed a rapid unfolding of a discussion and 
debate on political reform throughout the country. To show its 
unprecedentedness and boldness, let us just examine some of the 
speeches given by some radical reformers in the central 
leadership.
In a speech published in the Party journal Outlook
analysing the relationship between discipline and the need for
creative freedom in art and literature, Zhu Houze, head of the
Propaganda Department, said "As our country has not yet
outstripped the world's most advanced capitalist countries in
many different fields, it is difficult not to wonder whether we
can believe in socialism and communism, and whether the social,
economic, and political problems we face can be solved better
than by the ways found by capitalist countries." Then, after
some obligatory rhetoric about the need to adhere to the Four
Cardinal Principles as general concepts, he went on to admit
that China still confronted the "problem of choosing a political
road to follow."180 As Orvill Schell commented:
For China's chief of propaganda even to intimate that 
China's political direction was still unchosen was a 
startling admission, to say the least, and a clear signal 
to China's intellectuals that such free thinking was now in 
order on China's road to modernization. Zhu seemed, after 
all, to be saying that it was all well and good to keep the 
Four Cardinal Principles around as a kind of socialist 
comfort blanket, but that the real question of what kind of 
political system China should adopt was still up for 
grabs.181
179 "Let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of 
thought contend", a policy set forth by Mao for promoting the 
progress of the arts and the sciences and the development of a 
flourishing culture.
180 Outlook (Overseas Edition), No.18, 1986. Zhu Houze was 
removed in early 1987 during the anti-bourgeois liberalization 
campaign.
181 Schell, Orville, op.cit. . p.26.
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In August, Vice-Premier Wan Li, another staunch reformer,
and a member of the Politburo, gave a speech entitled "Rendering
the Decision-making Process Democratic and Scientific Is an
Important Task of the Reform of the Political System.” In this,
he strongly argued that:
The style of subjectivism, opinionatedness and
authoritarianism in past decision-making must make way for 
the spirit of research and study, democratic discussion, 
and collective leadership. ... In a modernizing society, 
science and democracy are inseparable. ... Without
democracy, there can be no respect for knowledge, human 
talent, or creativity. ... We have not yet established a 
rigorous system and procedure for making policy. We do not 
yet have an adequate support system, consultancy system, 
appraisal system, supervision system, and feedback system 
for that purpose. As a result, there is no scientific way 
of testing the soundness of a policy decision.... and 
[without changes] our socialist system will remain
imperfect and the national economy will not be able to 
develop continuously and steadily.1*2
Yet when the discussions and debates touched upon 
controversial issues such as the extent to which the 
modernization process should entail the absorption of values and 
institutions from the West; the relationship between economic 
modernization and democracy; the way to reform the paramount 
leadership of the Party and the introduction of political
pluralism etc., political reform became a divisive issue among 
the top leadership. At the Beidaihe meeting in August 1986, some 
veteran leaders expressed the view that they could agree on the 
need to reduce what had become the Party's own stranglehold on 
power, but did not think it proper to specify the division of 
power between the Party and government, which, they argued,
could lead to the weakening and negation of the Party's 
leadership and the violation of the "Four Cardinal Principles". 
Some even contended that China's current political system was 
basically suited to the needs of economic development.183 As a 
result, instead of making a decision on political reform, as had
182 Xinhua Digest. No.10, 1986, pp.1-6.
183 Nineties. No.200, 1986.
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been widely expected, the Party's Sixth Plenum in September 1986 
passed a resolution on the need to improve work in the 
ideological and cultural spheres. In the course of the drafting 
and redrafting of the report, both the liberals and 
conservatives tried to shape the document in ways that would 
support their position. One of the heated bouts of negotiation 
was over whether or not to insert criticism of "bourgeois 
liberalization”, and the final resolution was a compromise.
The wave of spontaneous demonstrations that swept through 
,a score of China's largest cities in December 1986 precipitated 
the showdown in the intense political struggle. When the student 
demonstrations shifted focus from local campus issues to the 
theme of "freedom” "democracy” and political reform, the Party 
moved quickly to suppress the protests. Several intellectuals, 
famous for their outspokenness in their criticism of the Party 
and their demands for political liberalization, were expelled 
from the Party. The ensuring intense propaganda campaign against 
"bourgeois liberalization” "complete Westernization” and 
"national nihilism” and the forced resignation of Party General 
Secretary Hu Yaobang in January 1987 did not only lead to the 
collapse of the arrangements for the succession to Deng Xiaoping 
but also disrupted and stopped the political reform process that 
had barely begun.
c. The Third Period from Oct. 1987 to Sept. 1988
Largely thanks to the resistance by the radical reformers 
represented by Zhao Ziyang, the anti-bourgeois liberalization 
campaign did not disrupt too badly the economic reform and 
opening-up process.
By September 1987, when the 13th Congress of the CCP was 
held, the reformers seemed to get the upper hand again. The 
Congress approved a detailed political reform programme and set 
about the task of carrying out comprehensive political as well 
as economic reforms for the whole Party. Soon after the 
Congress, radical prices and wages reforms speeded up, new 
experiments in building stock and bond markets and transforming 
*
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China's enterprises into limited companies on the basis of the 
contracting system were also under way.
However, by this time, many of the deep-rooted and chronic 
economic and social problems had become even more exacerbated; 
moreover many of the new malpractice that had emerged during the 
reform and opening-up process were also rhmpant. The situation 
came to a head when the price reform sent most of the cities 
throughout the country into panic purchasing in the summer and 
early autumn of 1988, which forced the leadership to bring the 
price reform to an abrupt halt. Conceivably, the reformers, 
especially the radicals like Zhao Ziyang, were put under great 
pressure. The whole political environment turned extremely 
unstable, and some serious overall social crises were soon to 
break out.
(2) Communist Ideology Is One of the Main Constraints on China's 
Political as Well as Economic Reforms
The above description has demonstrated that the tension 
between conservatives and reformers and the faltering political 
reform were among the most important reasons that gave rise to 
a series of cycles, or waves, in the economic reforms and 
opening-up in the 1980s. Here I would further argue that without 
a fundamental transformation of the old Communist ideology, real 
political reform can hardly be successfully carried out. By real 
political reform, I refer to, among other things, the 
replacement of rule of man by rule of law, the establishment of 
mechanisms that can effectively supervise and check the power of 
the Party and the state, and the institutionalization of 
political pluralism, etc., rather than administrative and 
organizational adjustments such as the division of the functions 
of the Party and the government, the streamlining of the 
institutions and bureaucracy, etc.. Only real political reforms 
can sustain and ensure the progress and success of the 
administrative reforms as well as the economic reforms.
Then, what are the main factors that prevented ideology 
from being fundamentally transformed?
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a. The limitations of Den? Xiaoping, China's Chief Architect of 
the reforms
In a Communist state, such as China, all the major and most 
significant decisions are made by a small number of senior 
leaders. Moreover, there is always a paramount leader who has 
the final say. In post-Mao China, Deng Xiaoping emerged as 
China's paramount leader, or as he is often called, "the chief 
architect of China's modernization cause", although he did not 
possess absolute authority as Mao had done. Evidently, a 
paramount leader's determination, courage, and especially his 
vision can exert crucial influence on the overall orientation of 
a country's development.
In the post-Mao decade starting from 1978, two great events 
should chiefly go to Deng Xiaoping's credit. First, he initiated 
the mind-emancipation campaign and put China on the path of the 
economic modernizations. Second, he opened China's door to the 
outside world and set China onto the initial stage of 
integrating its economy with the world economy.
But, as one of the first-generation Communist 
revolutionaries, Deng's philosophy and vision determined that it 
was beyond him to bring about the fundamental ideological 
changes that were essentially required by the political and 
economic reforms.
Firstly, Deng helped smash some of the old ideological 
taboos and enter forbidden zones but set some new ones himself.
Reviewing Deng's speeches and writings, one could see that 
if at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the early 1980s, 
he was advocating and emphasizing the importance of 
"emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts", then later, 
especially after the mid-1980s, he was often found to be 
emphasizing the significance of adhering to the "Four Cardinal 
Principles" and the necessity of opposing bourgeois 
liberalization and spiritual pollution. Accompanying this, the 
leadership was found, on many occasions, to be going against the 
principles and ideas advocated earlier by Deng.
For example,in his famous speech "Emancipating the Mind,
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Seeking Truth from Facts and Unite as One in looking to the
Future"184 Deng expounded the causes that led to the rigidity of
the mind. He said, beca'use Lin Biao and the Gang of Four set up
ideological taboos or "forbidden zones",
no one was allowed to go beyond the limits they prescribed; 
anyone who did was tracked—down, stigmatized and attacked 
politically.In this situation, some people found it safer 
to stop using their heads and thinking questions over.... 
Also because democratic centralism was undermined and the 
Party was afflicted with bureaucratism resulting from over­
concentration of power. This kind of bureaucratism often 
masquerades as 'Party discipline', 'Party leadership', 
'Party directives', 'Party interests', but actually it is 
designed to control people, hold them in check and oppress 
them. At that time, many important issues were often 
decided by one or two persons. The others could only do 
what these few ordered.185
In talking about the attitude and policy toward the masses
and the ideological problem, Deng said:
The masses should be encouraged to offer criticism.... One 
thing a revolutionary party does need to worry about is its 
inability to hear the voice of the people. The thing to be 
feared worst is silence.... In dealing with ideological 
problems we must never use coercion but should genuinely 
carry out the policy of 'letting a hundred flowers bloom, 
a hundred schools of thought contend'. We must firmly put 
a stop to bad practices such as attacking and trying to 
silence people who make critical comments - especially 
sharp ones - by ferreting out their political backgrounds, 
tracing political rumours to them and opening 'special 
case' files on them.... No leading comrades at any level 
must ever place themselves in opposition to the masses.186
Anyone who is familiar with China's past ten years, would 
be somewhat amazed to detect similarities between what the 
leadership was doing in the late 1980s and what Deng opposed at 
the end of the 1970s.
Just take one of Deng's speeches at the end of 1986 for 
example. It is a talk made to some leading members of the
184Maxwell, Robert (ed.). op.cit. . p.ix.
185 Ibid. p. 63.
186 Ibid. . pp. 65-67.
112
Central Committee of the CCP at the time of the students' 
movement at the end of 1986. At the very beginning of this talk 
Deng said: "Firm measures must be taken against any student who 
creates trouble at Tiananmen Square. We must resolutely impose 
sanctions on Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang,187 who are 
so arrogant that they want to remould the Communist Party." He 
criticized those leaders both at the local and central level who 
"took a laissez-faire attitude towards bourgeois 
liberalization." "When a disturbance breaks out in a place, it 
is because the leaders there did not take a firm, clear-cut 
stand. We have to admit that on the ideological and theoretical 
front both central and local authorities have been weak and have 
lost ground." Instead of advocating "emancipating the mind," 
Deng lay special emphasis on "the need for high ideals and 
strict discipline."188
Secondly, if Deng had adopted a relatively pragmatic 
attitude towards China's economic reforms and had demonstrated 
great boldness and confidence by initiating many economic 
changes, in the ideological and political spheres he had adopted 
a much more reserved and cautious attitude. And even when he did 
talk about ideological and political reforms, he always viewed 
them from the angle of serving the economic reforms.
After all, Deng began all the post-Mao changes by so-called 
"Bo Luan Fan Zheng" (putting right things which had gone wrong). 
To Deng and many other Communist leaders, China's political 
system was basically good; the problems were created by mistakes 
and the destructive policies of Lin Biao and the "Gang of 
Four". Therefore, by redressing the problems and returning to 
the correct Party line, China could become a powerful and 
prosperous socialist country in the foreseeable future.
Even when the politically obstructive effects on the 
economic reforms had been so manifestly demonstrated and Deng
187 These are well known Chinese dissidents.
188 Deng Xiaoping. Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 
Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987, pp.161-166.
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himself had to admit in 1986 that "whenever we move a step 
forward in economic reform, we are made keenly aware of the need 
to change the political structure. If we fail to do that, it 
will stunt the growth of the productive forces and impede our 
drive for modernization."189, Deng's political reform still 
referred to administrative reform, with the aim of overcoming 
bureaucratism and stimulating the initiative of the masses for 
the economic reforms. So any words or deeds that went beyond 
these limitations were not tolerated by Deng, as the ten years 
had shown.
Thirdly, as a Communist who had devoted all his life to the 
revolution, Deng would not abandon his faith and alter his whole 
world view and his faith in socialism. And moreover, as a
socialist country born out of the womb of semi-feudal and semi­
colonial society, Chinese-style socialism is tied in a hundred 
and one ways with feudalism. Some of Deng's views could
illustrate this point clearly:
1) If China's history could simply be described as
disorder and order existing alternatively, then the chief task 
of each ruler was to restore or defend "order". And "in times of 
order, China was inclined to orthodoxy and those who ruled China 
were only too ready to try and define this orthodoxy as soon as 
possible.11190 At the end of the 1970s, Deng and his colleagues 
put an end to the disorder of "the Cultural Revolution". Since 
then, keeping order, defending the stable and united situation, 
has been the primary concern for Deng. Like his historical
predecessors, Deng put forward "Four Cardinal Principles" as the 
orthodoxy. All the other theories and ideas, especially those 
imported from the West, that might challenge the orthodoxy are 
stifled. People who believe or spread these ideas are criticized 
or punished.
2) In China's history, there were, generally speaking, two
189 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. 1987, op.cit. . p.72.
190 Wilson, Dick (ed.). Mao Zedong in the Scale of History. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, p.283.
114
kinds of rulers: the tyrannical and the "enlightened" emperors. 
An enlightened ruler might show some concern for the living 
conditions of his subjects, might accept some suggestions and 
adopt some new policies, or he might be more tolerant of some of 
the fresh and different ideas.
In the 1980s what Deng and the other leaders are proud of 
is that they have granted the people some limited freedom of 
speech, have tolerated some degree of criticism in the press and 
have given people some opportunities to influence the election 
of the lower level leaders.
In talking about the political reform , Deng made it 
clear, that in essence, the purpose of political reform is to 
stimulate the initiative of the people. He said: "Without
political reform, economic reform cannot succeed, because the 
first obstacle to be overcome is people's resistance.191 These 
words fully indicated how Deng and the other leaders look at 
their relationship with the masses. As a Chinese theoretician, 
Hu Jiwei, (who was criticized in 1989), pointed out: "Actually, 
the wording of 'stimulating the initiative of the people' is not 
correct. As people's servants, what we should do is not to stand 
above the people and stimulate their initiative but adhere to 
the stipulations of the constitutions and respect and assure 
people's rights and their position as masters in the 
society. "192
3) The most predominant feature of feudalism, autocracy, 
is also shared by socialism. Deng, instead of denying this, 
publicly acknowledged it as an advantage of the socialist 
system. "The greatest advantage of the socialist system is that 
when the central leadership makes a decision it is promptly 
implemented without interference from any other quarters....
191 Deng Xiaoping. Fundamental Issues in Present~dav China. 
op.cit.. p.147.
192 Hu Jiwei, "Economic Reform and Political Reform Must Be 
Conducted Together", Economic Weekly. 2.4.1989. p.4.
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from this point of view, our system is very efficient.1,193 Deng
negated the Western sysjtems of the balance of the three powers
/
and multi-party selection; he said: "If we place too much
emphasis on a need for checks and balances, problems may 
arise.”194
So, although during the last decade Deng has been 
remarkably liberal-minded and bold in pushing forward China's 
economic reform and opening-up programmes, his communist and 
feudalism-ridden outlook and vision prevented him from grasping 
some historic "golden" opportunities to bring about more 
fundamental changes to China. Moreover, his very reserved and 
wavering attitudes towards the political reform and his 
intolerance and crushing of the democratic movements had, on 
many occasions, strengthened the conservative camp and weakened 
the reformist camps, which could not but severely affect the 
economic reform and opening-up programmes that he had been 
advocating all the time.
b. Opposition from the vested interests and the conservatives
The vested interests refer to those who felt threatened by 
the policies of the 1980s, such as large sections in the PLA and 
those who advanced up the career ladder during the "Cultural 
Revolution". They opposed the reforms mainly for personal 
rather than ideological reasons. However, they would always use 
the official ideology as their guise or shield to launch their 
attack on the reforms. A vivid example of their ability to cause 
the reformers embarrassment and trouble came in 1983-1984 when 
Deng initiated the campaign to oppose "spiritual pollution". If 
this campaign was intended to stop some of the unwelcome 
developments which had accompanied China's opening-up, then 
leftists, especially those in some grass-root units, fully 
exploited this opportunity to extend the campaign in a manner 
frighteningly reminiscent of the "Cultural Revolution" by, for
193 Deng Xiaoping, op.cit. . 1987, p. 192.
194 Ibid. . p. 153.
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example, attacking scientists for studying western journals and
women for sporting foreign 'perm'.195
/
But the strongest opposition came from the hard-line Party
leaders, who believed in the old revolutionary precepts and who
were still powerful. They were deeply wary of the pace and scope
of the changes. While the younger, more radical reformers of the
Party heralded economic incentives, a commodity economy, market
mechanisms, price reform, and reform of the political structure,
the older hard-line conservative leaders continued a discourse
in the rhetoric of the bygone revolution on centralized control,
evil winds, socialist spiritual civilization and spiritual
pollution. Just take one example. In September 1986, while
radical reformers and intellectuals were strongly calling for
democracy and political reforms, Wang Zhen, member of the
Politburo and one of the hard-liners, published an article in
Red Flag marking the tenth anniversary of Mao Zedong's death and
the publications of a new edition of his selected works. In a
style redolent of the past, Wang wrote:
To my mind, the best way to commemorate Comrade Mao Zedong 
is to earnestly study and propagate Mao Zedong Thought, to 
draw wisdom and strength from its valuable spiritual 
wealth, and to guarantee the success of the building of 
socialist material and spiritual civilization. China has a 
civilization of close to five thousand years. The Chinese 
nation has a revolutionary tradition and spiritual wealth 
worthy of our pride, of which the most valuable part is Mao 
Zedong Thought.196
It was natural for people to have different views and 
visions, but differences from the key figures at the highest 
level of decision-making could exert significant policy 
implications. This was even more so in post-Mao China when 
nobody including Deng, could wield power as arbitrarily as Mao 
once had. In the ten years, the repeated campaigns against so- 
called "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois liberalization", the
195 See Schram, S.R. op.cit..
196 Red Flag. No.9, 1986. Cited in Orville Schell, op.cit. . 
pp.20-21.
ups and downs of political reforms and especially the removal of 
Party General-Secretary Hu Yaobang in January 1987, and the 
ouster of Zhao Ziyang,"another General Secretary of the CCP in 
June 1989, all well indicated the extent of the opposition and 
the capacity of the conservatives to disrupt the reforms.
C. Weakness and Incapability of the Radical Reformers in the 
Ideological Sphere
Many of China's radical reformers believed in "Crossing the 
river by feeling the Stones", i.e. carrying out the reforms in 
a trial-and-error manner, making constant adjustments and 
adaptation as practice required. But without a new and cogent 
ideology, reform policies and measures could not be justified 
and rationalized; the gains and achievements of the economic 
reform and opening-up could not always be maintained and 
defended and attacks and opposition from the conservatives and 
leftists could not be adequately and forcefully countered.
As this chapter has shown, although the more radical 
reformist leaders were ready to take bolder and riskier measures 
that would launch China in the direction of a market economy, 
new forms of public ownership, and a more pluralistic political 
order, they did not succeed in bringing about the ideological 
transformations that the radical reforms badly needed. When 
various maladies in the old structure were not systematically 
and drastically dissected and many fundamental questions, such 
as why reform is necessary and what needs to be reformed, were 
not convincingly expounded in terms of theory, both reforms and 
reformers were bound to be placed in a vulnerable position. 
Therefore, once difficulties and problems emerged in the process 
of reform, reformers would always be confronted with censure and 
criticism from those upholding the traditional theories. Since 
the reformers were not well armed with counter theories, they 
could not justly defend themselves and the reform measures.
So in the last decade, what the radical reformers were 
trying to do in the ideological sphere, was to create a kind of 
"Kuan Song" (tolerant and relaxed) political environment so that
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the economic reforms could develop smoothly. When faced with the 
challenges and attacks from the conservatives, the radicals' 
attitude was to try to"avoid direct ideological confrontations 
and restrict and quell the debates and campaigns by 
administrative methods. This course of action by the radical 
reformers, although on some occasions effective in the short 
term, in the long run only exacerbated the problems. Since 
ideological emancipation was a pre-condition of political 
transformation, the scope and extent of ideological emancipation 
determine the scope and extent of political transformation, 
often making all the difference between success and failure. 
Moreover, like one falling domino knocking down another, a 
continuing lack of a coherent ideological guideline could only 
imperil political reform, and a lack of political reform would 
in turn imperil even those economic reforms already successfully 
underway.
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CHAPTER IV. PRACTICAL ADAPTATION AND DIFFICULTIES
Having described the unsuccessful attempt at working out a 
sound and cogent ideology for the new developmental strategy and 
the impact of this failure on opening-up and reforms on the 
macro-level in previous chapters, in this chapter, besides 
providing a brief survey of the development of direct foreign 
investment (DFI) in China's opening-up in the 1980s, I will seek 
to examine how well the adaptation process has gone in the 
actual implementation of the opening-up policies, especially in 
the area of the foreign-related economy (FRE) . Two main 
questions to be addressed in this chapter are: what are the 
difficulties and obstacles in the practical adaptation process, 
especially those resulted from the old and half-reformed 
economic structures and system? And how good a demonstration 
role has the FRE played for the state economy?
In order to obtain first-hand, reliable materials, I went 
back to the city of Tianjin in China and conducted a series of 
interviews with local officials, managers, academics, foreign 
businessmen and journalists, all of whom are closely involved 
with the development of China's FRE. I have explained why I 
chose Tianjin for the fieldwork and described the method used in 
the interviews in Chapter I. The following discussion will draw 
heavily upon the materials obtained from this fieldwork.
I. A SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 
THE 1980S: CHINA IN GENERAL, TIANJIN IN PARTICULAR
A. The Evolution of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI)
The opening-up of China's economy since 1978-9 has been one 
of the most dramatic policy changes of recent years. The 
opening-up policy has altered China's developmental strategy 
from one based on self-sufficiency to one of active 
participation in the world market. One of the most important 
aspects of the opening-up policy has been to attract DFI into
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China.197 Since the discussions in this chapter will be chiefly 
based on examples in this field, a brief survey of the evolution 
of DFI in the 1980s is 'appropriate and necessary.
The strategy of attracting DFI began in 1979 when the 
government's ten-year-plan (1976-1986), based upon taking out 
foreign loans and importing equipment and technology appeared to 
be failing, and more radical economic reform began to be 
implemented. The 1979 "Law on Joint Ventures" permitted foreign 
investment. However, the volume of foreign investment grew very 
slowly during the early 1980s. This was due to several factors 
the most important of which were that the legal environment for 
foreign investors was not well defined, the negotiation process 
was long and uncertain and little attention was paid to actually 
attracting foreign investors. 1984 and 1985 saw the first 
foreign investment boom resulting from a series of 
implementation regulations in 1983 which greatly clarified the 
legal environment for joint ventures. But this boom was short­
lived and foreign investment slipped back again in 1986 due to 
dissatisfaction with the way in which joint ventures were 
working out in practice.
According to Ho and Huenemann's survey of early foreign 
investors' experiences, a few common problems were: the high 
cost of doing business in China due to an outdated 
communications and transport system, high valuations of land, 
labour and other Chinese-contributed inputs, labour practices, 
etc.; perhaps, most restrictive of all was the requirement to 
earn foreign exchange, which limited access to the billion-
197 The types of contracts under China's opening-up policy 
include: a) 100% foreign owned ventures; b) Equity joint
ventures, where some contributions are allowed from the Chinese 
side in kind, c) Cooperative (or contractual) joint ventures, 
where the Chinese contribution is mainly in kind, normally land 
and buildings; d) Processing and assembly arrangements (for 
which fees are charged); e) Compensation trade, where the 
foreign side supplies machinery and equipment, and is repaid in 
instalments of the product. For the detailed description of 
these different types of contracts see John T. Thoburn et al. 
Foreign Investment in China Under the Open Policy. Hong Kong, 
Avebury Aldershot. 1990, pp.16-19.
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person domestic market which had attracted many foreign 
investors' interest to China in the first place.198
The promulgation df the "Provisions for the Encouragement 
of Foreign Investment” in October 1986 and the announcement of 
their implementation regulations over the next year were a 
turning point. They marked a shift in the government's attitude 
from allowing foreign investment to actively encouraging it. 
The new measures improved the investment climate both by adding 
new incentives and by removing past uncertainties. Now explicit 
encouragement was given to joint ventures which involved 
advanced technology and export production. Besides the 
extension of tax holidays, these enterprises also received 
priority in obtaining the services of public utilities and 
various other concessions. All joint ventures and wholly 
foreign-owned (WFO) enterprises received the right to exchange 
foreign exchange among themselves. They were to be subject to 
simpler import and export licensing procedures. And they also 
received the right to refuse to pay "unreasonable” fees.
Promulgation in April 1986 of the "Law on Enterprises 
Operated Exclusively with Foreign Capital** indicated a more 
relaxed attitude towards foreign control of DFI projects. And 
the long-awaited "Law on Co-operative Ventures" was also passed 
in April 1988, providing the legal framework for this type of 
foreign investment. So in order to reduce the legal gap between 
China and developed countries and improve China's legal 
environment for the DFI, since 1980 the Chinese government has 
passed over 200 laws and regulations pertaining to trade and 
foreign investment in China and signed investment protection 
agreements with over twenty Western countries.199
The SEZs have been granted special rights in attracting DFI
198 See Ho, S. and Huenemann, R. China's Open Door Policy; 
The Quest for Foreign Technology and Capital, Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1984. Also see Pomfret, 
Richard. Investing in China. New York, London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp.23-24.
199 Outlook Weekly. No.32, 1985, pp.21-23.
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ever since they were established in the earlier 1980s. For 
instance, the SEZs enjoy great autonomy in signing joint venture
contracts with foreign companies. The corporation tax rate is
only 15% in the SEZs. It is 33.3% in the rest of China.
Managers in the SEZs have full responsibility in making
decisions about production and marketing,, and they do not have 
to follow the government plan. Prices are determined by supply 
and demand and are directly related to the international market. 
In the WFO enterprises, foreign investors enjoy full control of 
management. The government guarantees foreign investors the 
right to transfer their profits into foreign exchange. It does 
not charge import duties on production goods needed by the SEZs.
Most of these policies have been implemented in the 
District of Hainan Island (now Hainan Province). And, as noted, 
in 1984 the Chinese government announced the decision to open 
fourteen coastal cities, which hold roughly 40% of China's total 
industrial capacity, to foreign investors. In 1987, the
government further opened the entire coastal areas to foreign 
investors. The two largest industrial cities, Shanghai and 
Tianjin, enjoy the right to approve contracts with foreign 
investors worth up to $30 million200 without permission from the 
central authority, while the limits for Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces and the city of Dalian are $10 million. Other 
provinces can approve contracts with foreign corporations for up 
to $5 million.201 By early 1991, the total number of foreign- 
invested firms came to more than 32,000, with $17 billion 
actually invested and another $30 pledged.202
B. A Brief Survey of Tianjin and the Development of Direct 
Foreign Investment in Tianjin \
Tianjin is a major industrial centre, the communication hub
200 All references in dollars are to U.S. dollars.
201 Beiiinq Review. Vol. 27, No.48, 26.11.1985, p.48
202 People's Daily. 27.6.91.
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and trading port city in North China. It is the main export 
outlet for Hebei Province and the entire north-west region. 
Total population is arotmd 8.5 million, including 3.5 million in 
the city area and the rest in surrounding counties within a 
total area of 11 thousand square kilometres.
Tianjin has an industrial history of more than 120 years. 
It has 6,154 industrial enterprises, a workforce of over 4 
million and 100,000 types of products. The total output value 
in 1988 was 36,256 billion yuan (excluding that of the 
individually owned industrial enterprises). Tianjin is the 
largest industrial base in North China.
Tianjin is a city with a long history of foreign contacts. 
The port started handling foreign trade in 1860. At present, it 
has close trade relations with over 12,000 overseas clients in 
more than 160 countries and regions.
Since the policy of opening to the outside world was 
implemented in 1979, DFI in Tianjin has been increasing every 
year. The Tianjin government has been making great efforts to 
improve the investment environment. Established in June 1987, 
the Tianjin Foreign Investment Service Centre exercises 
exclusive administrative authority on behalf of the Municipal 
Government of Tianjin and provides a social service, i.e. 
integrated administration and service for foreign investments 
from project approval to actual construction as well as matters 
concerning management after a project has gone into operation.
In April 1987, the State Council authorized the 
municipality of Tianjin to use $1 billion of foreign funds in 
addition to the original amounts allowed by the central 
government for the period of the Seventh Five Year Plan (1986- 
1990) in order to facilitate the opening to the outside world 
and promote the modernization of Tianjin. At the same time, 
Tianjin municipality was given greater authority to examine and 
approve projects. Moreover, more favourable terms for the 
submission of revenue to the state and foreign exchange 
retention were also approved.
Up to the end of March 1991, Tianjin had approved 609 joint
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ventures and joint cooperation contracts signed with investors 
from more than 20 countries and regions. The total pledged 
investment reached about $1.2 billion, 241 enterprises were in 
operation.203
As a result of the import of foreign advanced technology 
and management and also through the efforts of Chinese and 
foreign staff, some high quality and highly competitive products 
have gained prestige on the international market, such as 
"Dynasty” brand wine produced by the Sino-French Joint Venture 
Winery Ltd., "Wella Balsam Shampoo” and a range of hair care 
products produced by the Sino-German Joint Venture, Liming 
Cosmetics Industrial Co., a whole range of intravenous injection 
products produced by the Sino-Japanese OTSUKA Pharmaceutical Co. 
Ltd., etc.
As one of the 14 coastal open cities, Tianjin established 
its own Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA), 
a specific region wherein preferential policies and flexible 
measures, similar to those now exercised in the SEZs, are 
offered to foreign investors for setting up manufacturing 
enterprises of Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, Sino-foreign 
cooperative ventures and wholly-foreign-owned enterprises.
TEDA is located to the southeast of Tianjin, more than 50 
kilometres from the centre of the city, close to Tianjin Harbour 
and the coastal district Tanggu. By October 1990, 206 contracts 
of Sino-foreign joint ventures were signed between TEDA and 
foreign firms from 21 different countries and regions, including 
the USA, Japan, the then Federal Republic of Germany, France, 
Belgium, Denmark, Singapore, the Philippines, etc.. 109
enterprises had already started production, more than 90% of 
which were manufacturing projects, and 40% of the total products 
were exported. In 1990, the gross industrial output was 780 
million yuan, and the annual growth rate since 1984 had been an 
average of 30%.204
203 Evening Daily. Tianjin, 16.4.91, p.l.
204 People's Daily (overseas edition), 5.4.1991.
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II. ADAPTATION AND DIFFICULTIES
A. Difficulties in Adaptation Arising from Lack of Experience
After three decades of being all but cut off from the West, 
it naturally took time for Chinese business managers, 
administrators and workers to ~get used * to cooperating with 
foreign businessmen. When I went back to Tianjin to conduct my 
fieldwork in early 1991, more than ten years had passed since 
the opening up policies had begun to be implemented; Chinese 
society had become much more open, Chinese businessmen had 
become much more experienced and self-confident in conducting 
business with foreign investors. But many things had been 
learnt the hard way, and much was still left to be desired. 
Here, I shall just take two examples to illustrate the 
difficulties in this regard.
The first example is the Tianjin United Tyre and Rubber 
International Co. Ltd.(TUTRIC), a Sino-Canadian joint venture, 
the largest joint venture in Tianjin. This company produces 
giant engineering tyres mainly for the mining industry. The 
overall investment was $30 million, the largest manufacturing 
joint-venture in Tianjin and was built on the green field. The 
Chinese side, providing 75% of the investment, placed high hopes 
on it because China could not produce giant tyres for mines but 
had to import them at a cost of tens of millions of dollars each 
year till late 1980s. But the experience of cooperation was 
fraught with frustrations and difficulties.
The root of the difficulties lies in the fact that the 
Chinese side did not know and had not made an attempt to know 
enough about the foreign partner at the very beginning.205 From
205 In the interview with Manager Sun of Tianjin Sino-IBM 
joint venture in Tianjin China, April 1991, he repeatedly 
stressed the importance of choosing a good partner. He said: 
"Generally speaking, small medium-sized foreign companies tend 
to be short-sighted. They are concerned more about making money 
than helping you to establish a sound business while the large, 
especially the well-known, transnational corporations could have 
a longer-term commitment”. He took his joint venture for 
example: Since it went into operation in August 1989, IBM had
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1983 to 1985, throughout the long process of negotiations, the 
Chinese side did not know that the Canadian partner was a 
company already operating at a loss. This was only discovered 
when they visited Canada in 1986. As a matter of fact, the 
Canadian company originally only wanted to sell its equipment, 
but the Chinese side insisted oii~ setting* up a joint venture. 
Part of the Canadian company's investment was its equipment, the 
designed capacity of which was said to be over 14,000 tons a 
year. But the actual capacity was later found out to be only 
around 9,000 tons, and this became a bone of contention.
After the newly-built factory went into operation in 1988, 
the question of exporting its products soon emerged as the major 
source of disagreement. According to the contract, 60% of the 
products were to be sold abroad and the foreign partner had the 
exclusive sale rights in the foreign markets for the first three 
years.206 But in the implementation of the contract, the two 
sides could not agree on the price. The Canadian side argued 
that the products produced by a new corporation could only be 
sold at a lower price, while the Chinese side stressed that the 
new corporation could not afford to sell at a price that was too 
low because the output was small, and the cost was high. A 
series of meetings of the board of directors were convened, 
which, as Manager Zhang described to me, became "meetings of 
bitter wrangling", but still the problem could not be solved. 
As time passed, products were kept long in stock, interest on 
loans was going up as the corporation's predicament set deeper 
and deeper. Under such circumstances, the Chinese side decided
provided $1.4-2 million interest-free working capital each 
month. He said: "The foreign partner is not gazing at the
present profit but its share of the Chinese market and profits 
in the long term".
206 From my interviews, I found that due mainly to lack of 
experience and self-confidence in dealing with the foreign 
market, many Chinese partners would very willingly give the 
exclusive sale rights in the foreign market to its foreign 
partner. In many cases, this subsequently caused a lot of 
displeasure or dispute over the problems of price and profit.
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to sell abroad itself, which caused further quarrels and 
bitterness.
Not until the seventh meeting of the board of directors in 
September 1990, more than two years after production began, did 
the two sides come to an agreement. The Canadian side gave a 
guarantee to sell no less than three thousand tons a year; and 
the Chinese side could also sell abroad. "Only after such a 
long and hard time,” Manager Zhang said, "did we win back the 
sale right which we gave up so lightly at the beginning. It is 
a bitter lesson. Although the Canadian side had only 20% 
investment, it had been able to control us all along.”207
Another setback was over management. According to the 
agreement, a manager from the Canadian side became the General 
Manager of TUTRIC in 1989. Although he was an overseas Chinese 
and, as in many other instances of Sino-foreign joint ventures, 
such people had a good understanding of how China worked, he did 
not have much experience in management. So, under his 
management, 1989 turned out to be the worst in terms of the 
quality of products, according to Manager Zhang. (Manager Zhang 
did recognize that besides the personal qualifications of the 
foreign manager, the problems were caused by many other factors 
on the Chinese side, which will be discussed later) . By the end 
of 1989, the two sides had agreed to choose another general 
manager.
By the time I visited this corporation in early 1991, it 
had managed to increase both its output and exports. It could 
make as many as 390 types of tyres, many of which had previously 
had to be imported. However, because of the earlier 
difficulties with its exports, the economic retrenchment at the 
end of the 1980s and its ever-increasing outstanding loans, the 
corporation still had huge debts, and it was in great
207 Of the total investment the Chinese side has 75%, the 
Canadian side 20%, and a Hong Kong company, which acted as 
middleman, has 5%.
128
difficulties.208
The difficulties met by TUTRIC were by no means unique. 
Many other joint ventures experienced similar problems due to 
lack of experience and self-confidence. The second example is 
concerned with the very first joint venture in TEDA, the Sino- 
Danish Enterprise Co. Ltd., which- ran into great difficulties 
over a seemingly very minor technical point immediately after 
the factory went into operation. The Chinese side agreed to 
import bicycle parts at a unit price of RMB 128 yuan from the 
Danish company. But the Chinese manager did not make it 
absolutely clear it was at RMB 128 yuan and only to find that 
the Danish company were selling the parts at a unit price of 
$128. The problem was not solved until both the Chinese and 
Danish governments intervened. The Chinese manager was later 
removed.209
However, the more technical and practical problems as I
have just illustrated proved to be the easiest to overcome.
Indeed, Chinese administrators and managers have become much
more experienced and mature as time goes on. Many stupid
mistakes are less likely to recur. As Pomfret found:
There are still complaints on both sides about partners' 
misbehaviour, but they tend to be associated more with the 
older joint ventures. The newer joint ventures are more 
careful in partner selection and perhaps the partners are 
more aware of potential traps.... Since 1986 the Chinese 
ability to find suitable partners has markedly improved.210
Compared with more technical and practical problems, structure 
and system-related problems proved to be much more complicated 
and difficult. However, in the end, China's overall adaptation
208 Interview with Manager Zhang of Tianjin United Tyre and 
Rubber International Co. Ltd. Tianjin, China, April 1991.
209 Interviews with Mr. Han Bing, General Manager of Sino- 
Danish Enterprise Co. Ltd. and Mr. Li Linshan, Director of the 
Policy Research Office of Tianjin Economic-Technological 
Development Area. Tianjin, China, April 1991.
210 Pomfret, Richard, op.cit. . pp. 124-125.
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capability must be chiefly judged by the capability and 
effectiveness of overcoming these systemic and structural 
obstacles. '
B. Difficulties in Adaption: Waste and Loss of National
Interest Caused by Incompetence, Bureaucracy and Regionalism
If the mistakes and losses as mentioned in the previous 
section were mainly caused by lack of experience, then many 
others have to be attributed to the economic system and 
management structure-related factors. In a market economy under 
private ownership, the capitalists and their managers, bent 
solely on profits, have to be calculating and shrewd. Even if 
they make some sacrifices in the short term, they definitely 
attempt to maximize their profits in the long term. After all, 
whether or not they can make money is a matter of life and death 
for their business. In contrast, the administrators and 
managers under the socialist public ownership and management 
system do not need to be very calculating since the survival of 
the state enterprises are guaranteed by the state regardless of 
their performance.
When China's door was opened and the socialist 
administrators and managers were exposed to the changeable world 
economy and astute capitalists, the weakness and defects in the 
socialist managerial system immediately became evident. It is 
clear that without substantial improvement in economic 
management and administration, the hope of speeding up the 
modernizations through the opening up policy can hardly be 
realised.
In the last decade, a series of measures have been taken to 
loosen the government's rigid control over the economy, to 
vitalize the enterprises and delegate more autonomy to 
enterprises. Undeniably, managers now have much more say over 
the development of the enterprises, and they have accordingly 
begun to pay much more attention to the interests of their 
individual enterprises and have become more profit-oriented and 
cost-conscious. However, this is still far from enough because
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for Chinese administrators and managers making money or losing
it is still not a matter of survival, neither for their
/
enterprises nor for themselves.
As the manager of the TUTRIC said to me: "People often say 
that you need not worry at all w h e n  borrowing money from the 
Communist government, for whatever happens to the loans, what 
can they do to you?"211
The particular circumstances of the reform period, however, 
as some commentators have noted, gave rise to another kind of 
"calculation". For example, in view of the scarcity of China's 
foreign exchange, the government allows export enterprises to 
keep a certain percentage of the foreign exchange they earn in 
order to stimulate the growth of exports. In order to obtain 
more foreign exchange (which would enable them to import more), 
many enterprises export as much as they can at any cost. Because 
they do not have to be responsible for the loss, they can afford 
to compete with other Chinese enterprises in price cutting the 
result being that benefits are just handed over to foreign 
buyers. Besides, in order to get an opportunity to visit abroad 
or line their own pockets, some administrators and managers 
would lightly give concessions in the negotiations at the 
expense of national interests.212
In the course of the interviews I was also told some cases 
of incredible waste and losses caused either by incompetence and 
bureaucracy or by individuals seeking personal benefits. One of 
the Assistant Managers of Tianjin Huamei Garment Co. Ltd. (a 
joint venture with an Overseas Chinese corporation) described to 
me a case which had occurred in their company.213 In 1985-86,
211 Interview with Manager Zhang.
212 "The International Economic Environment in the Initial 
Stage of Socialism" by Zhang Youwen and Sun Xianjun. World 
Economy, March 1989, p.11.
213 In China, the enterprises that produce the same or 
similar types of products in a city form an industrial company; 
similarly a number of companies in a city form an industrial 
bureau.
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the General Company of Garments in Beijing allocated a quota of 
$500,000 of foreign exchange to the No.29 Cotton-Padded Clothes 
Factory in Tianjin to enable it to import some equipment. The 
factory did not use the whole amount. The General Company 
decided to use the rest of the foreign exchange to import some 
other equipment; any factories belonging to the Company were 
allowed to buy some of the imported equipment with RMB. But 
what was the equipment that the factories needed? Without 
necessary research and consideration, some managers in the 
General Company decided to buy a whole set of sewing equipment 
from a certain Japanese Company. The Assistant Manager said to 
me: "It is true that some of the equipment especially the
double-needle machines were much better than ours, but we did 
not need to buy the whole set. As a result, one third of the 
imported equipment has been kept in the warehouse since then. 
Nobody knows why the leaders in the company decided to buy that 
equipment from that Japanese company, but what is known is that 
a large amount of hard-earned foreign exchange was wasted.”214
During my meeting with this Assistant Manager, we also 
discussed one of the somewhat peculiar features in the 
development of China's joint ventures: a Chinese enterprise that 
cooperates with a Chinese state enterprise abroad. The Huamei 
Garment Co. Ltd. is a joint venture between the former Tianjin 
Fur Coat Factory and the Chinese Textile American Company which 
is registered in the United States. The "foreign” partner holds 
a 30% share of the investment but takes no part in the 
management and provides no new technology. I was curious to 
know the intentions and the benefits of establishing such a 
joint venture and the differences between past and present. The 
manager was very frank: The intentions were to get the benefits
granted to the joint ventures such as a tax holiday and export- 
import rights. Besides, during the boom of foreign-invested 
firms, it was a fashionable thing to do. As for the differences
214 Interview with Assistant Manager Li of Tianjin Huamei 
Garment Co. Ltd. Tianjin, China, April 1991.
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between then and now, he said, since there was no real foreign 
partner to take part in the management, there were no very 
obvious changes except 'that "We always remind ourselves and the 
workers that ours is a joint venture. We should be able to 
create higher productivity." He admitted that the previous 
management was almost intact. During the interview he 
repeatedly compared his joint venture with the neighbouring 
joint venture Tianjin Jin Tak Garments Co. Ltd., a Sino-Italian 
joint venture run by an Italian manager. Though both are joint 
ventures, the latter was obviously much better managed. So in 
some of these Chinese-Chinese cases, "the joint ventures become 
little more than a device to secure greater freedom of action 
for a Chinese company."215
The deep-rooted regionalism that reemerged with the 
economic reforms and opening-up sometimes caused tremendous 
waste and serious impairment to national economic interests. 
With more powers being delegated to the local level but without 
the corresponding establishment of an effective national macro- 
administrative mechanism at the same time meant that each 
province or city fiercely vied with the others in the 
importation and setting up of joint ventures without concern for 
the overall economic effects and making best use of its own 
advantages while avoiding the disadvantages. Local governments 
have competed to expand the scale of their investment in order 
to achieve a growth rate as high as possible. They have often 
been sufficiently powerful and influential to be able to 
instruct the local banks to finance local construction projects 
by issuing loans, since the banking system has not yet become 
independent of the government. The local authorities have 
usually paid greater attention to short-term benefits. They 
have been eager to invest in processing industries with a high 
profit and quick return on capital rather than in basic 
industries and infra-structure construction, thus intensifying 
the imbalance of the industrial structure. For example, in 1985,
215 Thoburn, John T. op.cit. . p.28.
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China produced approximately 400,000 motor vehicles in as many 
as 1,300 factories, or an average of about 3,000 vehicles per 
factory.216 Another example are the huge losses caused by many 
of the imported 113 production lines of colour TV sets and 97 
production lines of refrigerators which ended up idle.217 In the 
late 1980s, in order to develop local industries, some local 
authorities broke off the traditional economic connections so as 
to protect local markets through blockades and other trade
barriers. The normal circulation of commodities was obstructed 
and led to so-called "Silkworm Locoon Wars", "Tea Wars" and so 
on.
A talk given to a Japanese business delegation by Tianjin's
Deputy Mayor Zhang Zhaoruo can well illustrate the way many
regional leaders behave when they try to attract foreign
investors and compete with other regions:
Tianjin enjoys various advantages over other areas. Dalian, 
of course, is an oil centre, but it suffers from a chronic 
water shortage. The northwest region is far inland, and 
supplies from abroad have to come through Tianjin anyway. 
Shanghai's port facilities are already overloaded, it has 
no more undeveloped industrial land nearby, and the quality 
of water from the Huangpu river is far from good. As 
regards Guangdong and Fujian, Japanese investors may not 
mix too well with the large number of overseas Chinese and 
Hong Kong entrepreneurs already there. Water from the 
Pearl River is not good and transportation in inland Fujian 
is difficult.
By contrast, Tianjin port handles a large variety of
imports and is equipped with container berths. The area 
has a first-class water supply in the Luan River, 230
kilometres away. When the Tianjin-Beijing Expressway is 
completed in 1990, it will take only an hour and 40 minutes 
to commute between the two cities, instead of the current 
three hours. Tianjin also has an extensive railway network 
linking it with inland areas.218
216 The example was given by Jonathan K. Woetzel in China's 
Economic Opening to the Outside World - the Politics of 
Empowerment. London: Praeger, 1989, pp.118-119.
217 Guancrminq Daily. 21.9.1990.
218 "Case Studies of Joint Ventures in China (IV)" in Satoshi 
Imai. China Newsletter. No.77, p.17.
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Put simply, the inefficiency of the old and half-reformed 
economic system, incompetence, bureaucracy, regionalism, etc. 
have caused considerable waste and often damage to national 
interests and have in many ways prevented China from gaining the 
most possible advantages from its foreign economic activities.
C. Difficulties in Adapting to Modern Management Techniques 
Arising from Structural and Systemic Factors
(1) Interference from the Bureaucracies
It is true that boards of directors are set up in 
accordance with the laws and regulations pertinent to foreign- 
related firms; however, in practice, it is almost always the 
industrial company manager (the immediate superior leader of the 
enterprise manager) who becomes the chairman of the board. So 
the relationship between the Chinese managers in the foreign- 
related firms and their superior leaders at the industrial 
company or bureau level is still crucial. Just as befork, the 
managers of the joint ventures can be appointed, dismissed, 
replaced and transferred as the "superiors11 think fit. 
Certainly, all of these practices are normal if the decisions 
made are based on the performance. But the facts show that this 
is not always the case. For example, the chief Chinese manager 
of China Tianjin Otis Elevator Co. Ltd. had just been removed 
when I began my fieldwork, not because of his performance, since 
his was widely known to be one of the most successful joint 
ventures in Tianjin, but because of his poor relationship with 
his Chinese superior, as I was told by a cadre in Tianjin 
Foreign Investment Service Centre.219
In the interview with a cadre of Tianjin Jin Mei Beverage 
Co. Ltd. (a Sino-American joint venture), she said: "One cannot 
expect managers to be far-sighted because they are not sure how 
long they can work in one place and where and when they will be
219 Interview with Mr. You of Tianjin Planning Committee and 
Tianjin Foreign Investment Service Centre, Tianjin, China, April 
1991.
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reassigned.220
During the fieldwork, I visited Tianjin's Economic 
Technological Development Area (TEDA) twice and managed to talk 
to several leading officials in the TEDA, including Mr. Yan 
Zheng, Chief of the Administrative Bureau of Enterprise and 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce; Mr. Li Linshan, Director of 
the Policy Research Office of TEDA; Mr. Han Bing, Director of 
the TEDA's Association For Enterprises Board. In the course of 
our conversations, I paid special attention to the managerial 
structure of the TEDA.
TEDA was set up in December 1984. From the very beginning 
the founders were keen to establish a new structure and system 
of administration and management. The guidelines they set forth 
for themselves included: to act according to international
practice; strive to create a "small climate" favourable to 
foreign investment; set up the administration according to the 
principle of "small government and large society".
After more than six years' development, TEDA has been 
recognized as one of the most successful development areas among 
the fourteen coastal areas opened in late 1984. For example, 
after his visit to the TEDA, Mr. Chenxin Lee, an official of the 
Financial Section of the American Embassy in Beijing, reportedly 
made a proposal to the American government that all prospective 
American investors in China should visit the TEDA, because it 
was one of the most promising areas in China for foreign 
investment and its investment environment is second only to 
Shekou of Shenzhen SEZ. And in August 1986, both Deng Xiaoping 
and Zhao Ziyang inspected the TEDA and gave their approval and 
praise.221 By 1990, more than 70% corporations were making 
profits. The total tax collected in 1990 was 70 million yuan. 
Work efficiency is much higher than that outside TEDA. For
220 Interview with Miss Mao of Tianjin Jin Mei Beverage Co. 
Ltd. Tianjin, China, April 1991.
221 Pi Qiansheng. Exploration - Tianiin's Development Area in 
Progress. Tianjin: Tianjin People's Publishing House, 1988,
p.166.
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instance, in TEDA, the administration guarantees to finish 
dealing with a project proposal within ten days, while in other
4
parts of Tianjin, outside TEDA, it usually takes at least three 
months, and often half a year.222
An improvement on the _ "Old Tianjin", TEDA has, 
nevertheless, encountered many problems in the effort to improve 
its management. Firstly, the mechanism of "small government and 
large society" has not been stabilized by regulations and 
legislation. Without these there can be no guarantee that the 
newly established administrative system will not be overwhelmed 
by the old system and the worries of foreign investors can 
hardly be eased and dispelled. Secondly and related to the 
above point, some signs of regression to the old system have 
already appeared.223 Mr. Han said: "Since the old and new
systems are crisscrossed all over the country, it is impossible 
for the old system not to infiltrate into the TEDA. After all, 
work is done by people, policies are operated by people. Since 
almost all the cadres in the TEDA used to work in the old 
system, it is inconceivable that they are not influenced by the 
old conceptions and work style."224 Thirdly, obstacles come from 
the departments-in-charge and a variety of functional bureaux 
such as Finance and Labour Bureaux. It has all along been the 
common practice that administrative departments-in-charge 
control and intervene in the operation and management of the 
enterprises. The departments can have direct access to the 
factory floor without going through the manager. So "joint 
ventures", as once noted by Woetzel, "faced a real challenge in 
getting local functional bureaux to sever their links with 
venture departments and instead go through the general manager.
222 Interview with Mr. Yan Zheng, April 1991.
223 During my interview with Mr. Yan, he showed me an 
internal document of TEDA, in which administrators and managers 
are warned of the phenomenon of regressing to the old system, 
and the legalization of the managerial system has been put high 
on the agenda.
224 Interview with Mr. Han Bing, April 1991.
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One foreign general manager in Tianjin had to personally place 
an advertisement for personnel in the China Daily before his own
4
Chinese advertising manager would consent to bypass the Labour 
Bureau.”225 Many departments-in-charge are not familiar with the 
idea that in the joint ventures, major business affairs are 
dealt with and decided by the general managers and the boards of 
directors of the corporation. Instead, sometimes, they would 
issue some instructions directly to the managers. When they are 
told that the issue has to be discussed and decided by the board 
before being dealt with, some leaders are furious and call the 
managers to account for disobedience. Understandably, this 
would exert massive pressure on the administrator or manager 
since their whole career could be placed in jeopardy. For 
instance, a Chinese administrative department-in-charge, which 
is also the investor in a joint venture in the TEDA, became very 
dissatisfied with the General Manager and the Deputy General 
Manager, and without bothering to inform, still less consult 
the board of directors, the department issued an order to the 
corporation, declaring that a working team would be sent there 
to take over the management of the joint venture.226 Sometimes 
trouble could also arise from the fact that leaders and managers 
working in the TEDA generally enjoy much better pay and benefits 
than their counterparts or even superiors in the government 
organs and enterprises outside TEDA. The so-called ”red-eye 
disease" (being bitterly envious) is very disruptive especially 
when the "patient" is the former or current superior leader.227
What should be noted, however, is the fact that despite the 
defects and problems, generally speaking, the management level 
in the TEDA is much higher than that of the state enterprises 
mainly for the following reasons: first, the enterprises in the 
TEDA are much more exposed to foreign management expertise. In
225 Woetzel, Jonathan R. op.cit. . p. 118.
226 See Pi Qiansheng, op.cit. . p.47.
227 Interview with Mr. Han Bing.
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the TEDA, out of 206 approved projects related to 21 countries 
and regions, 109 have already gone into operation. Among these, 
more than 40% of enterprises have foreign investors directly 
involved in the management.228 Second, the majority of the 
administrators and managers in the TEDA are in their late 
thirties or early forties. Both Mr. Yang and Mr. Han, for 
example, are in their thirties.229 The generation of the thirty 
and forty year olds are playing an increasingly significant role 
in China's economic development. Many of them are liberal- 
minded, creative and bold. In terms of management, they tend to 
be more keen on learning and practising modern management 
techniques. Of course, the even younger workforce (most of whom 
are high school graduates in their twenties) provides the 
favourable condition for them to put the new management 
techniques into practice. Third, the TEDA is established on 
the green field, and in most cases, the managers are newly 
appointed and workers newly employed. So in the case of these 
enterprises, they have not inherited the old practices that need 
to be changed or replaced, a problem all the joint ventures 
built upon old enterprises face and always find a daunting or 
even impossible task.
(2) Difficulties in Creating the New out of the Old in the Cases 
of "One-Plant-Two-System” Model Joint Ventures
It seems the further away they are from the old 
administrative and management structure, the easier it is for 
the managers of foreign-related firms to adopt modern management 
techniques and act according to the international practice. I 
shall attempt to specify and illustrate the argument with the
228 See Chen Yue and Pi Qiansheng. (ed.).Research on China's 
Economic and Technological Developmental Area. Tianjin: Bohaiwan 
Publishing House, 1989, p.377.
229 The former Director of the Administrative Management 
Commission of TEDA, the No.l figure, Zhang Wei, was only in his 
early thirties when he was given the job. He resigned 
immediately after the 1989 June event.
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example of the so-called joint ventures of the "one-plant-two- 
system formula".
The "one-plant-two-system formula", created for the purpose 
of transforming existing plants, especially the state 
enterprises, means turning part of the plant into a joint 
venture with a foreign company, “so* that the introduction of new 
technology and modern management techniques in the joint venture 
could serve the purpose of raising the whole plant to a higher 
level of production. Obviously, the adjustment and adaptation 
task for this kind of joint venture is much more pressing and 
complex than for the other kinds of joint ventures. In addition 
to the relationship between the Chinese and foreign partners, 
there are also the relations between the Chinese joint venture 
part and the non joint-venture part, the relations between the 
foreign investors and the Chinese non-joint venture side. Since 
one of the main purposes of my fieldwork was to examine the 
adaptation capabilities of the Chinese managers and the causes 
of difficulties involved in the adaptation efforts, I naturally 
paid special attention to the "one-plant-two-system formula" 
joint ventures. In the interview with Mr. You of the Tianjin 
Foreign Investment Service Centre, he confirmed that there were 
definitely more problems with the "one-plant-two-system" joint 
ventures than with the other types of foreign-invested firms. 
One of the examples he gave was the case of the Tianjin Glass 
Factory. The conflicts between the two parts of the factory 
once became so tense that the manager of the old factory, who 
was also the chairman of the board of directors of the joint 
venture and the Party Secretary, first cut off both water and 
electricity supplies to the joint venture side, then sent in the 
workers of the non-joint venture side to carry all the furniture 
away from the joint venture. The incident was reported to the 
municipal government, but nobody could do anything about it. 
The Director of the Tianjin Economic and Trade Commission could 
only suggest turning the whole plant into a joint venture, but
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that was unacceptable to the foreign investor.230
In the interview with Mr. Gao Luan, Deputy Chief of the 
Project Department of 'the Tianjin Foreign Investment Service 
Centre, he recommended me that I visited the Tianjin Jin Rong 
Co. Ltd, which, he said, was the most successful joint venture 
of the "one-plant-two-system formula” so far.231
Tianjin Jin Rong Co. Ltd. is a Sino-Japanese joint venture 
invested and established by Tianjin Jin Hua Radio Factory, 
Japanese Matsuki Giken co. Ltd, Senbogi Seiko Co. Ltd., and K C 
Co. Ltd.. The company engages in the development and production 
of cassette recorders, cassette tape deck mechanisms, and 
assemblage mould and related electronic products. As for the 
management structure, the chairman of the board of directors is 
the manager of the former Jin Hua Radio Factory, now the manager 
of the non-joint venture part. The general manager of the joint 
venture side is a former vice manager of the old factory, and 
the deputy general managers are a Japanese businessman and a 
former vice manager of the old factory. My interview was with 
Mr. Sun Xingwen, Vice General Manager and Mr. Cai Jinbo, 
Director of Head Office, who is also the Chairman of the Trade 
Union and Secretary of the Party branch.
During the interview, I realized that when Mr. Gao 
evaluated the joint venture as quite successful, he must have 
referred mainly to the following three facts: First, no serious 
conflicts ever occurred either between the managers of the two 
Chinese sides or between the workers. Second, in terms of its 
economic performance, the joint venture managed to recoup its 
capital outlay within four years, 80% of the raw and processed 
materials have been produced in China rather than imported from 
Japan, and exports have been increasing. And third, the old 
factory has also benefited by using the products produced by the
230 Interview with Mr. You Qilu.
231 Interview with Mr. Gao Luan, Deputy Chief of the Project 
Department of the Tianjin Foreign Investment Service Centre, 
Tianjin, China, April 1991.
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joint venture side and as a result improve the quality of its 
own products.
Indeed, judged by the above achievements, the joint venture
is quite successful. Yet as far as the transformation and
modernization of the old managerial system is concerned, the
success of Jin Rong Co. Ltd. is not as impressive as it appears
to be. It is the management transformation that can ensure the
long term economic success.
Firstly, what kind of administrative structure should be
set up, the Japanese or Chinese models? There was, initially,
some disagreement over this between the two sides. However the
Japanese side soon realized that a concession had to be made
simply because there was no way of wholly copying the Japanese
model. As Director Cai said, in Japanese companies it is the
managers who decide all the business affairs, therefore only an
accountant and a few secretaries and assistants are needed. But
in China, enterprises are of public ownership, the superior
departments-in-charge frequently issue various directives and
documents, demanding that the enterprises send in various kinds
of forms and materials, and now and then some people are sent
down to check up on the work. To meet all those requirements,
you cannot but set up various sections. So altogether 14
administrative sections were set up, almost as many as on the
non-joint venture part. I asked whether there was any
differences at all between the two sides in this respect.
Director Cai said:
there are some changes, for example, we do not have to 
attend as many meetings as managers of the state 
enterprises have to since joint ventures enjoy more 
autonomy than state enterprises. Besides, although we have 
all kinds of sections, we have fewer staff. Apart from 
being Director of Head Office, I am also the Chairman of 
the Trade Union and Secretary of the Party Branch. In the 
other part of the factory as well as the other state 
enterprises, those are three separate organizations and are 
staffed by at least ten people. Here, we have only three
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people including me.232
In short, there^ is an increase in efficiency and 
simplification of the administrative body. But the state 
enterprise model is still clearly visible and the one-plant-two 
systems model is far from meeting the requirement of better 
staff and simpler administration in a modern corporation, with 
which the interviewees themselves agreed.
Secondly, what are the relations between the two parts of 
the factory really like? And how do they deal with the problems 
arising from the development of the joint venture? The Chinese 
managers of the joint venture knew very well that they could 
not avoid the interrelations with the other part, and they would 
have to handle the relationship well, for the two parts are 
still very closely interlinked: the joint venture building is 
rented from the old plant; the workers of the joint venture 
still use all the common facilities such as the canteen and the 
bath house and all the workers of the two parts are still 
allocated housing on the same conditions by the old factory, 
except that the joint venture pays the money for the workers of 
its part who are allocated housing; the non-joint venture side 
is one of the main users of the products made by the joint 
venture and last but not least, the manager of the non-joint 
venture part is the chairman of the board of directors of the 
joint venture and the current managers of the joint venture were 
all his deputies before.
Under such circumstances, the managers of the joint venture 
take a very careful attitude in its relations with the other 
part. In view of the fact that both the management personnel 
and the workers in the joint venture have a much higher 
intensity of work -fewer staff have to do the same load of work 
done by many more staff in the other part and the productivity 
has been almost doubled - the staff and workers there should be
232 Interview with Mr. Cai Jinbo, Director of Head Office, 
Chairman of the Trade Union and Secretary of the Party Branch of 
Tianjin Jin Rong co. Ltd. Tianjin, China, April 1991.
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paid much higher, which both accords with the regulations 
pertinent to foreign-invested firms and the principle of
4
"distribution according to work". Nevertheless, the workers in 
the joint venture only get 35% more wages than those in the 
other part. The bonus is also extremely moderate, just 8-10 yuan 
more each month. No wonder then that some workers even declined 
to be assigned to work in the joint venture, since the intensity 
of work there is almost twice as much. And quite unlike the 
other foreign-related corporations, the managers here in the 
joint venture also get a mere 35% higher salary than those in 
the other part. Yet according to the regulations and laws they 
should be able to receive a salary commensurate with that of the 
foreign investor. "This", as Vice General Manager Sun said, "is 
the direct consequence of putting the enterprise under the 
leadership of the old factory".233
Knowing that the pay differences between the joint venture 
and the other part are always the chief cause of all the 
troubles and conflicts, the managers in the joint venture from 
the very beginning set the principle and tactics regarding wages 
and welfare. The principle is: "To take a magnanimous attitude 
and make strenuous efforts." The tactics are: "Small steps and 
walk slowly". Manager Sun told me: "With these efforts, so far 
no serious rifts or quarrels have occurred since the 
establishment of the joint venture." Then I asked the manager: 
"But has not your conciliatory and careful attitude prevented 
the workers and staff in the joint venture from getting what 
they deserve, which also seems to be against the principle of 
distribution according to work?" Manager Sun said: "You are
right, but in practice, we have to take the endurance capacity 
of the other side into consideration.1,234
Another big issue was the relationship between the managers 
of the two sides. Again the managers in the joint venture took
233 Interview with Mr. Sun Xingwen, Vice General Manager of 
Tianjin Jin Rong Co. Ltd. Tianjin, China, April 1991.
234 Ibid. .
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a very conciliatory and cautious attitude and set the principles 
and tactics for themselves. As Manager Sun described to me, the 
principles and tactics in the case of disagreements, disputes or 
arguments were, first, to try to skirt round difficulties and 
avoid clashes; and second, wait for both sides involved to calm 
down and then try to find a solution and always be ready to 
compromise.235
However, even with that conciliatory attitude, some rifts 
and discontent did accumulate and come to a head. As a result, 
the former General Manager of the joint venture side had to 
resign and went on to find a job in Shenzhen SEZ.236 The rift 
was caused mainly by the "interventionist" attitude of the 
managers and party secretaries of the old factory. The joint 
venture was often not left to run its own business. On this 
issue, Manager Sun said that the managers in the joint venture 
naturally took the regulations and laws concerning the foreign- 
invested firms quite seriously because, firstly, they had to 
deal with foreign investors and worked together with foreign 
managers; secondly, the enterprises were not their own, and no 
manager wanted to violate the laws.237 Nevertheless some of the 
managers of the old plant did not have such a strong legal 
consciousness. Sometimes, when their opinion or requirement 
were turned down for legal or regulatory reasons, some managers 
would become very angry and question why it was always so 
difficult to get something done in the joint venture side. The 
conceptions and leadership style formed in the last several 
decades were by no means easy to change.
The Vice General Manager admitted that from the point of 
view of modernizing the management, the achievements of his
235 Ibid. .
236 I was told about this not by the managers themselves, but 
by somebody in the Tianjin Foreign Investment Service Centre.
237 These are the original words of Manager Sun. I think this 
well illustrates how at present many Chinese people look at the 
relations between laws and privately and individually run 
business.
145
joint venture were less than impressive. On the whole, the 
enterprise was still under the somewhat looser control of the 
superior department-in-charge and under the still firm control 
of the old plant. More often than not, it was the joint venture 
side that accommodated itself to, or yielded to, the old system, 
rather than the other way round. The modern management method 
barely stood a chance of being fully applied, let alone 
becoming dominant. At the initial stage of the joint venture, 
six Japanese took part in the management, and their opinions and 
suggestions were better heeded and followed. Later, especially 
after 1988 when the capital outlay had been recouped and the 
foreign management personnel withdrawn, it was virtually the 
Chinese managers who ran the business, with a Japanese Vice 
Manager visiting the corporation once in a while. Under such 
circumstances, there was a higher possibility of being 
overwhelmed by the old managerial system.
As for the 'demonstration effect” on the non-joint venture 
part, Manager Sun agreed that except for the fact that 
productivity had been increased (from a shift output of 600-800 
pieces to 900-1100 pieces) any influence on the management 
structure was minimal. As to why it is so difficult to adopt 
modern management techniques, the manager went deeper. He said 
that the crux of the problem lay in the system of organization 
and public ownership. When a manager was always appointed by 
his superiors and when he did not own any part of the enterprise 
and did not even know how long he could be in charge, he 
certainly dared not offend his superiors and would not like to 
displease his staff and workers. Of course, he said, there were 
some better managed state enterprises, the qualities of the 
managers did make a difference; however, the structure and 
conceptions formed in the last several decades still prevented 
modern management techniques from being successfully applied.238
Another obvious problem for the "one-plant-two-system 
formula” is how to decide who is to work in the joint venture
238 Interview with Assistant Manager Sun Xingwen.
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and who is to stay in the state-run part. Related to that is the 
question of what to do with people who cannot adapt to the new 
code of work in the joint venture and how to handle the troubles 
resulting from the gap, sometimes a huge one, between the wages 
and benefits of the two sides. These proved to be the most 
thorny problems for many "one-plant-two-system” joint ventures.
Through my interviews I observed two patterns: one is that 
the joint venture part is managed by foreign investors. In these 
enterprises, the workers would normally be chosen on the basis 
of interviews or tests. And the state-owned part functions as 
a pool for workers not needed by the joint venture part. There 
are larger gaps in the wages and benefits between the workers of 
the two parts in this sort of joint venture. Complaints and 
displeasure do arise from the workers on the state-run side. 
However, the joint venture side, generally speaking, are much 
more strictly managed, the work intensity and productivity are 
much higher, and last but not the least, as the joint venture is 
run by foreign investors, the discontent generally does not run 
wild and become too disruptive.239 Another pattern is the joint 
venture part run by Chinese managers like Tianjin Jin Rong Co. 
Ltd. In such enterprises, the problems mentioned above tend to 
be much more complicated and serious. As a result, many 
enterprises tend to take a conciliatory attitude often at the 
expense of blurring the boundary between the two sides, 
compromising with the old management and giving up some of the 
benefits to which the staff and workers in the joint venture are 
entitled. As in the case of Tianjin Jin Rong Co. Ltd., it is 
the managers of both sides who choose and decide who go to work 
in the joint venture. Since the wages and benefits on the joint 
venture side have been deliberately kept low, there is not much 
bitterness and displeasure; but on the other hand, there is not 
much incentive on the joint venture side either.
239 Interview with Mr. You Qilu.
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(3) The Most Difficult Aspect of All in Adopting Modern 
Management Techniques: , the Relationship Between Managers and
4
Workers
Another important question in adapting to modern managerial 
techniques is how to deal with the "personnel relations" in the 
joint ventures, especially those run by Chinese managers. Among 
the various relations, such as those between the Chinese and 
foreign partners; between the foreign investor and the superior 
leaders of the Chinese side; between the managers of both sides 
and the Party secretary and Party organizations, the most 
complicated one proves to be the relationship between managers 
and workers. Although workers in the foreign-invested firms are 
recruited on contract, those recruited from the state 
enterprises can preserve their permanent job status. What is 
more, workers can not be dismissed unless in extremely 
exceptional circumstances (I will illustrate this later), for in 
socialist China workers are regarded as the leading class and 
"masters" of the factory and the country. This point was once 
again vigorously stressed following the June 1989 events. For 
example, in a symposium whose participants included leaders of 
some industrial ministries and enterprises, Song Ping, one of 
the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the 
CCP said:
Since the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Party 
Congress (held in mid-1989 after the June Tiananmen 
Events), the General Secretary, Comrade Jiang Zemin, has 
emphasized repeatedly that we must rely on the working 
class whole-heartedly. This is determined by the nature of 
both our party and our country. Our enterprises are 
socialist and workers are the masters of the enterprises. 
Therefore, to revitalize the enterprises and economy, the 
most crucial thing is to reinforce in the workers' minds 
the sense of being the masters of the enterprises and the 
country. With that achieved, we can overcome any 
difficulties.240
Song Ping's speech obviously touched upon some more sensitive 
and fundamental issues, which will be discussed further in
240 People's Daily (overseas edition), 13.6.1991.
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Chapter V.
Next, I shall describe and analyze some of the major 
problems concerning the'relationship between the management and 
the workforce:
The recruitment of workers ---
As far as the foreign-invested firms are concerned, some
obvious progress has been made in the recruitment procedures
since the mid-1980s. In the 30 years preceding the economic
reforms, jobs had been allocated by the official Labour Bureau
without always taking appropriate qualifications into account,
and once a job had been allocated, the person had it for life.
Things began to change at the end of the 1970s, partly due to
the requirement of developing foreign-invested firms. But since
there was no real free market for labour in China, the
government authorities in the early 1980s interfered heavily in
the job allocation procedure. According to General Manager Qu
Jiapeng of China Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. in Tianjin,
*
"During 1983 and 1984, when we were recruiting workers, we had 
to file a lot of reports to the authorities, requesting approval 
as well as supplying data. We were required to keep a balance 
between the number of male and female workers we employed. So 
there was not that much real free choice."241
Starting from 1987, government involvement has been 
relaxed. Henceforth, the enterprise is only required to report 
to the authorities the number of workers needed and it can by­
pass the Labour Bureau by advertising the jobs in newspapers. 
There is no longer a quota for men and women. Again, according 
to General Manager Qu:
Take the case of our new graduate recruits for 1988. In 
China, the practice is for the government to allocate new 
graduates to various posts. So we applied to the 
authorities for eleven graduates. We examined the 
applications, asked the applicants to take the special test 
for joint ventures and found that only five of them met our
241 "Case Studies of Joint Ventures in China", China 
Newsletter. No.77, p.13.
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requirements. So we employed these five people and turned 
down the remaining six applicants, who were reallocated to 
other posts.242
/
Obviously, big progress has been made in recruitment. But 
in the absence of a real labour market or a mechanism allowing 
for the "free flow of personnel”,' those wishing to go to work 
in foreign-invested firms could still be held back by their 
present units.
The firing of workers
The firing of workers has proved to be the most difficult
issue faced by foreign-invested firms as well as the state
enterprises. After a decade of economic reforms, so little
progress has been made in this respect that in the Fourth
Session of the Seventh National Congress held in March 1991, the
problem of giving managers "the power of using people" again
became one of the central issues under discussion for almost all
of the deputies from enterprises. According to a congress
report written by the reporters of the Chinese Youth Daily. Mr.
Fan Zengsheng, a deputy from Shanghai, said:
Now it is extremely difficult to fire a worker. Two years 
ago, a worker in our Port Bureau was fired. The worker 
went to the municipal government and lodged an accusation 
against the leaders in his unit and caused a lot of trouble 
there. Then the superior leaders instructed the port 
authorities to solve the problem immediately. In the end 
the worker was reinstated after two years. That had a very 
bad influence indeed. By unduly emphasising social 
stability, the stability of enterprises has been endangered 
and production has also been hampered.243
Many people's deputies stressed that to deepen the reforms often 
means to be ready to pay a sometimes costly price.?44 I found
242 Ibid.. p.13.
243 "principal Melody - Deepening the Reforms" - a report of 
the Fourth Session of the Seventh National Congress, Chinese 
Youth Daily. 27.3.1991.
244 Ibid..
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out in the interviews that the issue of dismissals is still a 
huge barrier that prevents Chinese enterprises from adapting to 
modern management and 'overcoming the defects of the current 
system. The cases of dismissals described to me in my interviews 
almost all copied the following pattern: first of all, the
Chinese managers did not like the idea of firing, or rather, 
they knew that by no means would it offer an easy solution. So 
they would try every other means possible to solve the problem 
without firing anyone. In China's state enterprises, there is 
no such thing as making people redundant merely for production 
or cost reasons, or firing people because they failed to prove 
themselves qualified for the job. Dismissals would only occur, 
if ever, when some very serious offence had been committed such 
as frequently staying away from work without leave or good 
reason, repeatedly quarrelling and fighting with managers or 
the other workers, etc. Then, when all the managers in the 
enterprise thought that they could no longer avoid sacking 
someone, they would always try to find the person another job 
instead of what is known as "driving him into society". For 
firing somebody without finding him a way out would always cause 
more trouble for the enterprise. Since there is no social 
security system, the fired worker would always go to the local 
government. What is more, since there is no special government 
body to deal with this problem, the fired worker would always go 
to the highest leadership organ in the locality and cause some 
big disturbance there. And since the priority concern for the 
superior leadership is social stability, the enterprise would 
always be ordered to find a solution itself. Among the joint 
ventures I visited, both the Tianjin International Tyre Co. Ltd. 
and the Tianjin Hua Mei Garment Co. Ltd. had fired a worker and 
in each case, it was the manager in each Corporation who found 
another job for the fired worker.245
Related to the issue of dismissal, workers, technicians of 
state enterprises and many university graduates usually face the
245 Interviews with the managers of the two corporations.
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very difficult choice in deciding whether to go to work in a 
foreign-invested firm when they have a chance to do so. 
Although those who work in a foreign-invested firms can earn 
more, sometimes much more, than those in the state enterprises, 
the foreign-invested firms might cease to exist when the 
contract expires or if the firm even goes bust, and the 
employees would have to find another job by themselves. That 
possibility has deterred quite a number of people from taking 
the opportunity to work in a foreign-invested firm, for those 
who have been working in the state enterprises and university 
students choosing to work in a state enterprise can be assured 
a permanent job whatever happens to the enterprise.
To ease these worries recently an agency has been set up in 
Tianjin, which functions like this: when a person from a state 
enterprise or institution goes to work in a foreign-invested 
firm, he can leave his personal files246 with this agency. If 
he is fired or chooses to change job, especially back in a state 
institution or enterprise, the agency will help him find a job 
and guarantees that his working age (years of service) will be 
given continuity. (In China, promotion, increase in salaries 
and the granting of benefits are mainly dependent on one's 
length of service.)
Of course, the above situation mainly occurs in the WFO 
enterprises. For ”one-plant-two-systemH joint ventures, the 
state portion serves as the pool for workers not employed by the 
other part, while for those enterprises wholly turned into a 
joint venture, the workers not needed would almost always be 
given other jobs.
A somewhat special case was found in the Tianjin Jin Mei 
Beverage Co. Ltd., a Sino-American joint venture. My 
interviewee, Miss Mao, a medium-level cadre in the joint
246 In China, everyone's personal files are kept by the 
personnel division of his unit. And the files will follow him 
all his life. The foreign-owned enterprises do not ask for the 
person's files.
152
venture, told me that they had a so-called "double-insurance 
system" or "guaranteed contractual system". This means that on 
the one hand, workers in the joint venture (with the Coca-Cola 
Company and a very lucrative business) enjoy much better 
conditions and much higher wages than those of the ordinary 
state enterprises. On the other hand, they need not worry about 
losing their jobs, for although they are all contractual workers 
by law, if fired, they will be sent back to the former Beverage 
Factory, which exists only in name now, and then reallocated to 
another factory under the jurisdiction of the superior 
department-in-charge.247
So when people talk about improving China's managerial 
know-how and adopting modern management techniques, China's 
employment system has to be taken into consideration. In a 
market economy, the existence of a pool of the unemployed and 
the possibility of firing workers, are one of the preconditions 
of making effective use of modern techniques and enabling the 
management to orient itself towards the goals of profit 
maximisation and continuously improving the competitiveness of 
the company. Under China's current employment system, it is 
difficult to see how to make the techniques effective. Without 
the establishment of unemployment insurance, job retraining 
programmed and job information services, it is difficult for 
enterprises to implement these decision-making power in hiring 
and firing employees. Again, as many deputies of the National 
Congress pointed out in the Fourth Session of the Seventh 
National Congress held in March 1991: as far as the employment 
system in the state enterprises is concerned, people call it 
"the most benign system in the world", as is the distribution 
system. "Social security" becomes "enterprise security". As a 
result, many enterprises lose their vitality and 
competitiveness. After several waves of reforms, the systems of 
employment, welfare and distribution have become more and more 
rigid. The most required senses for the modernizations such as
247 Interview with Miss Mao Shihong.
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"competition” "free flow of personnel" "survival of the 
fittest", etc. are getting even more blunted.248
The Role and Status of Managers
In the discussion about the transformation of China's 
management system and the adaptation to modern managerial 
techniques in the opening-up process, one has to understand the 
role and status of China's managers or entrepreneurs. The 
modern managerial techniques are characterized by giving the 
manager the central position so that he or she has overall 
authority over personnel, production, sales, etc. In China, 
however, the role of a manager and his relationship with the 
workers are still questions of great dispute. In his article 
"Ten Theoretical Questions in Dispute in the Economic Field at 
Present" published in Development of Economics in September 
1990, Mr. Xiao Liang listed the eighth disputed question as "Is 
there a contradiction between giving prominence to the role of 
entrepreneurs and the master status of workers?" The article 
says:
Some people have asked: in recent years, has there been a 
tendency to place undue emphasis on the role of 
entrepreneurs and neglect the master status of workers? 
From the evidence revealed recently, one can say the 
tendency does exist. Therefore, it is indeed necessary to 
strengthen the propaganda of the master status of the 
workers which is determined by the nature of our country. 
But some recent articles have argued against giving 
prominence to the role of entrepreneurs. They think it is 
wrong to emphasis the role of managers.249
In the debate over this issue, the author takes the view that:
Giving prominence to the status and role of entrepreneurs 
is a necessity in developing the socialist commodity 
economy. The substance of giving prominence to the 
entrepreneur is giving prominence to management. In the 
past, we did not admit that the socialist economy was a
248 "Principal Melody - Deepening the reforms", op.cit..
249 Xiao Liang "Ten Theoretical Questions in Dispute in the 
Economic Field at Present", Developments of Economics. 
September 1990. Also in Xinhua Digest. December 1990, pp.48-49.
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commodity economy. Enterprises were only regarded as 
production units. Therefore, management was neglected. 
Now, we have recognised that the socialist economy is a 
planned commodit:y economy; enterprises should be 
transformed into independent commodity producers and 
therefore management must be given great attention too. In 
an enterprise, how well the management can be conducted is 
a matter of survival for the enterprise. The management 
activities of the directors, managers and contractors in an 
enterprise involve a lot of creative and complex work. If 
a great number of entrepreneurs who know how to manage and 
can manage well emerge, then China's economic development 
will have a very promising future. Of course,
entrepreneurs should rely on and mobilize the initiatives 
of the workers.250
Related to the status argument, how much an entrepreneur
should be paid is another matter of dispute. Before 1989,
enterprise contractors could get a salary two to four times as
much as the average wage of the workers. Since late 1989, with
the urge to mitigate the unfairness in income and distribution,
some people suggested the gap should only be at most two times
higher. Mr. Xiao Liang argued:
As I see it, if we admit that the work of an entrepreneur 
is a complex one, that they usually spend much more time on 
enterprise affairs than the ordinary workers and that they 
take certain risks, then will it be helpful to bring the 
initiatives and enthusiasm of the managers into full play 
and is it in accordance with the principle of distribution 
according to contributions, if their salaries can only be 
allowed to be at most two times higher than those of the 
workers?251
As extensively discussed in Chapter III, the confusions and 
contradictions in the official ideology, first of all, hampered 
or delayed the formulation of many laws and policies concerning 
the economic reforms and opening-up and then obstructed or 
complicated the implementation of the laws and policies. As far 
as the adaptation to modern managerial techniques is concerned, 
confusions and disputes over some most crucial aspects of 
enterprises, such as employment, dismissal, bankruptcy,
250 Ibid. .
251 Xiao Liang, op.cit. p.49.
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relationship of the manager with the Party Secretary and the 
concepts of status and relationship between managers and workers 
as discussed above easily put the managers in a very difficult 
position. Although the long-awaited "Enterprise Law" at last 
affirmed the principle of the "manager responsibility system", 
in practice, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
pursue it mainly due to two reasons. First, the relationship 
between many managers and Party Secretaries is most delicate and 
difficult to deal with. According to the "Enterprise Law", the 
managing director is required to be fully responsible for 
managing the business of the firm, while the Party secretary is 
in charge of supervising and supporting management. In fact the 
Party secretary is always more powerful and influential than the 
manager. According to a 1988 survey, over 38% of Party 
secretaries and factory directors "do not coordinate their 
management efforts" and "come into conflict too frequently".252 
The essence of the problem might be that the difficulties result 
from power struggle and personal interests, but each side can 
resort to ideology or law, i.e. the principle of the "manager 
responsibility system" vis-a-vis the upholding of the Party's 
leadership. After mid-1989 in particular, talk of "the 
manager's role as the core" and "the central role of the Party 
secretary" further complicated the matter. Most recently, the 
General Secretary of the CCP, Jiang Zemin, thus summed up the 
guideline for dealing with the relations inside state 
enterprises at a work conference on the reform of large and 
medium-sized state enterprises: "The Party organization in the 
enterprise must fully play the role of a political core; the 
manager responsibility system should be maintained and 
perfected; the working class should be relied upon whole­
heartedly. 1,253 It is not easy to understand how this guideline 
can be implemented in practice. Some enterprises have tried
252 Cited in Jonathan R. Woetzel, op.cit. . p. 118.
253 Jiang Zemin. "Speech at the Work Conference of the CCP^ *, 
Peoples Daily. 22.10.1991.
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having one person concurrently in charge as 'manager' and 'Party
secretary'. These experiments indicated that such a dual
/
position made it impossible for the person to concentrate 
entirely on management. Second, enterprises did not get all the
autonomous rights granted o r  delegated by the central
government, "because many powers were simply intercepted by 
various middle levels".254 So, in 1991, when Mr Chen Jinhua, 
Director of China's Economic Structural Reform Commission, 
talked about tackling the severe difficulties in the large and 
medium state enterprises in the 1990s, he said "genuinely giving 
the autonomy and rights guaranteed by the Enterprise Law and the 
policies of the central government to the enterprises is still 
one of the main tasks and keys to revitalizing the state 
enterprises.,|255
As for the joint ventures, although, generally speaking, 
their management level is higher than that of the state 
enterprises due to the support derived from some special laws 
and regulations and the direct involvement of foreign managers, 
there is much left to be desired as far as the adaptation to the 
modern management system is concerned. Of course, it is not true 
to say that the Chinese managers are incapable of adapting to 
the advanced managerial techniques. On the contrary, "Chinese 
managers and technicians are quite good at absorbing new ways of 
doing business", as a foreign general manager of a Sino- 
Australian joint venture pointed out. However, he went on to 
say that: "they are not trained to make decisions, especially 
individually. And there are too many interferences from above." 
When I asked whether he, as a foreign manager, also felt any 
pressure, he said:
Very much so. It is easier, though, to get along with the
senior people, but very difficult to deal with the
254 Gao Shangquan. China's Economic Structural Reforms in the 
Past Nine Years. Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1987, p.33.
255 Chen Jinhua. "Gradually Establishing the New System of 
Socialist Planned Commodity Economy", China's Economic 
Structural Reform. No.3, 1991, p.3.
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functionaries. If our joint venture is a free enterprise, 
then why do they care so much about how we conduct the 
business, and why do we have to get so many licences? If 
China wants to * compete in the world market more 
successfully, she has to learn and has to learn quickly.256
It is not easy to make “'a“ precise evaluation of the 
achievements in adapting to modern management in Tianjin's joint 
ventures. At the risk of being somewhat simplistic and 
arbitrary, I would say:
Firstly, the joint ventures run by foreign managers tend to 
be more successful in adopting modern management techniques. 
Actually some of them are very successful, such as the well- 
known Sino-American Tianjin Smithkline & French Laboratories 
Ltd. It is managed by both Chinese and American managers; all 
the technicians and administration staff have been trained by 
Smithkline Beckman Corporation either in China or abroad and the 
management is almost a strict copy of that of the American 
Corporation. It is not true, however, to say that all the joint 
ventures run by foreign managers are better than those run by 
Chinese managers. As mentioned above, a foreign manager, 
inexperienced in management and having too little knowledge 
about Chinese enterprises and society, may find himself in a 
very difficult situation as in the case of the Tianjin United 
Tyre and Rubber International Co. Ltd. But the joint ventures 
run by foreign managers only occupy a small proportion. An 
Australian investor, who is the General Manager of a joint 
venture said to me: "Only very tough people can stay on. In
Tianjin, foreign managerial and technical personnel have dropped 
from four to five hundred to about one hundred and fifty in the 
last couple of years (1989-1991) .1,257
Secondly, it appears to be easier for those joint ventures 
established on the green field, such as those in the TEDA, to
256 Interview with an Australian businessman, who asked me 
not to identify him in my dissertation. Tianjin, China, April 
1991.
257 Interview with the Australian businessman.
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adopt new management techniques because they do not have a set 
of established rules and practice to get rid of, and both the
4
managerial team and the newly recruited workers are much younger 
and better educated. But because the Chinese investor is usually 
a state enterprise and/or the department-in-charge, the head of 
which is always the Chairman of the Board of Directors, and the 
manager of the joint venture is often chosen from the managers 
of the state enterprise, there are two obvious problems with the 
management in this sort of joint venture: the liability of
regressing to the managerial stereotype prevalent in the state 
enterprises and intervention from the superior leadership.
Thirdly, the joint ventures set up with an established 
enterprise, such as the "one-plant-two-system” joint ventures, 
and those cooperating with another Chinese state enterprise 
overseas and run by Chinese managers, have the most difficulties 
in adapting to the modern managerial techniques and 
international practice. This should not be surprising since 
their relations with the state enterprises are so close, and the 
economic reforms in the last dozen years have achieved so little 
in transforming and revitalizing state enterprises.258
III. THE DEMONSTRATION ROLE OF THE FRE FOR THE STATE 
ENTERPRISES
A. A Demonstrably Better Performance by the FRE
Despite all the drawbacks and unsatisfactory aspects in the 
development of the FRE as described previously, compared with 
many of the state-run enterprises, the achievements and merits 
of the FRE are still very impressive.
Judging by people's perceptions of the FRE, beyond the fact 
that the central leadership, on the whole, deems the strategy of 
economic opening-up as a success - which would explain why the 
pace of DFI accelerated during the 1980s and why the authorities
258 The poor performance of many state enterprises by the end 
of the 1980s has made this point quite evident. See Part V.
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were happy to offer greater inducements to foreign investors259 
- the local officials and enterprise managers have an 
overwhelmingly positive'attitude towards the opening-up. During 
my fieldwork in Tianjin, an official in Tianjin's Economic 
Planning Commission told me that the Mayor, Mr. Nie Bichu, 
perplexed by the dire difficulties' of many state enterprises in 
the early 1990s, reportedly said: "Why is there comparatively so 
little trouble from the workers and enterprises of the joint 
ventures?”260 Many of the leaders of Tianjin were very 
enthusiastic about the idea of revitalizing the state economy 
through economic opening up, which is one of the most important 
findings in my fieldwork. And the joint venture managers I 
interviewed, despite various difficulties they were faced with, 
all gave an unequivocally positive evaluation of the FRE and 
regarded it as belonging to the most promising part of China's 
economy. Besides, the simple and manifest fact - that open 
cities and foreign-invested firms or institutions have become by 
far the best choice for work and that many of the products 
produced by joint ventures and WFOs have become best-selling 
commodities - also adds a very affirmative note to the FRE.
Judging by the economic indicators, the achievements of the 
FRE are also impressive. First is the development speed of many 
open areas. Shenzhen is the most obvious example. After ten 
years, Shenzhen has developed from a small border town into an 
international city with an annual industrial output of 15 
billion yuan by 1991. Guangdong province, being Hong Kong's 
neighbour, has developed so fast that it had reached the target 
of quadrupling its gross industrial and agricultural output on 
the basis of 1980 figures by 1992, eight years earlier than the
259 For example, see "China's Opening-up Trends in the 
1990s”, People's Daily. 18.4.1991. Also see Pomfret, Richard, 
Investing in China - Ten Years of the 'Open Door' Policy. New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p.130.
260 Interview with an official of the Tianjin Economic 
Planning Commission in Tianjin, China, April 1991.
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national target.261 Second is the ever increasing significance 
of the FRE in the national and many regional economies. Take 
China's biggest industrial centre, Shanghai, for example: the 
four hundred or so industrial foreign-invested firms established 
up until early 1991 have become a very important force in 
Shanghai's economic development. According to the statistics 
issued by the Shanghai Statistical Bureau, in 1990, 60% of the 
newly increased gross industrial value and 40% of the newly 
increased export value of Shanghai were created by the foreign- 
invested firms. The gross industrial output was increased by 46% 
of the 1989 figure, much faster than the 10% or so of the 
average growth rate.262 Third is the higher managerial level and 
higher efficiency compared with most of the state enterprises. 
As the case of Tianjin United Tyre and Rubber International Co. 
Ltd. clearly shows, although the joint venture was in 
considerable difficulties as described previously, compared with 
its neighbour, the Tianjin Tyre and Rubber Factory, the joint 
venture's workforce of about 900 has double the productivity of 
the 3000 workforce in the neighbouring factory, while the 
workers in the neighbouring factory still have on average 300 
yuan more bonus each year.263
Also, according to the policy analysts of TEDA, in 1987 the 
average productivity of the twenty enterprises in TEDA was 
60,000 yuan, which was more than double the average level of the 
whole of Tianjin. Comparing the number of workers in the TEDA 
with the numbers in the state enterprises of the same type, the 
former is only about one sixth of the latter. For instance, a 
Lighter Factory in TEDA has a workforce of 131 people, while the 
Tianjin Lighter Factory which has a similar turnover has a 
workforce of more than 700 people. A yarn-dyed fabric mill in 
TEDA has a workforce of a little more than 100 people, while
261 People's Daily. 8.8.1992.
262 "The Rapid Development of Shanghai's Foreign-invested 
Firms", People's Daily (overseas edition), 23.7.1991.
263 Interview with Manager Zhang.
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Tianjin's Sixth Yarn-dyed Fabric Factory, which also has about 
the same turnover, has a workforce of more than 800 people. So 
a much smaller workforde in the foreign-invested firms has been 
one of the major reasons why productivity in TEDA is much 
higher.264
B. The Desirability of Having the FRE Play a Demonstration Role
To make the outward-looking and interdependent economic 
developmental strategy a success, the better performing FRE must 
be able to play an increasingly active demonstration role for 
the state-owned enterprises economy. For however important a 
role the FRE has - indeed, "they are playing an indispensable 
role in some local economies"265 - taking the national economy 
as a whole, their role could not be said to be much more than 
marginal. This is demonstrated most obviously in these figures: 
by early 1991, the total number of foreign-invested firms was 
about 30,000, and the average size of a foreign-invested firm in 
terms of pledged foreign capital was just over $1 million, while 
the number of state and collective-owned enterprises was more 
than 400,000. Among the latter, the large and medium-sized state 
enterprises, although only amounting to 2.5%, provided more than 
60% of the taxes and profits to the state.266
The second World Bank Report on China's development, 
supportive of Chinese reforms to date, laid emphasis on the 
potential role of foreign investment: "Direct foreign investment 
is important less for the foreign capital or advanced technology 
it brings than for the demonstration effect of exposing Chinese 
enterprises to modern business and management techniques."267
Also, as C.B. Sung, a foreign investor in China, once
264 Chen Yue, Pi Qiansheng. op. cit. . p.396.
265 Speech at a conference on foreign investment by 
Vice Premier Tian Jiyun, People's Daily. 28.6.1991.
266 Guancrmincr Daily. 28.10.1991.
267 Cited in R. Delfs "Economic Marathon", Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 29.8.1985. pp.52-53.
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noted:
The amount of money China needs to reconstruct is far more 
than it can possibly get from foreign investors or than it 
can borrow. The real issue is whether foreign ventures can 
have multiplying and demonstration effects for Chinese 
enterprises surrounding it. Through 'demonstration 
effects', foreign ventures jnay serve .as models for Chinese 
factories.268
As for the Chinese reformers, many were also keen on making
full use of the "demonstration effects" of foreign ventures. As
early as December 1978, Deng Xiaoping pointed out:
We must learn to manage the economy by economic methods. 
If we do not know enough ourselves, we should learn from 
those who are good at it and learn from foreign advanced 
management techniques. Not only should the newly- 
established foreign-invested firms be run according to the 
foreign advanced methods, the transformation of the old 
enterprises should also be conducted according to the 
advanced methods.269
During his well-publicized inspection of Shenzhen in 1984, 
Deng summarized the role of SEZs as: "SEZs are a window, they 
are a window on technology, a window on management, a window on 
knowledge and also a window on our foreign policy."270
The radical reformist leaders such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang were more enthusiastic to increase and extend the 
demonstration effect and leading role of the FRE in the whole 
process of economic reforms. As already described in Chapter 
III, after a hiatus in the economic reforms from 1981 to 1984, 
from late 1984 a set of more radical reform programmes was put 
on the agenda.
If before 1984 moderate reforms were carried out largely 
within the context of the traditional planning system, since 
1984 more radical market mechanisms were introduced and market 
transactions began to be allowed to co-exist with "plan
268 International Trade. 27.1.1985. pp. 50-52.
269 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. 1987, op.cit. . p. 140.
270 Deng Xiaoping. Building Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics. op.cit.. p.140.
163
transactions". And since 1986, more fundamental problems, such
as the relationship between enterprise management and ecbnomic
administration and the' ownership status of enterprises, also
began to be tackled.271 As Cyril Lin has observed: "The period
1986-1988 witnessed an increasing acceptance by radical
reformers supported by Zhao of a full market system with
'indicative planning' of the type practised in Japan and the
Asian NIES. Thus reform thinking was informed by arguments for
capital markets and joint-stock companies."272
In line with this radicalization of the reforms the radical
reformers strongly advocated the extension of the principles and
policies of the SEZs to the rest of coastal China and to many
interior provinces and encouraged an accommodating attitude
toward foreign investment and even broader contacts with foreign
societies and international institutions.273
For after all, to integrate into the world economic system
so as to quicken China's modernization required much more than
opening up some coastal cities and expanding exports; China's
goal of modernization could only be achieved by getting rid of
the maladies of the old economic system, revitalizing the state
enterprises and bringing economic development onto an effective
and sound path.
As Nicholas R. Lardy argued in his China's Entry Into the
World Economy, where he talked about China's trade relations
with the outside world:
A dynamic foreign trade sector cannot emerge and coexist 
with a centrally managed industrial sector that fails to 
exhibit significant positive productivity growth. ... Over
271 With reference to Athar Hussain's "Chinese Enterprise 
Reforms - An Assessment". A paper presented at the first 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences - London School of Economics 
Bilateral Conference held in Beijing, April 1989.
272 Lin,Cyril, Z. "China's Distorted Economic Reform" in the 
Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of the Chinese 
Economic Association (UK). 1990.
273 See the discussion of the development of the SEZs in 
Chapter III of this dissertation.
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the long run, the pace of integration of China in the world 
economy will also depend on the degree of success of 
China's urban, industrial economic reforms. The reasons 
for this relationship are several. First, and most 
obvious, successful economic reform is likely to lead to 
more rapid development of the Chinese economy that, other 
things being equal, will increase the supply of goods for 
export and increase the “internal *demand for imports. 
Second, and probably more important, successful domestic 
reform would imply that domestic firms had increased 
substantially their ability to adapt to changing market 
conditions, to raise product quality, and to control costs 
- all developments that would increase substantially 
China's ability to sell manufactured goods on the world 
market. ... In short, a successful urban industrial reform 
will both increase the underlying growth of the Chinese 
economy and increase its competitiveness in international 
markets and thus likely lead to greater integration in the 
world economy.274
C. An Evaluation of the Demonstration Effect
So, if the FRE has developed better and faster than the 
state enterprises, and if a demonstration role of the former for 
the latter is desirable, then how has this role displayed 
itself in reality? I put this question to almost all of my 
interviewees, especially those who used to work in the state 
enterprises. Mr. Han Bing, Director of the TEDA's Association 
For Enterprises, said: "Compared with the interference inflicted 
upon FRE, the rigid administrative structure over the state 
enterprises has changed little in the last decade, which made it 
very difficult, if not impossible, for many state enterprises to 
learn from the experience of the FRE". Mr. Yan Zheng, Bureau 
Chief of the Administrative Bureau of Enterprise of TEDA, gave 
an even more blunt answer to the question: "It is impossible to 
transform the state enterprises. There is no hope. The 
experience of the last ten years has shown that most clearly." 
He went on to say: "At the present time, the foreign-invested 
firms are just like small islands. They are still too weak to 
exert any substantial influence on the predominant state 
enterprises. The hope lies in greatly developing the foreign-
274 Lardy, Nicholas R. China's Entry Into the World Economy. 
University Press of America, 1987, p.2 and pp.45-47.
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related market-oriented economy, not in trying to reform the old
way of running the national economy.”275
/
Mr.Yan's remarks reflected the views of many people who 
have a very positive attitude toward the opening-up and a
somewhat negative attitude towardthe on-going economic reforms 
in the state sector, which I will discuss further in Chapter V. 
What I want to reemphasize here is that the issue of the
demonstration effect of the FRE upon the state enterprises
clearly reveals the intrinsic interrelationship between China's 
economic opening-up and economic reforms.
Since one of the most significant developments in the last 
decade has been China's dramatic abandonment of Maoist extreme 
self-reliance and its extensive participation in world economic 
activities, the opening-up policy has received massive attention 
and extensive academic research and analysis. While that is 
perfectly justifiable, what should also be noted is that 
although SEZs and foreign-invested firms are always guided by 
certain special laws and policies, the whole opening-up
processes is, from the outset, part of the post-Mao economic 
reforms programme. Only by placing the opening-up process 
against the background of the whole economic reform, can people 
have a more comprehensive and better understanding of the 
evolution and the problems of the opening-up policies.
In my interview with him, Professor Chen Yue, a 
distinguished expert on foreign economic policy, took the view 
that "The biggest obstacle to economic opening-up is economic 
reform itself.”276 Despite some measures taken to loosen the 
rigid central control over the economy, by the end of the 1980s 
the state enterprises as a whole were still largely based upon 
a central planning system and rigid governmental control. The 
central and local authorities continued to play a key role in
275 Interview with Mr. Yan Zheng.
276 Ibid..
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allocating financial, natural and human resources.277 Asked to
evaluate the effect of the ten years' economic reforms, a
leading official in Tianjin's Economic Structural Reform
Commission,278 said to me:
Well, it is not a pleasant thing to say, but frankly, in 
terms of transforming “the economic structures and 
mechanisms, little has been achieved. In the public sector, 
since the fundamental problem of nobody assuming 
responsibility for losses is not solved, the business is 
still substantially conducted as a product economy rather 
than a commodity economy. Correspondingly, many of the 
defects associated with a product economy, which the 
economic reforms are attempting to do away with, not only 
persist, but even get worse. For example, in many places, 
the so-called 'iron bowl' for the workers and 'iron chair' 
for the cadres have become even more fixed. Egalitarianism 
in wages and bonuses are prevalent..
Thus, some of the economic problems produced by the command 
economy are still manifest.280 The dire difficulties faced by 
tens of thousands of state enterprises in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s demonstrated this most clearly.
In brief, with regard to the demonstration role of the 
FRE,the managers in the state enterprises either find it 
impossible or are reluctant to take pains to adopt modern 
managerial techniques. The crux of the problem lies in the fact 
that it is not merely a matter of applying modern managerial 
techniques in the enterprises, but that it is related to the 
overall administrative and leadership structures and the more 
fundamental issues such as the leadership of the Communist 
Party. In discussing the practice of "importing” foreign 
managers to help improve management, journalist Su Zhong argued:
277 Lardy, Nicholas R. op.cit. . p.xvii.
278 Again the interviewee did not wish to have his name 
mentioned in this thesis.
279 Interview with an official in the Tianjin Economic 
Structural Reform Commission, Tianjin, China, April 1991.
280 Also see Market Reforms in Socialist Societies. Peter Van 
Ness op.cit.. pp.8-9.
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"It is wrong to say that China does not have people as 
knowledgeable and capable as Gerich.281 The truth is that the 
Chinese 'Geriches' are tied up by old traditions, by the 
'relations snare' they have formed over the years and by the 
imperfect economic and political system of the country.1,282
To sum up, just as the failure of the attempt to work out 
a sound ideology for the new developmental strategy has brought 
a negative impact on the development of the opening-up and 
economic reforms, the half-reformed and hard-to-reform old 
economic and managerial systems have also hampered the 
adaptation process in the actual practice of the opening-up 
policies: many entrepreneurs in the FRE have found it difficult 
to act according to international practice and adopt modern 
management techniques, and the state economy, on the whole, has 
not been carried along in its reforms by the FRE - one of the 
ultimate aims of the opening-up.
It is true that along with the opening-up, a broader 
economic reform has been carried out in order to eliminate the 
malpractice in the old socialist economic system, yet, mainly 
due to ideological and political reasons, as argued in Chapter 
III, many fundamental economic issues - such as ownership, 
bankruptcy, price control, status of entrepreneurs and workers, 
etc. - have failed to be effectively addressed and solved. It is
281 One of the well-publicized "imported foreign managers" is 
Werner Gerich of the Wuhan Diesel Engine Plant who came from 
what was then West Germany. He was eulogized in Chinese press in 
1986 for taking "an axe in his hand and chopping down many 
bureaucratic practices and lazy habits".
282 China Daily. 4.12.1986, p.4.
Actually I found myself in such a situation during the 
fieldwork: a cadre from Tianjin Planning Committee took me to 
three joint ventures: two are Chinese run and one is foreigner 
run. When the cadre asked for a car to be sent for us, only the 
foreigner-run company refused the request. And in my interview 
with her Miss Mao Shihong of Tianjin Jin Mei Beverage Co. Ltd, 
told me that the "relations snare" had become such a headache 
for the Chinese managers, they had very willingly given up the 
power of appointing middle level cadres to the foreign manager.
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this incapability of the leadership to deal with these crucial 
economic as well as political issues that has fundamentally 
hampered the adaptation process.
Full of difficulties and frustrations as it is, the FRE, 
nevertheless, has become part of the most rapidly developing and 
the most promising section in China's economy. As a well-known 
saying sums up: "The development of China's economy relies
firstly upon 'Lao Wai' (FRE) and secondly upon 'Lao Xiang' 
(village and township enterprises).”283 The relatively better 
performance of the FRE has vindicated the opening-up and the 
reform policies, greatly strengthened the momentum of the whole 
opening-up and reform process and profoundly changed popular 
modes of thinking on many fundamental economic and political 
issues. This last point is of far-reaching significance, for it 
is popular modes of thinking and changes in them that will, to 
a great extent, determine the orientation of China's long term 
development. The following chapter, besides briefly evaluating 
the consequences of China's growing interdependence with the 
world economy, will conduct an extensive discussion on the 
changes in the popular modes of thinking that have taken place 
during the course of the opening-up and economic reforms in the 
1980s.
283 Guanoming Daily. Interview with Mr. Jiang Yiwei, Director 
of the Research Association of China's Enterprise Reform and 
Development. 1.11.1991.
CHAPTER V. THE CHANGES IN POPULAR MODES OF 
THINKING UNDER THE OPENING-UP POLICY
Despite the problems and difficulties in the adaptation 
process discussed in the previous chapters, China's economic 
development and achievements in the last decade have, on the 
whole, been very impressive. China's economic growth rate has 
been one of the fastest in the world. The country is well on 
course for quadrupling its gross output value of industry and 
agriculture in the twenty year period from 1980 to the year 
2000. As a result, the living standards of most of the people 
have improved considerably, and China has become a much more 
prosperous country. One of the major contributing factors to 
China's fairly rapid development has been its increasingly close 
links with the world economy. China's foreign trade has 
expanded rapidly, so that it constitutes a much greater share of 
its total gross national product than was the case in the 1970s; 
China now welcomes virtually any form of investment, including 
WFOs, equity and contractual joint ventures and even foreign 
purchase of stocks; China has also become more active in the 
major institutions that form the foundation of the world economy 
- it joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
in 1980, more recently, it joined the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference, the Asian Development Bank and the Asia- 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Process and it also apply to 
reenter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986. As 
Prof. Lardy noted at the Conference of 19th Pacific Trade and 
Development held in Beijing in June 1991: "One of the most
distinctive characteristics of China's reforms, compared with 
those of the Soviet Union and the East European countries, is 
that China has become a very important participant in the world 
economy.”284 China's growing contact^with the outside world
284 Quoted in People's Daily. 3.6.1991.
over a continuous period of more than a decade has brought about 
many changes, some of which can be duly regarded as 
characteristic of interdependence, or more precisely in China's 
case, initial interdependence. Transnational influences and 
challenges and the development of the market economy have 
created forces increasingly beyond the control of the 
government. China's modernization process and its growing 
participation in the world system have inevitably set off the 
classic revolution of rising mass expectations of a better life 
and have begun to give rise to aspirations to develop a civic 
society based on justice, democracy, freedom, etc. Sooner or 
later, the government will have to become more sensitive and 
responsive to these mass expectations. It seems inevitable that 
the satisfaction of rising demands by citizens will increasingly 
become a major source of the state's legitimation and, in the 
long run, even of a government's continuity in office.285 
Already, unlike the pre-1978 period, in dealing with its 
political or diplomatic relations with the outside world, 
especially the West, the Chinese government has had to take into 
consideration the likely impact of any major policy decision on 
its foreign economic relations as well as on its domestic 
economic development. For example, one of the important reasons 
why the communist authorities were keen to convince the world 
that China's door remained open after the June 1989 events was 
because they feared that the loss of foreign-economic ties and 
the help from the outside could be too costly and destructive to 
the modernization programme.
Of course, interdependence basically means mutual 
dependence as discussed in Chapter II. Though at the present 
initial stage of interdependence China's economy on the whole is 
more dependent upon the developed countries than the other way 
round, the developed world, especially the newly industrialized 
economies in East Asia, has also increasingly felt the impact of
285 Also see Perspectives on World Politics. Richard Little 
and Michael Smith (eds.), (Second Edition), London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991. p.45.
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the fast growing Chinese economy. Indeed, in recent years, the 
economic relations between mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
for instance, have be'come so close and interdependent that 
people have begun to regard the region as a distinct economic 
entity and call it "Greater China". Let us look at a few 
figures: by mid-1992, more than three million Chinese workers in 
Guangdong Province alone were working for Hong Kong companies; 
Hong Kong manufacturers were employing more workers in South 
China than they were in Hong Kong itself; by 1990, Hong Kong's 
cumulative investment in China had already reached more than $25 
billion; 36% of Hong Kong companies had moved to the Pearl River 
Delta in China. By mid-1992, China's real estate investment in 
Hong Kong reached $12 billion. As far as the trade and economic 
links between mainland China and Taiwan are concerned, in 1991, 
the total trade value between the two sides was $5.8 billion, a 
43% increase compared with 1990. In 1992, bilateral trade was 
expected to reach $7-8 billion. Taiwan's investment in mainland 
China also reached $2-3 billion.286
Interestingly, the emergence of the "Greater China" 
economic entity has indirectly increased China's interdependence 
with the Western developed countries, especially the U.S. Take 
Sino-US economic relations for example. Since the U.S. is both 
a very important source of advanced technology and investment 
and an important market for China, China is obviously much more 
dependent on the U.S. than the other way around. That is why 
China tries very hard to get the "Most Favoured Nation" (MFN) 
trade status from the U.S. each year287. However, the emergence 
and development of the "Greater China", means that the U.S. now 
has to be much more cautious in playing the "MFN" card in 
dealing with its relations with China, for by withholding the 
MFN from China, the U.S. will not only seriously affect China's
286 See Nanbei Ji. (Hong Kong), Issue 265, July 1992, pp.29-
33.
287 The MFN status is extremely important for China's foreign 
trade. For instance, China's trade surplus over the U.S. was 
$10.4 billion in 1990. See The Economist. 11-17, May 1991, p.17.
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trade and economic development, but also harm Hong Kong's 
economy and thereby its own economic interests could also be 
harmed. Without the M^N, the Sino-US entreport trade through 
Hong Kong would be reduced by 35%-47% (which amounts to $4.6- 
$6.2 billion). Taiwan's economy would also.be affected. That is 
why both Hong Kong and Taiwan strongly called on the U.S. to 
maintain China's MFN. The U.S. cannot afford to harm its 
economic relations with Hong Kong because it has more than $7 
billion investment there, and Hong Kong is one of its key trade 
partners; the bilateral total trade value in 1991, for example, 
was as high as $17 billion.288
However, as indicated in Chapters I and II, in studying 
China's opening-up to the outside world in the 1980s, the focus 
of this thesis is to examine the difficulties and problems 
resulting from China's domestic ideological, historical and 
systemic factors and show how the ever-growing interdependence 
with the outside world has influenced China's economic, social 
and political development and particularly its impact on popular 
modes of thinking. That is to say, this thesis has approached 
the issue of interdependence more from China's domestic aspect 
than from its external aspect; and more from a political angle 
than from an economic one. So in this chapter, besides briefly 
indicating the scope of the growing interdependence in the 
economic field such as in the areas of foreign trade and DFI, 
I shall mainly examine and analyze the ways in which this 
process of growing interdependence has contributed to changing 
popular modes of thinking.
I. CHINA'S CLOSER LINKS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON HER ECONOMY
Foreign Trade
The openness of China's economy is first and foremost 
reflected in its rapid foreign trade growth. In 1978, the total
288 Ibid. . p.34.
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amount of imports and exports was $20.6 billion. By 1989, it had 
reached $111.68 billion.289 The average annual pace of trade 
expansion was in excess of 15%, over three times the rate of 
growth of world trade. During this decade, China's role in the 
world economy grew significantly. In 1978, China ranked thirty- 
second among the world's exporting countries. By 1989, it shot 
up to become the thirteenth largest exporting country.290 In the 
process its share of world trade almost doubled. That means 
that China's exports surpassed those of several industrial 
market economies such as Australia, Spain, Denmark as well as 
several upper middle-income developing countries such as Brazil, 
Mexico, South Africa and Singapore.291
Conventionally, analysts use the trade ratio - the ratio of 
exports plus imports relative to gross national product or 
national income - as an indicator of the degree of "openness" of 
an economy, but because of the uncertainties and complexities 
involved in measuring China's trade volume and its gross nation 
product (GNP)292, the calculation of China's trade ratio can be
289 Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
1990, Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
Publishing House. And Chinese Statistical Yearbook 1990. 
Beijing: Chinese Statistical Publishing House.
Figures in the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade compiled by Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade and those in the Chinese Statistical 
Yearbook compiled by the General Customs Administration are 
different because they differ in coverage, valuation and 
recording times. See Nicholas Lardy. Foreign Trade and Economic 
Reform in China 1978-1990. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1992, pp.12-13.
290 Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
1990. Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
Publishing House.
291 See Lardy, Nicholas, op.cit. . pp. 12-15.
292 China compiles its trade data in U.S. dollars, and its 
GNP in terms of domestic currency. The calculations are likely 
to mislead mainly for two reasons: one, for China's economy, the 
relative prices of non-traded goods and particularly services 
are fixed by the government at unusually low levels; two, the 
official exchange rate usually underestimates the true value of
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highly misleading. For example, in the Almanac of Chinese 
Economy in 1989. the trade ratio was calculated as 27.9%293. 
However, although it is difficult to judge accurately China's 
trade ratio, by comparing the growth of China's trade and its 
GNP in the 1980s, one can find that the foreign trade grew 
faster than GNP after 1978. Indexes of China foreign trade and 
gross national product show that real GNP more than doubled from 
100(1978) to 250.2(1988), whereas the real volume of foreign 
trade more than tripled from 100 to 320 in the same period.294 
Therefore, one can conclude that China's trade ratio did become 
higher in the last decade and the openness of China's economy 
did increase considerably. As a result, the influence of 
foreign trade on China's domestic economy has been greatly 
heightened. China's imports contribute significantly to 
increased levels of technological sophistication and production 
capacity in a number of key domestic industries. At the same 
time, international markets are a growing source of demand for 
Chinese goods. Because foreign trade has grown far more rapidly 
than the domestic economy, in a sense trade has served as an 
engine of growth.
Likewise, various kinds of foreign aid and loans have gone 
a long way in alleviating China's dire shortage of capital and 
investment in its development. Since 1978, the Chinese 
government have begun to accept massive foreign aid, loans and 
credits from international financial organizations, foreign 
governments and commercial banks. By the end of the 1980s, 
China borrowed more than $50 billion altogether, most of which 
was used in the construction of the 100 or so key projects, 
especially for the improvement of the infrastructure.
the currency as measured by its purchasing power parity. See 
Lardy, Nicholas, op.cit.. pp.150-155.
293 Almanac of Chinese Economy in 1989. Beijing: Economic 
Management Publishing House, 1990.
294 See Lardy, Nicholas. Appendix, Table B.2, op.cit.. 
p.154.
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DFI
The rapid development of direct foreign investment in the 
last decade has done more than any other factor to integrate the 
Chinese economy into the world economy. Its impact on China's 
development has gone far beyond the economic sphere.
Since China's first joint venture was established in 1979, 
more than 32,000 foreign-invested firms were established and a 
total of US $40.36 billion were invested by early 1990.295 Of 
the first 500 big enterprises in China, only 6 were foreign- 
related in 1986; by 1991 as many as 32 were foreign-related.296
Though judging by their share in the composition of the 
total industrial output value, the role of foreign-invested 
firms in China's economy still could not be said to be much more 
than marginal,297 nevertheless the FRE in reality is having a 
much greater influence than the percentage can suggest mainly 
for the following two reasons.
Firstly, China's development is very uneven. The gaps 
between regions are huge. Generally speaking, the East and 
South-East are much more developed than the other parts of 
China. With a population of only 19.5% of the national total, 
the 11 open coastal provinces (from Liaoning to Guangxi and 
Hainan provinces) accounted for almost 40% of national gross 
values of industrial output, 33.4% of gross domestic product and
295 Pomfret, Richard, op.cit.
296 Economic Daily. 4.6.1992.
297 China's total industrial value of output consists of four 
categories: state economy, collective economy, private economy 
and others. The FRE is included under the item of "others” 
together with the cooperative enterprises between state and 
collectives, between state and individuals and between 
collective and individuals. The percentage of "the others" was 
0.48% in 1980 and 4.38% in 1990 (See Almanac of Chinese Economy 
in 1990. Beijing: Economic Management Publishing House, 1991). 
Despite a tenfold increase, the percentage was still quite 
small.
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25.91% of all local budget revenue.298
Thus, if it is true to say that the East and the South-East 
regions are vital to the national economy, then it is also true 
to say that DFI is playing a very important role in China's 
overall economy, because it is in these more developed regions 
that most of the DFI is concentrated and it has been widely 
recognized as playing an increasingly important and 
indispensable role there.299
As a commentary in the Economic Daily said: "Though the 
proportion of San-zi (FRE) enterprises in the overall national 
economy is still small; they have played a very positive role in 
absorbing foreign capital, introducing technology and talented 
people into our country, in increasing exports and in adjusting 
our industrial structure."300
Secondly, the percentage of foreign-invested firms may 
still be small, they nevertheless belong to the most healthy 
and viable part of China's economy and their performance, on the 
whole, is much better compared with that of the state economy. 
As late as 1991, one third of state enterprises continued to be 
loss-making and another third barely broke even.
Out of the some 58 billion yuan deficit in 1991 calculated 
by international standards, which include foreign and domestic 
debts, "Subsidies to loss-making state industries cost the 
government 50.6 billion yuan."301
Therefore, it has been widely recognized that it is the 
private sector, which includes the foreign-invested firms, that 
has been the main driving force in China's economic development 
in the last decade. This becomes even clearer by examining the
298 State Statistical Bureau, Economic Research and 
Statistical Materials for the Economically Open Coastal Areas. 
Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1989.
299 A speech in a conference on foreign investment by Vice 
Premier Tian Jiyun, People's Daily. 28.6.1991.
300 Economic Daily. 4.6.1992.
301 The Economist. 28.3.1992. p.72.
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source of export growth in the 1980s. "By 1990 exports of 
foreign-invested firms at $7.8 billion, and township and village
4
enterprises, at $12.5 billion, accounted for one third of 
China's exports. Astonishingly, they accounted for almost half 
of the growth of exports over the decade of the 1980s."302 Thus 
the credit for China's rapid development should directly go to 
them rather than the ailing state enterprises. The increasing 
importance and impact of the FRE can be seen even more clearly 
through examining the way that the leadership approached the 
issue of revitalizing the state enterprises at the end of the 
1980s.
The national leadership has been calling for and attempting
to revitalize the state enterprises ever since the end of the
1970s, however, there is a substantial difference between then
and the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. At the
end of the 1970s, the leadership saw the question of
revitalizing the state enterprises as essentially an economic
issue and it regarded the challenge to their performance as
coming from outside China, especially the four little tigers of
Asia. But by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s, it has become a political issue as well as an economic
one and the challenge or threat to their role comes from within
as well as from without. This could be duly regarded as an
example of the consequences of China's increasing
interdependence with the outside world. To illustrate this
point I shall just quote a paragraph from an article written by
the Director of the Institute of Economics of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences. He writes:
To build socialism with Chinese characteristics, to give 
full play to the superiority of the socialist system, the 
most important thing, in terms of the economy, is to 
increase continuously the vitality of the state-run large- 
and medium-sized enterprises. Only thus can the dominant 
position of public ownership be consolidated, and people's 
faith in socialism strengthened. Despite the fact that, if 
measured in terms of the size of enterprises, the size of
302 Staff reporter, "Exports Boom for Foreign Funded Firms", 
China Daily. 21.1.1991. Cited in Lardy, Nicholas, op.cit..
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the workforce and registered capital, socialist public 
ownership is still in an absolutely dominant position, the 
last decade has witnessed a sharp fall in the ratio of the 
state economy in the national economy. In terms of the 
value of national industrial output value, the share of 
state-run industry is falling at the rate of 2% or so each 
year from the high point of 76% in 1978 to 54.5% in 1990, 
more than a 20% drop. As against^ that the collective 
economy, especially the individual economy, private economy 
and FRE have been growing very fast. Out of the national 
gross value of industrial output, from 1980 to 1990 the 
share of the collective economy went up from 24% to 35.6%, 
that of the individual enterprises went up from 0.02% to 
5.4%, and the other enterprises including foreign-owed and 
joint ventures went up from 0 to 4.5%. ... If this trend
were to continue, the superiority and dominant position of 
the state economy in the national economy will be lost. 
The dominant position of socialist public ownership will 
either be replaced by non-socialist economic elements or by 
the collective economy.303
Of course, contacts with the outside world and the impact 
of interdependence under the opening-up policy are not confined 
to the economic area alone. During the last ten years, the 
Chinese government has sent more than 100,000 scholars and 
students to Western countries and Japan for study and 
training.304 In turn, thousands of foreign scholars have been 
invited to China to give lectures and seminars on various 
academic subjects. Furthermore, the government of China has 
loosened its control over the flow of information from abroad 
and it has also made it easier for Chinese citizens to leave the 
country. China has rapidly expanded its tourist industry and 
expanded its export of labour to the international market. All 
these have, to some extent, exerted their influence both on 
China's domestic social and political development and on China's 
political relations with the outside world, and the most 
significant and far-reaching influence is undoubtedly on popular 
modes of thinking.
303 Guancrminq Daily. 20.11.1991.
304 People's Daily. 14.8.1992.
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II. THE OPENING-UP AND CHANGES IN POPULAR MODES OF THINKING
In his book ChinaTs Crisis. China's Hope. Mr. Liu Binyan, 
a major critic and perhaps China's best known journalist, 
writes:
I often speak of two processes in motion at the same time, 
one a system of organized economic reforms originating in 
the Central Committee, the other a series of great 
spontaneous transformations going on at the lower levels of 
society and spreading into every facet of the people's 
lives. The latter changes are far more profound than the 
former, since they involve the people's economic status, 
political situation, lifestyles, interpersonal 
relationships, modes of thinking and ethical values. These 
are the forces that will someday determine the future of 
China.305
Indeed, one of the most noticeable changes in China's last 
decade has been the ever growing autonomy, spontaneity and 
uncontrollability in many aspects of social life. The mind 
emancipation campaign at the end of the 1970s and the ensuing 
liberalization of the economy and the opening-up towards the 
outside world all helped people to break away from the old 
mental restrictions and made it possible for more and more 
people to begin to think for themselves. With regard to China's 
opening-up, the change in popular modes of thinking could be 
regarded as both an effect and an important measure of China's 
ever increasing interdependence with the outside world and as 
the ultimate force driving China into further integration with 
the world community.
In my interviews with the FRE local elite306, I tried hard 
to find out how they perceived China's on-going opening-up and 
economic reforms. For example, what did they think were the 
advantages and disadvantages in using DFI for the development of 
China's national economy? How did they understand the concepts
305 Liu Binyan. China's Crisis. China's Hope. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London: Harvard Univ. Press, 1990, p.xix.
306 iipRE local elite" here refers to the local officials, 
managers, economists and policy advisers who work for the FRE.
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and relationships of dependence, independence, self-reliance and
interdependence? What did they see as the main obstacles to
furthering the opening-up and economic reforms? And what were
their views on some of the fundamental issues such as ownership,
and the relationship between a market and a planned economy?
The modes of thinking and the changes in them represented
by the FRE local elite are of enormous significance, for
although the economic reforms and the opening-up were originated
by the pragmatic and reform-minded national leaders, it is these
people who are carrying out the policies. In this sense, their
modes of thinking and vision would, in the long run, determine
the success or failure of China's reform and opening-up. As John
T. Thoburn and others concluded in their study, Foreign
Investment in China Under the Open Policy:
... in practice, the attitudes of local officials have been 
as important a factor (as tax reduction and other 
incentives) in Hong Kong businessmen's decision on where to 
invest. Also, foreign investment into China has been 
attracted usually by Chinese companies and local 
authorities who wish to work in partnership with foreign 
firms, not by the national government. And whether the 
Hong Kong firm can bring about the required organizational 
changes within the company depends much on the attitude of 
the Chinese partner. Whether the Chinese partner in a 
joint venture can make full use of its status and carry out 
the required reforms is very much dependent on the vision 
of the local managers especially in the state companies, 
one of the least reformed areas of the Chinese economy. 
For a reform-minded management, a foreign partnership 
greatly strengthens their ability not only to import 
foreign technology and find foreign marketing outlets, but 
also to introduce enterprise reform. All san zi (foreign- 
related) ventures are supposed to be allowed to employ 
workers on contract, whose services can be dispensed with 
if they do not perform adequately, and local managers can 
learn about modern management techniques.... If the 
Chinese company is not reform-minded, but simply wants the 
foreign exchange or the kudos of following the open policy, 
problems can arise with the foreign partner if the partner 
wishes to introduce a Hong Kong (or Western) style of 
management.307
The discussion on the changes in the modes of thinking of
307 Thoburn, John T. op. cit. pp.4-5, 19-20.
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the FRE local elite will cover the following three aspects: 
their attitudes towards the advantages and disadvantages of the 
FRE; their understanding of independence and interdependence; 
and their viewpoints on some of the main issues which are 
crucial to furthering the opening-up and economic reforms.
A. Attitudes Towards the Advantages and Disadvantages of the FRE
In view of the serious damage inflicted upon the Chinese 
economy by the rigid pursuit of the policy of self-reliance 
during the "Cultural Revolution", the post-Mao leadership took 
the approach that the process of modernizing the economy could 
be accelerated with the help of foreign countries and firms.
In adopting the outward-looking, or "interdependent" 
developmental strategy, China hoped to benefit from 
participating in the world economic structure of the 
international division of labour and from engaging itself in the 
give and take of the world economy. But it is not a risk-free 
strategy, for by exposing a poor country's fragile domestic 
economy to the consequences of foreign economic penetration it 
could reduce the poor country to a dependent status in the 
international hierarchy.
As discussed before, the Chinese reformist leaders were 
aware that there would be a price to pay for opening the door to 
the outside world. They knew that no foreign advanced 
technology would be given for nothing, no foreign investment 
would come unless profits could be gained. And besides that, 
unwanted Western social, cultural or even political influences 
would also creep in. Nevertheless, the reformers seemed to be 
willing to pay a price, believing that gains would far outweigh 
the losses. Deng Xiaoping, for example, appeared to be 
confident that the negative aspects of opening up towards 
foreign investment could be kept under control for the following 
two reasons:
First, the socialist economy was seen to be the mainstay of 
the whole economy. In his talk with the Japanese delegation to
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the Second Session of the Council of Sino-Japanese Non-
Governmental Figures in 1984, Deng stated that:
Our socialist economic base is so huge that it can absorb 
tens and hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of foreign 
funds without shaking the socialist foundation. Besides, we 
adhere to the socialist principle of distribution and do 
not tolerate economic -polarization. Thus, foreign 
investment will serve as a major supplement to the building 
of socialism in our country. And as things stand now, this 
supplement is indispensable. ... Naturally, some problems 
will arise in the wake of foreign investment. But the 
negative aspects are far less significant than the positive 
use we can make of it to accelerate our development. It may 
entail a slight risk, but not much.308
Later that year, at the Third Plenary Session of the Central
Advisory Commission of the CCP, Deng gave a lesson to the old
cadres who "are always worried that undesirable things may
happen" under the open-door policy. Deng said:
Some of our comrades,... worry that the country might go 
capitalist, ... but such a thing will not happen. 
However much we open up in the next 16 years before the end 
of the century, the publicly-owned economy will remain 
predominant. Even in a joint venture with foreigners, half 
is socialist-owned. And we will take more than half of the 
actual earnings from joint ventures. So, don't be afraid. 
It is the country and the people who will benefit most from 
them, not the capitalists. Negative effects are inevitable 
but we can deal with them.309
And second, the socialist state apparatus was regarded as 
the guarantor against unwanted influences. In dealing with the 
negative influence that would arise from the open-door policy, 
Deng said, "We should be sure not to overlook the role played by 
the state apparatus." He said: "Our socialist state apparatus is 
so powerful that it can intervene to correct any deviations. To 
be sure, the open policy entails risks, some decadent bourgeois 
things may be brought into China. But with our socialist 
policies and state apparatus, we shall be able to cope with
308 Deng Xiaoping. Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China. 
Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987, p.57.
309 Ibid. . p.80.
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them. So there is nothing to fear."310
Yet some in the leadership were not so sure whether the 
open door policy was 'in the nation's best interests. They 
feared that the open door policy would weaken the Chinese 
resolve for self-reliance and lead to dependency on foreign 
firms and countries.311 It is against that background that I 
will consider how the actual practitioners of the opening-up 
policy, i.e. the FRE local elite, have evaluated the advantages 
and disadvantages of the FRE.
(1) Advantages
By the beginning of the 1990s, after more than ten years of 
economic reforms and opening-up, my overall impression is that 
the local elite working for the FRE have a predominantly
positive attitude towards the opening-up strategy. To be sure, 
in the early years, deeply constrained by the old ideological 
and historical mentality and the lack of experience in dealing 
with foreign investors, many local politicians and economic 
administrators adopted a rather cautious or even suspicious
attitude towards foreign investment. At that time the notions
of "being exploited", "loss of national interests", "collusion 
with the West, especially the Japanese, the former invaders of 
China" did loom very large in people's minds. But with the 
growing recognition of the current and potential benefits of 
DFI, a more positive attitude toward foreign-invested firms was 
formed. Almost all of the managers and local officials I 
interviewed agreed that DFI had indeed brought a lot of benefit 
to the Chinese economy and disadvantages have only been
secondary. The advantages may be listed as follows:
(a) A closed and inward-looking economic structure has 
begun to be broken up. As Prof. Chen Yue, a distinguished
310 Ibid. . p. 124.
311 For example, see Strategies For Joint Ventures in the 
People's Republic of China, by Ike Mathur and Chen Zai-sheng. 
Connecticut London: Praeger, 1987, pp.134-136.
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academic and senior advisor to Tianjin foreign-related economic
development, pointed out:
The most significant and far-reaching advantage of using 
DFI is that China's economy has begun to be linked with 
the world economy which will enable us, first of all, to 
take an active part in the international division of labour 
and make full use of our comparative advantages of cheap 
labour; and second, to break free from the beaten track of 
our economic development, namely, high investment, low 
output, and the pursuit of high speed rather than 
efficiency. Both of these can make it possible for China 
to accumulate wealth more quickly and to strengthen greatly 
the economic foundation.312
(b) DFI has played an outstanding role, especially in the 
latter half of the 1980s, in speeding up China's economic 
development and improving people's living standard. Just 
consider Tang Gu - one of Tianjin's three coastal districts and 
where Tianjin's Economic-Technological Development Area is 
located. In the year 1990, the district's 135 foreign-invested 
firms turned out a gross value output of 800 million yuan, which 
is more than a third of the total of the district.313 The 
leader of Tang Gu district once said: "With the establishment of 
TEDA in Tang Gu and the modernization of the harbour, Tang Gu 
has seen rapid development in the 1980s. New buildings, hotels 
and factories are going up everywhere. Tang Gu has become an 
important outward-oriented developmental zone bursting with 
vitality. ”314
The role DFI has played in improving people's living 
standard is even more evident. Given that products made abroad 
are either not easily available or beyond ordinary people's 
purchasing power, many products made by foreign-invested firms 
have become the next best choice. Advertisements of joint- 
venture-made products can be seen everywhere, on TV, in 
newspapers and in the streets. They give people a much wider
312 Interview with Prof.Chen Yue.
313 People's Daily. 27.6.1991. P.3.
314 Ibid..
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and usually a much better choice. A very good example was given 
by Mr. Han Bing. His Sino-Danish Enterprise Co. Ltd. is a joint 
venture producing high-'grade bicycles. "BuGatti" and many other 
newly-designed colour bicycles made by this joint venture have 
become the most sought after bicycles on the market.315 The 
three old brands "Flying-pigeon", "Phoenix” and "Eternity” have 
lost their more than three decade long dominance of the market 
in just a couple of years.
Another obvious benefit of developing the FRE is in the 
area of employment. In Tang Gu, where TEDA is located, the 
emergence of so many foreign-invested firms has meant that
almost all of the high school graduates could easily find a job. 
As a matter of fact, it has become very difficult for the most 
recently established joint ventures to hire as many high school 
graduates as they would like, which is in sharp contrast with 
the early 1980s when a great number of young people were
"waiting for jobs". Moreover, it has become a plain fact that 
people are materially much better off if they work for joint 
ventures or live in areas where joint ventures have 
proliferated.
(c) Closely related to the above point is the positive role 
played by DFI in accelerating China's technological progress. 
As the above-mentioned Sino-Danish Enterprise Co. Ltd. has 
clearly shown, the joint venture has rapidly narrowed the gap in 
the bicycle industry between China and the developed countries. 
Again, as Mr Han Bing told me, with the establishment of the
Sino-Danish Enterprise Co. Ltd. and the emergence of so many
types of better made, better designed bicycles on the market, 
the Tianjin Bicycle Factory came under huge pressure. This is 
one of China's largest bicycle producers that produces one of 
the "old three" most prestigious bicycles - the "Flying-Pigeon". 
In order to secure its own survival, the Tianjin Bicycle Factory 
established a very close relationship with the Sino-Danish 
Enterprise Co. Ltd. with the aim of absorbing the latter's
315 Interview with Mr. Han Bing.
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advanced technology and upgrading its own bicycle production.316
Another very telling example in this regard is the case of 
the Tianjin United Tyre and Rubber International Co. Ltd. 
(TUTRIC) mentioned previously. Although the actual development 
of the Sino-Canadian joint venture itself was far from smooth, 
in terms of technology transfer and technological progress, it 
should definitely be classified as a success. As Vice Manager 
Zhang said:
The introduction of new technology through the 
establishment of the joint venture has indeed saved a lot 
of money and much time. In order to acquire the technology 
for producing huge engineering tyres, the government 
invested a great amount of money both in the period of the 
Sixth Five Year Plan (1981-85) and the Seventh Five Year 
Plan (1986-90) , however the results were far from 
satisfactory. In contrast, we managed to produce the 
engineering tyre required within just one year - 1988. 317
(d) The experience of dealing with foreign investors has
facilitated changes in conceptions and ideas which has been
regarded by the FRE local elite as one of the far-reaching
results of absorbing DFI. As several of the policy advisers of
the Developmental Area once noted in an article:
The achievements made in the aspect of conceptual changes 
are as important as those made in the economic area: a
large number of young cadres with new ideas and greater 
professional ability have emerged; the conceptions and 
ideas of democracy, legality, competition, efficiency, 
fairness, the realization of individual value, etc. have 
been accepted and better understood by more and more 
people; 'project is life', 'investor is king' and other 
similar slogans have become widespread and accepted; the 
democratization of political life has become the demand of 
more and more people.318
(2) Disadvantages
The discussions and debates regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of attracting and making use of foreign investment
316 Ibid..
317 Interview with Mr. Zhang.
318 Chen Yue, Pi Qiansheng. op.cit.. p.453.
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have never stopped in the last decade. The well-publicized 
article published in all of China's major newspapers and 
magazines at the end of 1990, "The World Economic Situation and 
China's Economic Problems - a talk between He Xin and Japanese 
Economic Professor S" again strongly argued about the dilemma 
faced by China and the other developing countries in absorbing 
foreign investment. (I shall give a more detailed analysis of 
Mr. He's article in the Conclusion.)
The relatively unfavourable position of developing 
countries in the international division of labour and the 
features of unpredictability in the international intercourse 
have been described and analyzed in the theoretical discussion 
of the relationship between independence and interdependence in 
Chapter II. Here, it is necessary to examine how the grass-root 
level practitioners of the opening-up policy looked at the 
disadvantages in making use of DFI.
What many people concern most is whether DFI could retard 
the development of domestic industry and in the end damage 
China's national economy even though it may increase China's 
export capacity and help obtain badly needed capital, technology 
and managerial know-how. In this regard, the question often- 
raised is the competition between DFI and home-made products, 
and one of the most controversial cases I came across during my 
fieldwork is the joint venture with the Coco Cola Company.
Before I went to Tianjin to conduct the fieldwork, I was 
aware that opinions were quite divided on the desirability of 
the consequences of having a joint venture with the Coca Cola 
Company and selling the products on China's market. So I was 
eager to find out more about the development of the joint 
venture and people's attitudes towards the impact of the 
establishment of the corporation. Besides talking about this 
joint venture with officials in the Municipal Planning 
Commission, who were clear about the decision-making process 
over the joint venture, I managed to visit the enterprise and 
had talks with some of its managers and cadres.
Both Coca Cola and Pepsi have established several bottling
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operations in China, and Coca Cola has a wholly foreign-owned 
corporation (WFO) in Shanghai and Pepsi a WFO one in Guangzhou 
to make the syrup for'these joint ventures. Tianjin Jin Mei 
Beverage Co. Ltd. - Tianjin's joint venture with the Asian 
Branch of Coca Cola Company - was approved in 1987, the first 
Sino-American joint venture to produce beverage base in China.
Because the products were considered to be luxuries, soft 
drink joint ventures were not encouraged by government policy 
and the approval of these kinds of applications was supposed to 
be strictly controlled. However, as Prof. Pomfret has 
mentioned: "To ward off criticism of their luxury aspect, both 
(Coca Cola and Pepsi - author) have found strong PRC sponsors, 
as Coca Cola's operations almost all involve CITIC (China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation) as a partner and 
Pepsi has good relations with local Guangzhou and Guangdong 
authorities.1,319 Tianjin's joint venture also had its superior 
sponsor. In this case it was China's Light Industry Ministry, 
which has 15% shares in this highly profitable enterprise. The 
Ministry's share was said to have played a decisive role in 
obtaining approval for the joint venture.320
After it went into formal operation in October 1990, it 
soon proved to be a huge success in terms of profits. In the 
first year, the gross value of output was as high as more than 
110 million yuan and the profit was more than 11 million 
yuan.321
But the "negative" or "undesirable impact", as some people 
said, was also obvious. Actually it was even more noticeable to 
me as I had stayed abroad since 1988. In the shops almost all 
the previously home-made soft drinks had disappeared. Instead, 
"Coca" "Sprite" and "Fanta", etc. could be seen everywhere. 
Four soft drinks factories in Tianjin had either been forced out
319 Pomfret, Richard, op.cit.. p. 118.
320 Talk with cadres in Tianjin Planning Commission, 
Tianjin, China, April 1991.
321 People's Daily. 26.4.1991.
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of operation or were producing only a very limited number of 
products due to loss of market. The shrewd move the Coca Cola 
Company made was to establish the joint venture with the best 
soft drinks producer in Tianjin which had been producing one of 
China's best-known soft drinks "Shanhai Guan".
Besides the rapid domination~of China's soft drinks market, 
some other unpleasant aspects have presented themselves. As one 
of the managerial staff said: "Coca Cola is determined to
control China's soft drinks market and dump its goods in China. 
We in the joint venture can distinctly feel that the foreign 
investor would not like to see China increase its capability of 
producing its own concentrate. ”322
As mentioned above, both Coca Cola and Pepsi have 
established their own WFO in China. This is for the purpose of 
producing the concentrate so as not to put their secret formula 
at risk. But in Tianjin's case, the approval of the joint 
venture was granted on the condition that Coca Cola Company 
should help China to produce its own beverage base or 
concentrate. Though a new concentrate called "Jin Mei Le" has 
been produced and widely accepted on the market, nevertheless, 
as a member of the managerial staff said, the American side had 
a very ambivalent attitude towards helping China to produce its 
own concentrate. They were afraid that China's own concentrate 
would compete with their own and threaten their markets. She 
told me:
Last year, Chinese technicians managed to trial-produce a 
new concentrate which is very similar in its flavour to 
'Sprite'. But since Coca Cola company has a share of 50% 
of the total investment, it has final control over the 
products. According to the contract, new trial-produced 
products must be sent for approval to Hong Kong, where the 
Asian Branch of Coca Cola Company is located. The above- 
mentioned 'Sprite'-like product understandably was not 
approved by the Asian branch.323
322 Interviews with some managerial staff of Tianjin Jin Mei 
Beverage Co. Ltd. Tianjin, China, April 1991.
323 Ibid..
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The cadre also said: "We have a very strong feeling of
being led by the nose by the foreign partners. Since the 
American side has half of the investment, they are in full 
control. We have to rely on them for capital, technology and 
concentrate.1,324
Thanks to the four principles concerning DFI proclaimed by 
the Chinese government, namely, encouragement, restriction, 
prohibition and permission, so far there have not been examples 
of severe competition between home-made products and DFI-made 
ones on a large scale, but some degree of competition has become 
obvious, as shown in the case of the Sino-American Tianjin 
Smithkline & French Laboratories Ltd, one of Tianjin's most 
successful joint ventures. The joint venture mainly produces 
tablets and capsules and has an annual production capacity of 1 
billion tablets and 200 million capsules. Its manufacturing 
facility is designed strictly to comply with the G.M.P. standard 
stipulated by the American Food and Drugs Administration. All 
the major production equipment, which is computerized and has a 
high efficiency, were imported from countries such as the U.K., 
Germany and Italy. Moreover, all of the current products of the 
joint venture were introduced from the Smithkline Beckman 
Corporation. Its products are so competitive that the business 
of China's wholesale departments of drugs have been severely 
affected.325
The controversy and debate over absorbing foreign capital 
and technology and protecting the national economy also occurred 
over the establishment of Tianjin's Sino-IBM joint venture, 
whose vice manager described to me the two opposed viewpoints 
among the ministerial leadership concerning the joint venture.
One was held by the then Minister of Engineering and 
Electronics, Li Tieying (a member of the Politburo of the CCP 
and a member of the State Council from 1987), the Chief of the 
Computer Department of the ministry and some other leaders.
324 Ibid..
325 Interview with Mr. You Qilu.
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They argued that China had spent many years in developing its 
computer industry but it had failed to make satisfactory 
advances. Computer manufacture, had, after all, become an 
international industry. By establishing joint ventures with a 
large computer corporation such as IBM, China's computer 
industry could be brought forward so as to catch up with the 
advanced technology more quickly, which would benefit China in 
the long run. The other view was represented by the Vice 
Minister in charge of day-to-day business, the Chief of the 
Production Department of the ministry and others. They argued 
that China already had the "Great Wall" computer company, which 
was enough for China's limited market. Accordingly, the 
national computer industry should be fostered, otherwise it 
would be overwhelmed.
After many debates and much manoeuvring, the joint venture 
was established in 1990326. But it still faced certain problems 
in its development, one of these being the obvious discrepancy 
between the goals of the Chinese Ministry-in-charge and the IBM 
Corporation. The Ministry of Engineering and Electronics hoped 
that: (a) by relying on the technology of IBM, China could
export an increasing number of computers; (b) the exportation of 
Tianjin's software products could also be promoted; (c) within 
a few years' time, the joint venture could use more than 40% 
China-made parts; and (d) through the process of increasing the 
proportion of China-made parts, China's industry of basic 
computer parts production could be updated. On the other hand, 
IBM's main goals were: (a) to occupy 25% of China's computer
market with Ps2 products; (b) to set up a foothold for the long­
term entry into China's computer market, and in support of that 
aim it recognized the need to train a large number of managerial
326 Its establishment was badly disrupted and affected by the 
June 1989 events. When the negotiations were coming to the 
conclusion, the events took place and the IBM negotiators were 
immediately called back. Although the agreement was at last 
reached in 1990, the investment was reduced from the original 
$30 million to $300 thousand. From interview with a Vice 
Manager of the joint venture.
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personnel and workers; (c) to increase the joint venture 
investment to $10 million as soon as possible; and (d) they 
hoped Tianjin could take the lead in using Ps2 computers.
Another problem still faced by the joint venture was that 
because of the different viewpoints in the ministerial 
leadership, the managers of the joint venture had to be very 
cautious in dealing with the interpersonal relationships. Each 
year, they had to try very hard and do a lot to get permission 
to import computer parts because the Chief of the Second 
Department of Provision held the more negative view described 
above. As for the foreign investors, the Vice Manager said they 
understood the disagreement among the ministerial leadership 
very well. They did not expect a very satisfactory development 
in the short run but saw good prospects in the long run. Every 
year there would be some senior figures from IBM would arrive in 
Beijing to undertake some manoeuvring and persuasion.327
Then how do the local elite view the disadvantages?
They generally agree that there has to be a price, or so- 
called "tuition fee" to pay. They realized that some foreign 
investors, especially the smaller ones, tend to adopt a short­
term attitude and try to gain benefits by every means, fair or 
foul, sometimes at the expense of the Chinese partners. It 
necessarily takes time for Chinese business people to become 
more experienced and mature in dealing with foreign investors. 
As one of the officials in TEDA said: "As a weaker partner, we 
were clearly in a disadvantageous position and could sometimes 
suffer some losses. But it was by cooperating and competing 
with the better and stronger, that in the end, we were able to 
increase our own capabilities.1,328
However, in the interviews, what the local officials and 
managers emphasized most was that many of the mistakes and 
losses could have been avoided, and that the failure to do so
327 Interview with Vice Manager of Tianjin - IBM joint 
venture. Tianjin, China. April 1991.
328 Interview with Mr. Yan Zheng.
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clearly revealed the defects in the decision-making process and 
in the economic structure. In their views first of all, there 
was no well thought-out, comprehensive and coherent blueprint 
for the opening-up from the very beginning. Secondly, no 
institutionalized or sound decision-making mechanisms had been 
established. As the well-known economist and former president 
of Nankai University, Professor Teng Weizao pointed out: "Among 
the leaders above the bureau level, very few are graduates of 
economics. They still very much rely on 'patting their heads' to 
make decisions. When asked about the feasibility and efficiency 
of a project, they would say 'I did not think of it in that way, 
what I know is that there must be some advantages for us to have 
the foreign investment." 329 Thirdly, the losses and failures 
resulted from the re-emergence of regionalism and from the 
central government's inability and ineffectiveness in tackling 
the problems. They agreed that with the liberalization of the 
economy, regionalism was an inevitable and not totally 
undesirable phenomenon. But the unchecked regionalism often 
characterized by "using one's neighbour's field as a drain" 
(shifting one's troubles onto others) and regional 
protectionism, could be very harmful and disruptive especially 
when the respective interests and responsibilities of the centre 
and regions have not been defined. The problems, many argued, 
lay in the failure of the government to put adequate emphasis on 
the national interests from the very beginning of the opening-up 
and to establish new mechanisms of overall control in good time. 
Some drastic administrative measures were hastily taken only 
after a large amount of hard-earned hard currency had already 
been spent on importing cars and other consumer goods. Dozens 
of TV and refrigerator production lines had been bought from 
abroad by many regions330 and the national reserve of hard
329 Interview with Mr. Teng Weizao.
330 By 1985, 113 assembly lines of colour TV sets were set 
up, of these only 24 were authorized by the central government, 
while the remaining 89 were approved by local authorities.
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currency had plummeted. That was when losses and damages had
already been incurred.
The economists I interviewed often compared China with the
four NIEs in East Asia. Professor Chen Yue said, for instance:
Many problems that have become prevalent here did not occur 
in South Korea in the process of ‘modernization. For 
instance, when South Korea began to export colour TV sets, 
most of the Korean people were still watching black and 
white. They also had very strict control on the 
importation of cars and electric appliances. Unlike China, 
most of the cars used there were made in South Korea.
He stressed:
Opening-up requires a well-organized and highly effective 
decision-making system, which is still obviously lacking in 
China. Besides, the relationship between the central 
government and local governments must also be sorted out. 
Under the current system, once the centre loosens its 
control, the localities would make best use of the 
opportunity for their own interests, which would always 
turn out to be in some ways disadvantageous or detrimental 
to the overall development and interest of the nation.331
As far as the competition between the DFI and home-made 
products is concerned, the local elite's attitude was somewhat 
divided and ambivalent. They all agreed that one of the most 
important aims of absorbing DFI was to facilitate competition so 
that all the production would be oriented towards quality and 
efficiency rather than quantity. Even in the case of soft 
drinks some people pointed out that the joint ventures with Coco 
Cola and Pepsi Cola Companies had brought China's soft drinks 
production and consumption to the international level in a very 
short period of time.
However, some people argued it was wrong to give away the 
soft drink consumption market to the multinational corporations. 
No national industry could compete with Coco Cola and the like. 
The national soft drinks industry was doomed to suffer. Prof. 
Teng Weizao said: "Our economy is said to be a planned economy,
Economic Daily. 15.1.1992.
331 Interview with Professor Chen Yue.
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but in many cases, there is little plan where plan is most 
needed and little protection where protection is most 
needed.”332
The attitudes of many people were determined by their own 
interests. The officials and workers in joint ventures, for 
example, usually enjoying handsome wages and bonuses, were 
naturally happy and supportive. The local government followed 
a similar approach. As one official said: "What the local
government cares about most is how to fulfil the task of turning 
over required profits to the central government. So long as the 
joint ventures can make more money and make a contribution to 
the local economy, all is fine. As for the issue of advantages 
or disadvantages to the national economy, it is beyond their 
consideration.1,333
B. Attitudes Towards Independence and Interdependence
Compared with the problem of advantages and disadvantages, 
the issues of independence, interdependence and the relationship 
between the two at first sight seem to be too academic and 
irrelevant to the actual practice of the opening-up policies. 
But through my interviews I found that the practitioners of the 
FRE do ponder the issues seriously and hold certain views, and 
these questions do have their practical implications for the 
opening-up policy as well. As a theoretical discussion on 
independence and interdependence was undertaken in Chapter II, 
I shall further explore the question here by considering several 
practical issues so as to illustrate how the elite looked at the 
questions.
(1). DFI vis-^-vis Sovereignty and Independence
As the memory of China being trampled on, her people
332 Interview with Prof. Teng Weizao.
333 Interview with an official in the Tianjin Planning 
Commission, Tianjin, China. April 1991.
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oppressed and her territory seized still remains fresh in the 
minds of the older generations, every major move in China's 
process of opening-up towards the outside world, especially the 
capitalist West, has been questioned, criticized or even 
condemned by some people. The return of foreign capitalists, 
especially the Japanese; the establishment of foreign-invested 
firms, especially the WFO ones; the setting-up of the SEZs and 
the like, have, in some people's minds, revived the issues of 
exploitation, sovereignty and concessions, etc.
The debates and criticisms have continued and have 
sometimes become intensive and severe. To illustrate this, let 
us look at the matter of land sale, another major move of the 
opening-up beginning at the end of the 1980s.
To lease land is the latest development in using foreign 
capital. In 1989, the government of Hainan Island declared at a 
news conference that the government had decided to lease 30 
sq.km. of land in Yangpu Developmental Area of Hainan Island to 
a contractor for seventy years. A Japanese company registered in 
Hong Kong offered to buy it at 2000 Yuan per mu (equal to one 
fifteenth of a hectare) . This immediately caused a mighty 
uproar. Some representatives of the National People's Congress 
and the Political Consultative Conference questioned: "What on 
earth are you going to do? Even before Hong Kong has been 
regained, you are beginning to sell Yangpu Habor to the 
Japanese?"334 Some condemned it as "inviting a wolf into the 
house and opening the door to robbers".335
334 Xu Dazhang and Huo Shuangmin "On Losses and Gains of the 
Lease of Land in TEDA", Research on Developmental Area . April 
1990. An internal publication in the TEDA. p.2.
335 China Youth Daily. 17.10.1991. It was revealed later 
that the general manager of the company is an overseas Chinese, 
Mr. Yu Yuanping, who was approached on this matter by the former 
Party Secretary of Hainan Province, Mr. Xu Shijie and Vice 
President Mr. Wang Zheng. It was also revealed recently that at 
the height of the "Yangpu Disturbance" in early 1989, Deng 
Xiaoping gave his instruction to Hainan through telephone from 
Beijing:"I think the decision made by Hainan Party Committee is 
correct. It is a rare opportunity, which brooks no delay. But
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While the heated debate was still going on, Tianjin, 
"risking universal condemnation”, signed, along with American 
MGW Corporation, a contract leasing the latter 5.362 sq. km. 
land in the TEDA for seventy years on August 8 1989. According 
to the contract, the area will be built into a "comprehensive 
industrial zone” with WFO as the main part of it. A large 
building of 52 stories with a height of 211 m., the highest in 
North-East China, is to be built.
Conceivably, the signing of this contract evoked strong 
repercussions. Even some people who were not directly related 
with it at all raised queries about it. For example, a resident 
of Anqing City of Anhui Province sent a letter to a newspaper, 
asking whether the sale of land "would be detrimental to the 
sovereignty of our country? How much advantage could we actually 
get from it?”336 More sharp criticism and queries came from 
people in political, economic, legal and financial circles.
In regard to economic and technical concerns, the main 
questions raised included: whether the sale price was set too 
low (at about 3 Yuan per sq.m.); what the gains or earnings on 
China's side would be and whether the loss would outweigh the 
gains?
From the political point of view, the questions were much
sharper, and criticism also came from higher levels. In cause of
my interviews, I was told that a very well-known people's deputy
from Beijing led a group of people to inspect the TEDA shortly
after the signing of the contract. Upon his return to Beijing,
he strongly voiced his condemnation:
While the Qing Dynasty's evil doing of humiliating the 
nation and forfeiting its sovereignty is still fresh in 
people's memory, while Hong Kong and Macao are still not 
regained, how could Chinese people tolerate this new 
disgrace? ... Tianjin's New Harbour is the gateway to the
you must explain clearly your stand to those holding different 
opinions outside the Party. The formalities must be completed 
and done quickly.” But the contract was not signed until 
September 1991, mainly due to the June 1989 events.
336 Xu Dazhang and Ho Shuangmin, op.cit. . p.2.
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capital, Beijing; it was here the Eight-Power Allied 
Forces337 landed in 1900. Now you have given up the outpost 
of coastal defence to the Americans, and allowed them to 
build a 211 m. high building, they can easily get the 
secrets of our coastal defence; how can we defend our own 
territory?338
This resembles the charges made against the plan of land leasing 
in Hainan Island: "Even with regard to the small islands and 
wasteland such as the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands) and the 
Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands), we fought for every inch of it 
and many Liberation Army soldiers died in the process, so how 
could you cede a large area of land near Yangpu Harbour to 
foreigners?"339
Some also questioned the length of the lease, saying: 
"During the seventy years the foreigners can make a fortune, and 
then leave us an area in ruins". Some said: "By tying our
development onto the cart of Americans, we leave ourselves at 
the mercy of the foreigners. If they go bankrupt, what a huge 
loss it would bring to our economic construction!".340
The officials in the TEDA stood firm in the face of the 
censure and condemnation. Policy researchers and advisers 
published a series of articles arguing strongly for the latest 
development in using foreign investment. I noticed that quite a 
few issues of the internal publication Research on the 
Development Area were devoted wholly to the debate and 
discussion over this issue in late 1989 and early 1990, which 
most clearly demonstrated the views and conceptions of the 
officials and managers not only on the specific issues of land
337 The Eight-Power Allied Forces refers to the aggressive 
troops sent by Britain, the United States, Germany, France, 
Tsarist Russia, Japan, Italy and Austria in 1900, to suppress 
the anti-colonial imperialist Yi Hequan Movement of the Chinese 
people. See Chinese English Dictionary. Beijing: People's 
Publishing House, 1980, p.9.
338 Xu Dazhang and Huo Shuangmin, op.cit. . p. 12.
339 Ibid. . pp. 13-14.
340 Ibid. . p. 16.
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sale but also on some broader issues such as sovereignty, 
independence and interrelations with the world economy, etc. 
Here are some of their main views expressed in several articles 
in the Research on the Development Area.
(a) Those who have equated land lease with “selling out 
sovereignty" and "creating new concessions'" have mixed up three 
key notions: lease of land, ownership of land and state 
sovereignty. State sovereignty is only impaired or lost when the 
country is invaded by an external force and part or all of the 
territory is occupied and the political power is interfered with 
and manipulated, etc. The sale of the land lease for a fixed 
period of time, however, is only a kind of commercial civil 
activity, which has nothing to do with impairing the 
sovereignty, since the foreign investor is only the leaseholder, 
the activity would not in any way interfere with or manipulate 
a country's political affairs, it would not affect territorial 
integrity and the government's jurisdiction over the residents 
on the land.341
(b) Some people's comments on the lease of land and coastal 
defence can only be treated as sheer nonsense. In our time when 
modern military science and technology have become so advanced, 
anybody suggesting that a beachhead can deter or defend is 
either ignorant or has ulterior motives.342
(c) People have to look at the land lease from a longer 
perspective. As with any other policies of the opening-up, we 
may lose something or not see the benefits clearly in the short 
run, but it will be beneficial to our national economy in the 
long run. As the use of DFI has demonstrated, after a few years' 
development, we have absorbed some advanced technology and 
managerial know-how; we have extended our foreign economic 
activities and more and more products have been exported to the 
world market. After seventy years, the current saline-alkali
341 Wei Jianyie. "On Lease and Ownership of Land and State 
Sovereignty", Research on Development Area. 15.4.1990.
342 Xu Dazhang and Hou Shuangmin. op.cit.. p.4.
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wasteland would be turned into a developed comprehensive 
industrial zone as today's Hong Kong and Macao have proved to be 
most convincingly. As tor the lengths of sale, what should be 
understood is that foreign investors are very shrewd 
businessmen, different lengths of contract will determine 
different plans of investment. Only when the contract is long 
enough could the investor possibly recoup the capital outlay, 
and invest in those public service items which are necessary for 
the development of the industrial zone but take considerable 
time to produce benefits. In short, the more investment is made 
with a longer point of view, the more beneficial to our national 
economy it will be.343
In the interviews with some younger and better-educated 
administrators and managers, such as Mr. Yan Zheng, a bureau 
chief of TEDA in his late thirties, Mr. Han Bing, Director of 
the Association for Enterprises of TEDA also in his late 
thirties, Mr. Zhang Bingxue, Vice Director of the United Front 
Work Department of Tianjin Municipal Committee of the CCP, a man 
in his early forties, we discussed the issues of self-reliance, 
independence and interdependence.
Some said that China, being a large country, could not rely 
on anybody else for its survival and development. The 
fundamental development strategy should be based on self- 
reliance. But this principle does not mean China should or can 
isolate itself from the rest of the world. On the contrary, 
China's independence could be best guaranteed by its integration 
into the world economy. In today's world, any country that stays 
outside the world economic system would lag behind and be left 
in a vulnerable position. In the long run, the benefits from 
opening-up would outweigh the losses and disadvantages, and the 
international division of labour could facilitate the rapid 
development of China's productive force. As for dependency,
many of the younger local officials and managers took the view 
that it is not that easy for a vast country like China to become
343 Ibid. . pp. 15-16; and Wei Jianyie. op.cit. . p.3.
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dependent. The danger does not lie in foreign multinational 
corporations or foreign countries, but in our incapability to 
adapt quickly to the ilew situations and setting up effective 
macroscopic adjustment and control mechanisms. So far, the 
foreign debt only amounts to several percent of the total fixed 
assets. With effective and strict control, China will not be 
caught in the deep debts as some other developing countries have 
been.
They also stressed that after a decade of opening-up, 
China's economy has become more and more interdependent with the 
world economy. In the coastal areas especially, China's most 
developed regions, the proportion of the foreign related economy 
has substantially increased and its role in some regions' 
economic life has become undeniable and indispensable. If China 
were to fail to get MFN from the U.S., its export industry as 
well as the overall economy would suffer huge losses.
Asked about the phenomenon that at the end of the 1980s 
and the beginning of the 1990s, "independence and self-reliance” 
were again given much more emphasis than in the early and mid­
eighties, some argued that this reflected the views of some 
leaders of the older generation. Others argued that it had a lot 
to do with the rapidly changing international situation. Some in 
the leadership may suspect that, compared with the 1980s, the 
world political situation might be more changeable and 
international economic competition might be more intense in the 
1990s. They put more emphasis on the "self-reliance" and 
"independence" so that China could be better prepared for 
whatever complicated situation might come.344 Some interviewees 
held a more critical attitude: the development of the modern 
economy and the international division of labour have negated 
self-reliance. In dealing with international relations, one must 
not forget that nowadays everything is closely linked with 
economic relations, therefore, one must adopt a realistic .and 
pragmatic attitude, and concessions can be made so long as they
344 Also see Beijing Daily. 17.11.1990. p.3.
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will increase the welfare of the Chinese people. One of the 
crucial reasons why the "four Asian tigers” have become 
industrialized is that they grasped the opportunity offered by 
the adjustment of the world economy in the 1960s and 70s. Now 
there is a golden opportunity for China. She, too, must grasp 
the opportunity and bravely face the challenge.
(2) Import Substitution and Increasing the Proportion of China- 
made Products
As far as the degree and orientation of the opening-up are
concerned, put crudely, there are two distinctly differing
views. One holds that China is facing an open world and China's
development requires fully opening to the outside world;
therefore, in terms of the economy, China should fully
participate in the international division of labour and make
full use of its comparative advantages so as to genuinely
integrate into the interdependent world economy. The other
concedes that it is true that China's development needs
international cooperation, foreign trade and foreign investment,
but these are to serve the long term goal of self sufficiency.
Accordingly, on the choice of China's foreign economic
development strategies, there are basically two kinds of
argument: one "takes import substitution as the long-term
strategy in catching up with the large industrial countries.
The other holds export promotion or export-orientation as the
right strategy. 1,345 The difference between the two is wide and
the debate is still going on, which definitely bears with it
policy implications.As Nicholas Lardy noted:
While China has reorganized its foreign trade apparatus, 
undertaken substantial changes in its exchange rate system 
and curtailed export taxes on some goods in order to 
promote the growth of export, the transition from import 
substitution to export promotion is still very partial. 
Although China's highest political leaders frequently
345 He Lianchen, Zou Dongtao, Yang Qiubao. "On China's 
Foreign Economic Developmental Strategy and Competition 
Strategy", China's Economic Problems. No.2, 1991. Also in
Xinhua Digest. 6.1991. p.55
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reiterate their support of what has come to be called the 
'open door policy', they have not necessarily fully 
understood the necessity of transforming their attitude 
towards international trade. That attitude is perhaps 
reflected in Premier Zhao Ziyang's report to China's 
National People's Congress, in the spring of 1986, on the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). On international 
economic issues he began by recounting the successes 
achieved under the open door policy and spoke of the need 
to become more competitive in international markets. But, 
strikingly, he also called for China 'making every effort 
to produce at home whatever we can and to expand production 
of import substitutes and to increase the proportion of 
goods produced at home,' words that could well have been 
spoken by Mao Zedong in the period of most extreme autarky 
and self-reliance. Perhaps the emphasis on import 
substitution and self-reliance does not reflect the true 
thinking of China's reformist leadership but is intended 
for those elements within the Chinese leadership who oppose 
China's opening policy. But whether these formulations 
represent a dominant or minority view, they are troubling 
since they have no room for the pursuit of a long-term 
trade strategy based on China's underlying comparative 
advantage.346
For the manufacturing industry including foreign-invested 
firms, the import-substitution strategy, among other things, 
means increasing the degree of self-sufficiency in the domestic 
market and the proportion of goods produced at home. This 
strategy generally requires tariff protection, administrative 
control and coordination. In my interviews, I found that many 
joint ventures were required by higher authorities to increase 
the proportion of home-made parts. And managers generally 
disliked the system of having targets imposed from above. For 
example, in the case of Tianjin's Sino-IBM Company joint 
venture, the Engineering and Electronics Ministry, the ministry- 
in-charge of the Chinese side's investor, required the joint 
venture to reach the target of using 40% China-made products 
within 5-8 years. The manager told me: "It is an unrealistic 
target and is unlikely to be fulfilled. We have, first of all,
346 Lardy, Nicholas R. op.cit. . 1987, pp.44-45.
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to ensure the quality of the parts.”347
Professor Teng Weizao, an expert on the world economics,
also expressed his view on import substitution: "If China's
home-made goods are of high quality, of course it is better and
cheaper to use them. The point is we should not lower the
standard of the products merely for the sake of increasing the
proportion of home-made goods.”348 He took a joint venture-made
car, Santana, for example. At the beginning, all the parts were
imported and the joint venture was only to assemble the car.
The quality was very good and it sold well both at home and
abroad. Later, according to the target set by the ministry-in-
charge, home-made parts took up 50-60%, and the parts were
produced by factories chosen by the ministry. Since there was
no competition the quality of the parts was not stable and as a
result the overall quality of “Santana” fell sharply. Professor
Teng Weizao said:
This kind of emphasis on self-reliance is narrow-minded and 
one-sided. It fails to understand that the basic meaning 
of opening-up is to learn from others' strong points to 
offset our weaknesses and make the best use of our own 
comparative advantage. Besides, this kind of protection of 
home-made products does not help domestic enterprises 
enhance their competitiveness in international economic 
activities, and the chronic malady of the old economic 
system - low efficiency, high cost and poor quality - are 
not thereby eliminated.349
(3) "Modelling After the International Investment Environment" 
and "Acting According to the International Practice"
In dealing with foreign investors, many of the local elite 
interviewed did not seem to be much influenced by the 
traditional Chinese wariness about what should and should not be 
absorbed from the West. The overall mentality, especially among
347 Interview with the Vice Manager of the Sino-IBM joint 
venture in Tianjin, China. April 1991.
348 Interview with Prof. Teng Weizao.
349 Interview with Prof. Teng Weizao. Also see He Liansheng, 
Zou Dongtao and Yang Qiubao. op.cit.. p.55.
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the younger generation, was clearly to learn and to integrate.
What they cared aboqt more was how to get things done
/
efficiently and properly rather than whether they were 
politically or ideologically justifiable. "Modelling after the 
international investment environment” and "Acting according to 
the international practice”, the two slogans that are popular 
and widely accepted in China's open cities and SEZs, well 
demonstrate this mentality.
Modelling after the international investment environment
This slogan was first strongly advocated by Mr. Zhang Wei, 
Director of the Administrative Commission of TEDA, in 1986. It 
was approved and accepted by the national leaders, Hu Qili, 
member of the Politburo, Gu Mu, member of the State Council, and 
Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary of the CCP. It refers to 
"modelling the building of the developmental areas after the 
first-class investment environments in the world, at least not 
inferior to the export-processing zones in Asia, which requires 
concentrated investment, bold reforms and the granting of 
flexible policies and adequate autonomous power in some small 
areas with good conditions so that the various conditions 
required by foreign investors could be fully provided.1,350
This idea is based on the understanding that international 
capital would certainly flow to the regions where the best 
investment environment is available. The Asian "Four Little 
Tigers" plus Thailand and Malaysia have all created very good 
investment environments. If China seeks to compete with them 
for foreign investment, it should make great efforts to improve 
its investment environment. And for that purpose, some well- 
placed coastal areas should take the lead in doing so without 
waiting for the overall national economic reforms.
The essential condition for this idea to be carried out is 
to insulate the areas from the larger "climate" outside with 
special policies so that bold experiments and reforms can be
350 Pi Qiansheng. (ed.), op.cit.
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carried out modelled after such areas in other countries.
Now several years have passed, it is generally agreed that
a lot of progress has been made since 1984 in respect of
overcoming bureaucracy and increasing efficiency. For example,
TEDA has reduced the period of project examination and approval
from 100 to 30 days. It has also issued more than 40
administrative regulations and rules relating to personnel,
land, investment, city construction and administration, etc.,
which have provided the legal basis to adjust both the business
behaviour of the enterprises and people's social behaviour.351
And in the process of implementing the laws and regulations,
many courses of action which were not in accordance with
international practice have been changed.
In the past, the project department conducted a very strict 
scrutiny over the feasibility report of a project and would 
not give the approval if they judged that the project would 
not be profitable. The foreign investors were often 
puzzled and annoyed by this, for according to the 
international practice, any firm should be allowed to be 
set up as long as it is lawful. As for whether it can make 
money or not, that is exclusively a matter for the investor 
and the government should not intervene. Later, TEDA made 
some radical changes and would carry out the examinations 
only from the perspective of law and the balance of foreign 
currency.352
However, the development still fell far short of initial 
expectations. As one of the officials in the TEDA said: "Now 
all the open areas up and down the country are still subject to 
interference and are bound up by the old structures in one form 
or another."353 The TEDA is determined to carry on with the 
efforts, in the belief that China's reforms have been and will 
continue to be full of difficulties and setbacks; they will have 
to make their independent efforts without waiting for the 
improvement of the "larger climate"; moreover, their experiments
351 Chen Yue, Pi Qiansheng. op.cit.. p.367.
352 Pi Qiansheng. op.cit. . p.46.
353 Pi Qiansheng. (ed.), op.cit. . pp.130-131.
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and experience can play an exemplary vanguard role in 
stimulating the overall reforms and opening-up and help make the 
process of reforms irreversible.354
Acting according to the international practice
This slogan was not officially endorsed until 1987 in the 
Party's Report to the Thirteenth Congress: "Our country will 
further amplify the foreign-related economic legislation, 
implement the preferential policies, improve the investment 
environment so that foreign entrepreneurs can run their 
enterprises according to the international practice in our 
country and we can absorb more foreign investment. 1,355 Since 
then, there have been some heated discussions and debates about 
"international practice” all over the SEZs and open areas in the 
country. This was naturally one of the most popular topics in 
the First Economic Theoretical Conference of the Developmental 
Areas in China's coastal cities held in Tianjin Nankai 
University in November 1988. A number of papers presented at 
this conference not only reflected the FRE elite's views on this 
specific issue, but they also represented how their authors 
understood China's interdependence with and integration into the 
world economy - the central theme of this thesis.
In the articles, "acting according to the international 
practice" means to act according to the laws of the commodity 
economy. And as far as the FRE is concerned, the core of it is 
to improve the investment environment. This should provide 
Chinese business people with a new perspective, namely, in the 
effort to improve the investment environment, they should pay 
more attention to the international practice that the foreign 
investors follow. The aim of this is to create the kind of 
investment environment in which the foreign investors could run 
their business according to the common practice of the commodity 
economy. One of the articles noted:
354 Ibid. . and interview with Mr. Li Linshan.
355 Beiiing Review. Sept. 1987.
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In view of the fact that since the end of WWII, the 
international division of labour has become much more 
advanced, the world market has become increasingly 
integrated, the traditional parochial concept of national 
economy is clearly out of date. What we should do is to 
take part in the international division of labour actively 
so that China could share more and more comparative 
advantages, which is exactly~the goal of acting according 
to the international practice. Because only when we act 
according to the international practice, can we genuinely 
play our role in the world commodity economic arena. 
Therefore, the chief criterion to measure whether we are 
acting according to the international practice is to see 
whether our course of action has facilitated deepening our 
participation in the international division of labour and 
increasing the 'internationalization' of our national 
economy.35(5
But, international practice is undefined and varied, so 
there is a problem of deciding what practice to follow. Someone 
else argued:
Two criteria should be followed: we should adopt those that 
have been followed by most economies, especially the 
developed countries and the newly industrialized economies 
(the four little tigers for instance); and those that will 
help us to sort out problems as they emerge in the field of 
the foreign related economy. ... A cognitive premise for 
the principle of acting according to the international 
practice is: we are a member of the open world, a component 
of this huge ever-developing organism. Therefore, we must 
take the whole world in view, emancipating our mind, 
broadening our outlook and getting rid of parochial 
arrogance. Only thus can we make continuous progress in 
integrating into the outside world.357
C. Views on Some of the Major Issues Concerning the Reforms and 
Opening-up
As repeatedly expounded in this thesis, from the very 
beginning China's opening-up strategy faced this central 
dilemma: on the one hand, the implementation of the economic 
reforms and opening-up opened the way, intended or not, for
356 Shen Kui. "A Tentative Discussion About Acting According 
to the International Practice", in Chen Yue & Pi Qiansheng 
(ed.). op.cit.. p.278.
357 Ibid. . p.279.
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China's economy to integrate into the largely capitalistic world 
economic order; on the other hand, the leadership attempted to 
maintain and develop/ a socialist political system. The 
incompatibility of the two has become more and more obvious with 
the evolution of the reforms and opening-up in the last decade. 
And the conflict has frequently - obstructed the development and 
fundamentally threatened the survival of the reforms and 
opening-up programme. Nevertheless, the last decade's reforms, 
especially the opening-up and the growing interdependence with 
the outside world have helped broaden people's vision and 
enabled them to form their own views on a series of fundamental 
issues, which will be of crucial importance to China's long term 
development. Next, I shall examine the local elite's views on 
two of the most fundamental issues concerning further reforms 
and opening-up: the question of ownership and the issue of
combining planning and the market.
(1) The Issue of Ownership
With the implementation of the economic reforms and 
opening-up policies, the non-public-ownership elements were 
allowed to exist
and grow in China. Besides domestic individual and private 
enterprises, Sino-foreign joint ventures, cooperative and
wholly-foreign-owned enterprises were also allowed to be 
established. These are "classified, respectively, as the state 
capitalist economy, the semi-socialist cooperative economy and 
the capitalist economy".358 The rationale for this policy is as 
follows:
Although the existence of these forms of ownership is a 
challenge to the traditional theory of ownership, because 
these forms of ownership only amount to a small proportion 
in our economy, they will not change the dominant role of
socialist public ownership in our economy. On the
contrary, their existence could set off competition with 
the public ownership, and help increase the vitality of 
socialist public ownership, raise the quality of our
country's products and increase the competitive capability
358 Gao Shangquan. op.cit.
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of our foreign trade.359
In assessing the outcome of the competition after a decade, 
although socialist public ownership still retains its dominant 
position, the gap between public and non-public ownership both 
in terms of speed of development and efficiency, has become 
increasingly evident. In terms of development speed, the annual 
average rate of increase of the gross value of industrial output 
from 1985 to 1990 was, respectively, 15% for the state 
enterprises, 26% for the township enterprises and 54% for the 
foreign-related (sanzi) enterprises. As far as efficiency is 
concerned, take Tianjin for example: the average value of output 
per capita for 1990 was respectively 26.4 thousand yuan for the 
state enterprises, 75.4 thousand yuan for the foreign-invested 
firms; the average profit and tax per capita turned in was 3,800 
yuan for the former and 7,400 for the latter.360 The much 
stronger performance of the non-public-ownership sectors and the 
generally poor performance of the public ownership sector formed 
a sharp contrast. The issue of ownership naturally became a 
focal point again in theoretical and policy debates around the 
end of the 1980s.
Different and opposing views regarding the significance and 
course of action of ownership reform have existed both in the 
decision-making and theoretical circles ever since the beginning 
of the reforms. If 1986-1988 saw a more radical attempt to 
reform ownership - the reforms of the "contracting 
responsibility system" in the medium and large-sized state 
enterprises and "leasing" in the small state enterprises were 
implemented aiming at dividing the right of ownership and right 
of management; and the experiments of changing the state 
enterprises into stock companies were also allowed - then the 
end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s saw a slowing-down 
of this reform and the increasing politicization of the
359 Ibid..
360 Economic Daily. 14.1.1992, p.3.
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ownership issue.
By early 1991, the serious difficulties many medium and 
large-sized state enterprises faced could no longer escape the 
attention of the leadership. Indeed, the central government 
called a series of meetings and took a number of measures to 
tackle the problem. However, the matter was treated more as a 
political issue than an economic one. As Premier Li Peng said 
during a series of symposia on how to revitalize the state 
enterprises: "To revitalize the state enterprises is not only an 
economic issue but a political one. We must approach this 
question from the high plane of consolidating and developing 
socialist public ownership.11361 The Party secretary, Jiang 
Zemin, put it even more clearly in his inspection tour of 
Tianjin:
The medium and large-sized state enterprises are not only 
the main source of our country's finance, but also the 
pillar of our socialist economy. Whether or not we can 
revitalize them does not only directly relate to the 
overall stability of the national economy but also relates 
to the maintenance of the predominant position of the 
public ownership economy and the consolidation of the 
socialist system. Therefore, it is not merely an economic 
issue, but an important political one as well.362
In contrast to the national leadership, the local officials 
and managers do not approach the issue from such high political 
ground. The views they hold are largely identical: the
ownership reforms should continue and without this fundamental 
transformation, the state enterprises can hardly be genuinely 
revitalized. Many of the joint venture managers used to be the 
managers of state enterprises, and through their own experience, 
they keenly feel that the old public ownership and the economic 
administrative structures and system built on it are the source 
of many defects and malpractice in the state economy.
Among many examples in this regard is one given by the Vice 
General Manager of Jin Rong Co. Ltd., a one-plant-two-system
361 Guancrminq Daily. 10.9.1991.
362 People's Daily. 1.8.91.
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model joint venture: "Just beside the gate of our factory, there 
are two restaurants, one is publicly owned and run by our 
factory, the other is privately owned. The quality of service 
is so different that even the workers of our own factory won't 
go to the factory's restaurant but to the privately run one." 
This manager pointed out: "The difference between public
ownership and individual or private ownership has become so 
obvious nowadays that everyone agrees something must be done to 
address the problem of ownership. But the ideological 
constraints and confusion on what is socialism prevents us from 
carrying out fundamental reforms."363
The officials and managers in TEDA seemed to be more open- 
minded on this issue and often link the problem with the 
opening-up.
The General Manager of Sino-Danish Enterprises Co. Ltd., 
Mr. Han Bing, said: "I think it is a good idea to convert the 
fixed assets of the state enterprises in terms of money and sell 
them to foreign investors. The history of the last several 
decades has indisputably shown the failings of public ownership, 
but why can't we carry out more fundamental reforms in this 
aspect? Clearly people's minds are still being bound and they 
are afraid of being accused of 'national betrayal'." He was also 
in support of the experiments of turning state enterprises into 
stock companies. He said: "At present, it could be a way out 
without completely demolishing state ownership. But besides the 
current practice of raising capital by shares inside and outside 
enterprises, shares should also be allowed to be sold to foreign 
investors.1,364
The Bureau Chief of the Administrative Bureau of 
Enterprise, Mr. Yan Zheng, regarded auction as a good method. 
He said: "The fixed assets of the state enterprises could be 
sold through auctions to foreign investors. Some people doubt 
whether buyers would be attracted. I don't think there will be
363 Interview with Mr. Sun Xingwen.
364 Interview with Mr. Han Bing.
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any problem if the prices are set reasonably low enough."365
(2) The Issue of Combining Planning and the Market
As mentioned earlier, after the June 1989 events, some of
the obviously market-oriented reforms during 1986-1988 were
slowed down and the significant slogan "the state regulates the
market and the market guides the enterprise" approved at the
thirteenth Party's Thirteenth Congress held in September 1987
was seldom mentioned. Instead, combining plan and market became
the guideline and was regarded by the leadership as the only
correct way for China's economic development.
Again, like the issue of ownership, the relationship
between planning and market is a very complex one which I cannot
go into an extensive discussion of it here. What I want to
point out is that this guideline seems to have been put forward
more for ideological and political reasons than out of economic
necessity. In other words, the guideline was set down because it
was ideologically justifiable and convenient, not because it was
economically logical or sound. This argument would appear even
clearer when one considers the fact that all the former East
European socialist countries took it as their guideline when
they carried out economic reforms and none of them succeeded.
As Mr. Gao Shangquan, Vice Director of China's Economic
Structural Reform Commission, once acknowledged before the
Eastern European social upheavals at the end of 1989:
How to combine plan and market is still a problem that 
socialist countries are exploring in their economic 
reforms. Hungary's reforms have undergone a process of 
twenty years. Yugoslavia's about forty years, but both of 
them find themselves in a state of nondescript, neither 
planning nor market can duly play their roles. In 1968, 
Hungary abolished its compulsory plan. However, the large 
enterprises are still in the monopoly position, enterprises 
cannot go bankrupt, capital and personnel cannot move 
freely, competition is inadequate and the functions of the 
government do not change accordingly; as a result, the
365 Interview with Mr. Yan Zheng.
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market cannot duly play its role.366
Apparently, in China, many officials, academics and
businessmen are not convinced that the combining of the two will
be possible, not to speak of the claim that it is the only
correct way forward. In Xiao Liang's article "The Ten
Theoretical Questions in Dispute in the Economic Field at
Present", the first two most arguable questions enumerated by
him are concerned with the relationship of market and planning:
"What is the relationship between plan and market?"; "Is a
planned market economy a theoretically sound formulation?"367
In an article published in Economy of Special Economic
Zones in February 1991, "On the Transition Period of Reforms",
the author, Wang Zhuo also predicted that: "Another round of
intense debate over the relationship between market and planning
is inevitable. The essence of it will be whether the reforms
should be market-oriented or plan-oriented.1,368
In the discussions over this issue, the official who is in
charge of Tianjin's enterprise reforms put it bluntly:
It is sheer nonsense and daydreaming to say combining 
planning and market is the only sound and correct way. It 
is true that as with anything else, the market has its own 
defects and failings. Under some circumstances, for 
instance, the blindness in action could incur loss and 
waste due to the spontaneous adjustment of the market. But 
to prevent the blindness with an overall compulsory plan 
is actually replacing commodity economy with product 
economy. In the developed countries many companies go 
bankrupt each year, but many new companies are set up. 
Their market is directing the flow of resources. In China 
we do not have this mechanism.369
366 Gao Shangquan. op.cit. . p. 100.
367 See Xiao Liang, op.cit.. p.46.
368 Wang Zhuo. "On the Transitional Period of Reforms", 
Economy of Special Economic Zones, no.2, 1991. Also in Xinhua
Digest. No.7, 1991, p.45.
369 Interview with an official in the Tianjin Economic 
Structural Reform Commission, who asked not to be identified in 
the thesis.
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Some academics and managers have said that as a result of 
the attempt to combine the two, in many circumstances the 
defects of both have been combined rather than their strong 
points. Governments at each level interfere so much that equal 
competition conditions can hardly be created. Take some 
manifestations of the interference for example: (a) Interference 
in investment: The government has the power to take some
capital away from an enterprise for so-called centralized use on 
a larger scale and the government can also set various 
restrictions concerning investment and projects. All of these 
could prevent the enterprise from promptly adapting its 
production arrangements to the changing market conditions, (b) 
Interference in price: Enterprises cannot always increase or
reduce prices according to the supply and demand on the market, 
which deprives the enterprises of their flexibility in the 
competition. (c) Interference in the management and 
administration of the enterprise: Many decisions, such as the 
setting up of internal organizations, the appointment of 
personnel, the laying down of regulations and rules and so on 
cannot be made completely with the practical needs of the
production in mind, which often results in the lack of sound and 
necessary mechanisms, and the development of a poor competitive 
capacity. To say that such kinds of state enterprises have the 
defects of both planning and the market at the same time is 
because their behaviour is characterized by seeking the 
protection of the government and increasing its dependence on
the government in investment and output on the one hand, and
evading the supervision and control of the government on the 
other.370
Many officials and managers in the TEDA have become deeply 
convinced of the advantages and effectiveness of a market 
economy. I asked Mr. Yan Zheng, whether it was also the
370 Interview with Mr. Liu Rongcang, Deputy Director of the 
Institute of Finance & Trade Economics of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences. Beijing, China. April 1991. Also, interview 
with Mr. Han Bing.
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guideline for the TEDA to combine planning and market. He
answered with a categorical "no":
Our guideline is' not even market-oriented. We are 
genuinely practising market economy. The responsibility of 
the TEDA Administrative commission and all the departments 
is only to provide the services and exercise supervision 
according to regulations arrd'Taws. We do not interfere in 
the management and production of the enterprises at all. 
When an applicant, either Chinese or foreign, satisfies all 
the requirements, he can set up an enterprise in the TEDA. 
Whether the enterprise will thrive or go bankrupt, is 
absolutely a matter for the enterprise itself.371
Mr. Li Linshan, Director of the Policy Research Office of 
the TEDA described to me: "Once the Governor of Guangdong
Province, Mr. Ye Xuanping, was asked why Guangdong had been able 
to develop so fast. Ye reportedly said, 'Because we are 
following the principles of a market economy as far as possible. 
If you do the same, you can also develop fast.'"372
The economists I interviewed, Teng Weizao, Yang Jingnian 
and Chen Yue, all took the view that there is no pure market 
economy or planned economy in today's world. The problem is how 
to define plan and market. It is true that a market economy can 
involve risks, shake-ups or even turbulence; whether one is 
ready to transform the economy into a market-economy is 
dependent on whether one is willing to take these risks. Some 
leaders, Chen Yun, in particular, prefer stable development. 
What they care about is that everyone has food to eat and 
construction can be carried out gradually. They do not seem to 
care much about efficiency and technological progress. But the 
problem is whether shake-ups and turbulence can really be 
avoided if market-oriented changes are not introduced. The 
current state of the state enterprises has obviously caused a 
lot of economic and social problems, and without substantial 
reforms and changes, more troubles or crises cannot be avoided
371 Interview with Mr. Yan Zheng.
372 Interview with Mr. Li Linshan.
217
anyway.373
To sum up, one tif my most important findings in the 
fieldwork undertaken in April 1991 is that many local officials 
and entrepreneurs, especially those in their thirties and early 
forties and who have received a~higher education, do have an 
overwhelmingly positive attitude towards the opening-up policy 
and the prospect of integrating China into the outside world. 
They are the generation who tend to be much more open and 
liberal-minded. Through the opening-up of the last decade their 
mode of thinking has undergone significant changes and many of 
them have learned to use their own minds and make their own 
judgements. Many of them are already in responsible and leading 
positions. In the medium term, they will surely play an even 
more important role in deciding China's future.
373 Interview with the professors: Teng Weizao, Yang Jingnian 
and Chen Yue.
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the ideological constraints, historical shadows and 
systemic obstacles, in the 1980s, China's reformers, especially 
the practitioners at grass root level, have shown great 
creativity and adaptability. As a result, today's China has 
become much more prosperous and active in the regional and 
global economy. China's increasing economic interdependence 
with the outside world has also helped to bring about 
significant changes in the social, cultural and political fields 
and particularly in popular modes of thinking.
To a certain degree, the opening-up and the economic 
reforms have taken on a life of their own. The dynamism and 
momentum of the reforms have exposed more sharply the failings 
of the existing socio-economic and political systems. In many 
cases, they have also initiated further changes. It has become 
increasingly apparent that there can be no half-way house: 
Adaptation is a continuous process and more fundamental changes 
need to be carried out.
However, as I set out at the beginning of this thesis, the 
reform strategies of the CCP are fundamentally flawed. The 
conflict between its economic liberalism and its political 
authoritarianism and the incompatibility of opening-up to a 
largely capitalistic international economy while attempting to 
maintain political and ideological control over the society not 
only gave rise to a series of disruptive waves and cycles during 
the course of the last decade, but it has also fundamentally 
threatened the future survival of the whole reform programme. 
Indeed, at the end of the 1980s, the whole reform and opening-up 
programme was brought to the brink of collapse.
The period during which I did this research witnessed the 
most dramatic and volatile episode in the post-Mao era. The 
June 1989 Tiananmen events; the removal of Party Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang; the strongest counter-offensive by the conservatives 
since 1978 and the dramatic resurgence of the reforms and
219
opening-up in 1992 orchestrated by Deng Xiaoping himself, all 
helped to give immediacy to the research while also vindicating 
my approach. With reference to the latest developments in the 
last couple of years, this concluding chapter seeks to examine 
further the fundamental problems faced by the opening-up and 
economic reforms and see what implications they might have for 
China's domestic development and its relations with the outside 
world in the near and medium future.
I. THE 1989 CRISIS
China's economic reform and opening-up process reached a
crossroad when Deng Xiaoping's once seemingly credible and
orderly plan for the transfer of power upon his death collapsed
with Hu Yaobang removed from the post of General Secretary of
the CCP in early 1987. As Harold Jacobson and Michel
Oksenberg summed up the situation in their China's Participation
in the IMF, the World Bank and GATT;
The new duumvirate - Zhao as general secretary and Li Peng 
as premier - brought together individuals with quite 
different orientations to the reform process. Li clearly 
was the more cautious, sceptical of the rapidity and 
desirability of many major reforms with which Zhao was 
identified: price reform, introduction of capital and
labour markets, and changes in the government revenue 
system. The removal of Hu Yaobang also essentially 
terminated the steps toward political reform. Meanwhile, 
in 1987-1988, the leaders confronted increasingly severe 
economic problems: lagging agricultural production, some
undisciplined foreign borrowing, government deficits, 
accelerating inflation, and growing social disorder. The 
populace perceived also that their leaders were 
increasingly corrupt and engaged in nepotism. And many 
among the leaders saw the populace as increasingly 
corrupted by foreign culture and values. The top leaders 
became deeply divided over how to respond to these mounting 
problems. Some, such as Zhao, believed only additional 
reform could remedy the problem, while others, such as Li 
and increasingly Deng, believed retrenchment on both 
economic and political fronts was the only answer.374
374 Jacobson, Harold K and Oksenberg, Michel. China's 
Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT - Toward a 
Global Economic Order. Ann Arbor: The Univ. of Michigan Press,
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A series of shocking developments in 1989 - the student-led 
anti-corruption and pro-democracy demonstrations in more than 80 
cities from April to June; the June 4th killing in Beijing; the 
removal of Zhao Ziyang and some other reformist leaders and the 
political and economic sanctions imposed by the West, etc. - 
brought the whole process of reform and opening-up to the verge 
of collapse.
The launching of China's economic reform and opening-up was
based on a consensus on a number of key points among the
leadership. These included: the need to improve the standard of
living after decades of scarcity and living with shortages; the
need to carry out certain economic reforms including expanding
China's foreign economic relations and giving the market some
role to play; the need for the socialist sector to retain its
dominant position and the necessity for continued unchallenged
leadership by the Communist Party. Yet it was "a discordant
consensus”375. While all the leaders had agreed on the above
principles, they differed as to how far and how fast the reforms
should be carried out. (See the discussion in Chapter II) .
Moreover, the principles were not consistent and the
disagreements and contradictions between them became more and
more pronounced with the evolution of the reforms and opening-
up. As Peter Van Ness has noted:
The Party leadership, for its part, wants to achieve 
greater economic efficiency and is implementing market 
reforms for this purpose, as we have seen. But introducing 
a market mechanism means changing the fundamental structure 
of the economic system, and a market, if it is to achieve 
the intended benefits, is not something that can be turned 
on today and shut off tomorrow. Moreover, market operation 
also requires a decentralization of power (both economic 
and political power) and if successful, the market will 
create new political interests within the society that will 
inevitably present challenges to the Party's monopoly of 
political power.376
1990, p.161.
375 Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove. op.cit.. p.64.
376 Peter Van Ness, op.cit. . p. 19.
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In other words, a decade of reforms and opening-up challenged 
both orthodox Marxist ideas about socialist construction and the 
Party's virtually exclusive hold on political power. The June 
1989 events and the ensuing East European revolutions made the 
threat absolutely clear that reforms could bring to the 
Communist rule. By political instinct, the leadership, 
especially the conservatives among them, would try to halt the 
reforms and regain firm control over the society. For after all, 
the ultimate aim of Communist-led reforms was to consolidate the 
socialist system and the rule of the Communist Party.
Indeed after mid-1989, a campaign of "opposing bourgeois 
liberalization” was carried out on the largest scale since the 
reforms began; strenuous efforts were made to impose the 
official ideology and the principles of socialism on the 
populace, and once again people were told to judge everything 
according to whether it was socialist or capitalist; warnings 
against the policies of "peaceful evolution" allegedly pursued 
by the capitalist and hostile West were sounded repeatedly in 
the official media and press. All these developments gave rise 
to fears and speculations about the prospect of completely 
halting and reversing the economic reforms and the policies of 
the opening-up process.
II. AVOIDANCE OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE REFORM AND OPENING-UP
The fears of the collapse of the reforms and opening-up as 
mentioned above did not materialize however. The survival and 
continuation of the opening-up and reform was, I believe, 
basically determined by three factors:
A. The Dictates of the Economic Imperatives
It is not true to say that the conservatives were not 
politically capable of halting or reversing the opening-up and 
reform policies. Indeed, as Kevin Bucknall noted: "Since 1949 
the CCP has demonstrated the capacity to give up economic 
benefits for ideological goods, be they left-wing Maoist or more
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orthodox Soviet-style centralized planning. Such events occurred 
in 1958-1960, 1966-76 and 1977-78. "377 But the deepening of the 
economic reforms and thfe expansion of the opening-up in the last 
decade have made it increasingly difficult for the Communist 
leadership once more to give up economic benefits for political 
and ideological reasons. The reformist policies have been 
demonstrably successful, economic flexibility has increased, and 
living standards have been markedly improved and even today 
China's interrelations with the world economy have become so 
substantial that breaking this link would cause huge losses to 
the national economy as a whole and some regions, especially the 
most developed coastal areas, in particular. So the key 
questions that those attempting to alter or reverse the reforms 
and opening-up policies have to answer are: what alternative do 
they have? How can they motivate their citizens to work harder 
without a return to coercion or terror since the pre-reform 
system had been seen by the public, even the leadership 
themselves, as bankrupt? If they reject market reforms, what 
solutions can they offer to the serious problems of declining 
competitiveness in socialist societies? For, after all, ”The 
fate of the Party and socialism will be eventually determined by 
whether socialism can achieve much higher labour productivity 
than capitalism," as one of the old communists, Bo Yibo, 
admitted at the seventieth anniversary of the CCP in July 
19 91.378 So despite the strengthening of political and 
ideological propaganda and control, the opening-up process has 
not been badly disrupted. On the contrary, the leadership "is 
keen to convince the world that China's door remains open."379
377 Bucknall, Kevin. China - The Open Door Policy. Sydney, 
London: Allen & Unwin, 1989, pp.174-175.
378 Guancfmina Daily. 5.7.1991.
379 The Economist. 11-17. 5. 1991, p.70.
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B. Increased Popular Faith in the Cause of Opening-up and 
Economic Reforms
The public support' for the reform policies has been another
important factor that has helped prevent the reforms and
opening-up course from being derailed. And since the latter half
of the 1980s this faith has been further strengthened by the
conspicuously contrasting performances of the state economy and
the foreign-related and the private economy. By the beginning
of 1991, according to official figures, one third of state
enterprises were loss-making and another third barely broke
even, the private and the FRE had not only achieved higher
efficiency and productivity as demonstrated in a series of
economic indicators described previously, but they had also
begun to establish the beginnings of an effective alternative
economic system. "In the SEZs and many open areas, some
effective mechanisms of market, enterprise management and
planning have been established, all of which are in accordance
with the law of value, which ensure the long-term healthy
development of the economy" 380
What is even more worthy of notice is that the achievements
of the private and foreign-related economy have been seen by
many people as a demonstration of the effectiveness of the
market economy, and accordingly the least reformed elements of
the traditional system of central planning are seen as the main
obstacle to further and more successful opening-up and reforms.
As the Vice Director of China's Economic Structural Reform
Commission, Gao Shangquan, summed up:
The rapid development of the SEZs was achieved through the 
effort of 'jumping out of the current economic structure' 
and establishing a new one which enabled people to act
according to the economic laws, and to adjust to the
changes of the international market. With the development 
of the four SEZs and the further opening-up of the fourteen 
coastal cities and Hainan Island, we will face the world 
market on an even larger scale. However, the present
economic structure has increasingly become the main 
obstacle to the extensive foreign economic relations.
380 People's Daily. 7.6.1991.
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That's why we must speed up the tempo of economic 
reforms.381
4
So, at the beginning of the 1990s, one could clearly 
discern a trend of calling for the expansion of the private and 
foreign-related economy and relying on opening-up to revitalize 
the state economy, including the large and medium-sized state 
enterprises. Many people now believe that it might be possible 
to pass by or get out of the current state economic structures 
and make full and flexible use of the current opening-up 
policies by encouraging and facilitating as many state 
enterprises as possible to establish joint ventures or 
cooperative enterprises with foreign companies.
C. The Key Role of Deng Xiaoping
The crucial role played by Deng Xiaoping in the post-Mao 
reform process is beyond dispute. As Robin Munroe once
commented:
... the entire post-Mao programme has hinged, essentially, 
on the outstanding presence and commanding support of one 
man, Deng Xiaoping. This is not to imply that the reforms 
have lacked either public or official support: far from it. 
The point is rather that, without Deng, China would almost 
certainly not have undergone a social transformation 
remotely approaching in scale that of the 'second 
revolution' which he has so doggedly pursued over most of 
the past decade.382
The most telling example has been Deng's defence of the
reforms and opening-up in the aftermath of the 1989 June crisis.
As people have seen, immediately after the June 4th events 1989,
amid various rumours and speculations, Deng Xiaoping,in his June
9th speech, declared:
The lines, principles and policies formulated since the 
Party's Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress are correct; 
one centre, two basic points, - that is to take economic 
construction as the central task and the four cardinal 
principles should be upheld on the one hand, and the reform
381 Gao Shangquan. op.cit. . pp.83-84.
382 See Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove (eds.). op.cit. .
p. 78.
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and opening-up be carried out on the other, - are all
correct. All of them must be continued.383
As mentioned above', after the June 1989 crisis, while still 
paying lip service to reforms and opening-up, the conservatives 
launched a big counter-offensive in the name of opposing 
"bourgeois liberalization” and resisting the "peaceful 
evolution" towards a Western-style political and social system. 
They repeatedly stressed the importance of state enterprises 
though many of them were loss-making, as described above. They 
placed unprecedented emphasis on the principle of combining 
plan and market without actually knowing how to do it. They 
strongly advocated the principles of independence and self- 
reliance and even questioned the benefits of making use of 
foreign investment. In order to reduce the high rate of
inflation some austerity measures were indeed needed, however 
the pace of reforms and economic development slowed down too 
much. In 1989, the economic growth rate was less than 4%. In 
1990 and 1991 the growth rate was only 4% and 7% respectively, 
the lowest growth period since the early 1980s.384
Deng Xiaoping was not happy about this kind of obstruction 
to the reforms and opening-up, and not long after the 1989 June 
Crisis, he began trying to get the reforms back onto the fast 
lane. The first sign of Deng's reassertion of his reform and 
opening-up policies was the dramatic publication of a series of 
bold articles in the first half of 1991 in Shanghai's Liberation 
Daily.385 The most important one was that of 2nd March entitled 
"There Must Be New Ideas for the Reforms and Opening-up". The 
central points of the article include:
383 People's Daily. 10.6.1989.
384 People's Daily. 22.12.1992.
385 The articles include: "There Must Be New Ideas for the 
Reforms and Opening-up" (2.3.1991), "The Sense of Extending the 
Opening-up Should Be Stronger" (22.3.1991), "Reform and Opening- 
up Need a Large Number of Cadres of Both Ability and Political 
Integrity" (12.4.1991).
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The banner of the reforms and opening-up must be raised 
even higher. The policy of reforms and opening-up should be 
carried out in a faster, better and bolder way... The most 
important thing at: present is to encourage people to come 
up with new ideas and dare to take some risks... For that 
purpose, we must call for further emancipation of the mind. 
Emancipating people's mind is not something that can be 
done once and for all. Take “the relationship between plan 
and market for example: some people tend to equate planned 
economy with a socialist economy, thinking that behind the 
market adjustment, there must be a capitalist ghost. With 
the deepening of economic reforms, more and more people 
understand that plan and market are only two means and 
forms of resources allocation. They are not the lines of 
demarcation to divide socialism from capitalism. There is 
plan in capitalism and there is market in socialism 
[Emphasis added by the author of this thesis] The 
acquirement of this scientific understanding of the 
question of a socialist commodity economy is nothing short 
of another major mind emancipation. Under the new 
circumstances of deepening the reforms and expanding the 
opening-up, we must guard against degenerating into 'new 
rigid thinking'. We must not simply equate developing a 
socialist commodity economy, a socialist market and market 
adjustment with capitalism; we must not think of employing 
foreign capital as conflicting with independence, and being 
overcautious and full of worries in the practice of 
absorbing foreign investment; we must not pit economic 
adjustment and rectification against deepening the reforms 
and dare not uphold and amplify them, or even reverse the 
reforms which have been proved in practice to be correct 
and effective; we must not use 'developing the economy in 
a continuous and steady manner and not being overanxious 
for quick results'386 as an excuse for becoming slack in 
the work and not even trying to do those things which can 
be accomplished. All in all, further emancipating our mind 
is the indispensable condition for us to fulfil the 
strategic goal of the second stage of development.387
The series of articles by Huang Fuping focused on the 
following two issues: the first is concerned with the promotion 
of cadres. Reformists insist that those widely recognized as
386 This was the very point that has been repeatedly 
emphasized by some more conservative members in the leadership, 
for example, the Premier Li Peng. See Li Peng's speeches during 
1989-1991 in People's Daily.
387 Liberation Daily. 2.3.1991. The goal of the second stage 
of development is to double the gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output 1990-2000. The first stage was to double the 
gross output value 1980-1990 which has been accomplished.
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having made outstanding achievements in the reforms and opening- 
up should be chosen, while the conservatives maintained that 
political behaviour or"record should be the chief criterion in 
choosing cadres. The second is concerned with the orientation of 
reform and opening-up. The reformers strongly advocated 
expanding reforms and opening-up and absorbing foreign capital 
on a larger scale so as to deepen the reforms, while the 
conservatives stood for "self-reliance and hard work" so as to 
prevent the "peaceful evolution" purportedly intended by the 
West.
Understandably the sharpness and boldness of the articles 
touched upon the sensitive nerves of some people. According to 
the Hong Kong journals Zheng Ming and China Spring, the Vice 
Editor-in-chief of Guangming Daily and the Director and a Vice 
Director of the Theory Section of People's Daily all condemned 
the views expressed in the articles and said the articles should 
be criticized. Some people from the Propaganda Department of the 
CCP were reportedly sent to Shanghai to carry out an urgent 
investigation into the articles. Only when they learnt that 
Huang Fuping was a writing group standing for Huang Pujiang 
Review and represented the views of the Shanghai Party 
Committee, and what is more, the 'backstage boss' was none other 
than Deng Xiaoping, did they stop the investigation.388
The major dramatic move by Deng Xiaoping was the 
inspection tour he made in South China at the beginning of 1992. 
During this inspection tour, Deng put forward several new ideas 
or new formulations, which include: both plan and market are 
mere economic means, they are not the lines of demarcation to 
divide socialism and capitalism, there is plan in capitalism and 
there is market in socialism; the Party's basic line of "one 
centre, two basic points" (one centre: take economic
construction as the central task; two basic points: the four 
cardinal principles should be upheld and the reform and opening-
388 See China Soring. 7.1991, pp. 10-12. Also see Zheng Ming 
No.4, 1991.
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up carried out) should be followed for a hundred years; the 
rightist tendencies should be guarded against but the main 
danger is from the "Left”; reforms and opening-up should be 
carried out in a bolder and faster way.389 Though Deng's tour 
and talks were not widely reported until several months 
later,390, the new wave of reforms and opening-up stimulated by 
Deng's tour proved to be overwhelming. As the result, the 
growth rate of the GNP in 1992 was 12% higher than in 1991.391 
The FRE developed even faster. During 1992, as many as 40,000 
Sino-foreign projects were signed, more than three times the 
number of 19 91392. Apart from all these achievements the 
Fourteenth Party Congress held in October 1992 formally endorsed 
the key ideological formulation: China should go all out to
develop a socialist market economy.
While again convincingly demonstrating the predominant role 
of Deng Xiaoping, China's latest development has also vindicated 
one of my chief findings in this thesis: there has been a
growing conviction and faith in the cause of opening-up and the 
market-oriented reforms and, to a considerable extent, China's 
reforms and opening-up have assumed a life of their own.
III. A STILL UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Although the economic reforms and opening-up have continued 
after the 1989 crisis, none of the fundamental political and 
ideological issues that led to the crisis have been seriously 
addressed. In fact, the leadership seems to be more determined 
than ever to keep its monopolistic political control over the 
society and political reforms have been largely moved off the
389 See Economic Daily. 1.4.1992.
390 It was reported that some conservative leaders did not
like what Deng had said and resisted the circulation of Deng's
talks. See Zheng Miner. Issue no. 3.4.5. 1992.
391 People's Daily. 28.12.1992.
392 People's Daily. 31.12.1992.
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agenda. Deng Xiaoping does not believe that economic reform has 
to be accompanied by political reform. For Deng, so long as the 
economy develops well, ,the society will be stable and the rule 
of the Communist Party can be ensured. This strategy of 
economic liberalism and political authoritarianism is, I 
believe, fatally flawed on at least two counts as demonstrated 
in the previous chapters:
Firstly, without making corresponding reforms in the 
political and ideological fields,.the economic reforms would be 
left unjustified and unprotected. Thus, the reform policies are 
always in danger of being challenged and even reversed. The 
conservative counter-offensive in the wake of the 1989 crisis 
bore this out most clearly. As mentioned above, the period from 
mid-1989 to 1991 saw the tightening of political and ideological 
control with the slogans of "opposing peaceful evolution" 
appearing in the newspapers on a daily basis; the "Proposal on 
the Ten Year Plan of the National Economy and Social 
Development" and the "Eighth Five Year Plan" passed by the 
Seventh Session of the Thirteenth Party Congress at the end of 
the year gave prominence to the principles of "adhering to 
independence, self-reliance, building up the country through 
thrift and hard work", the first most vigorous emphasis on these 
principles since the early 1980s; the publication of an 
alarmingly conservative article in People's Daily."The Situation 
of the World Economy and China's Economic Problems" by He 
Xin,393 in this the author criticized China's economic reforms 
since 1984 and held that foreign investment and capital were 
means of capitalist economic invasion which were harmful to the 
national economies of the developing and poor countries.394
Another article with an awkward title "Ask 'whether its 
surname is socialism or capitalism'" published in Guancrminq
393 A research fellow in the Chinese Institute of Social 
Sciences, who was one of a few intellectuals seen to be actively 
supporting the conservative counter-offensive after the June 
1989 Crisis.
394 See People's Daily. 11.12.1990.
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Daily in August 1991 has also summed up the ideological dilemma:
Our socialist revolution and construction are carried out 
under the circumstances of having a backward economic and 
cultural background and being surrounded by international 
capitalism. The objective social conditions, especially the 
level of productive forces, determines that the individual 
and private economy must be allowed to exist and develop to 
a certain extent. Having a positively.supplementary role to 
play though, their existence and development would 
unavoidably have a negative impact such as disrupting the 
socialist economy, giving rise to thoughts of the 
exploitative classes and even providing the ground for the 
emergence of the ideological and political representatives 
of the exploitative class. The development of the current 
world economy, science and culture also determines the 
necessity for us to open up to the outside world, absorbing 
foreign advanced technology, scientific managerial 
experience and progressive cultural achievements. 
Nevertheless, the international bourgeoisie, especially the 
hostile forces, would certainly make use of the opportunity 
to carry out ideological infiltration and exert both 
economic and political pressure on us. All of these are the 
unavoidable and objective contradictions existing on our 
road of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. We 
must, therefore, on the one hand, give play to the positive 
role of the individual and private economy, and on the 
other, restrict its negative impact. By the same token, we 
must on the one hand, persist and extend the opening-up, 
and on the other, resist the capitalist decadent ideology 
and life style. Without asking if it is surnamed socialism 
or capitalism, we can not keep sober-minded and deal with 
the contradictions properly.39*
Secondly, without reforming the unitary Leninist political 
system, which is dominated by personal authoritarian politics at 
the top leadership level, and without creating more autonomous 
institutions and more flexible procedures capable of brokering 
competing interests at the levels of international, bureaucratic 
and social politics, the tensions and conflicts created by
reforms and opening-up can easily iiytejisify or even explode, and
*
the political struggle among the top leadership ofl national 
developmental strategy and transfer of power on the death of 
Deng, Chen Yun and the other powerful octogenarians could still 
threaten the reform and opening-up policies.
395 Qin Si. ”Ask 'whether its surname is socialism or 
Capitalism'”, Guancrming Daily. 7.8.1991.
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/It is true that Deng's determination and great political 
tactics and skills have played an indisputably crucial role in 
keeping China's reform ,and opening-up on track. But ironically, 
the bigger the personal role Deng Xiaoping seems to play, the 
greater the worry there is. Deng Xiaoping was 88 years old in 
1992. The simple question is -what will- happen when Deng is 
gone? Deng Xiaoping's failure to arrange a credible and orderly 
plan for the transfer of power upon his death has been a source 
of worry and uncertainty about China's future development.
Of course, Deng's influence and power should not be over­
stated. The various factions that exist and the capabilities of 
the conservatives as described before mean that Deng has to 
manage to make his policies and views prevail through a lot of 
manoeuvring and even at times a struggle. As I have just 
described, it took Deng two to three years of efforts to get the 
reform and opening-up back onto the fast lane after the 1989 
crisis.
In brief, economic imperatives, the increasing 
interdependence between China's economy and the world economy 
and the changes in popular modes of thinking, all, in the long 
term, favour the continuation of China's reforms and opening-up, 
which will lead to a further development of China's market 
economy and the further integration of China into the world 
community. That is to say, the increasing interdependence is not 
only the result of the outward-looking development strategy but 
at the same time the driving force for further interdependence. 
However, the tension arising from the CCP's leadership's concern 
for preserving Chinese political identity while pursuing 
policies that deepen the interdependence between the Chinese 
society and the largely capitalist outside world has yet to be 
resolved. The orientation of China's future development will 
eventually be determined by internal developments. And the 
continued refusal to consider fundamental changes in political, 
institutional and ideological fields could still put the reform 
programme in jeopardy.
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